THE COURT OF APPEALS 
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 
TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO 
THOMAS G. BURNS, et al., : O P I N I O N 
Appellants, : 
CASE NOS. 2004-T-0071 
- vs - : and 2004-T-0072 
DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF : 
JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al., 
Appellees. 
: 
Administrative Appeals from the Court of Common Pleas, Case Nos. 03 CV 23 and 03 
CV 25. 
Judgment: Affirmed. 
Frederick G. Cloppert, Jr., William J. Steele and Rory P. Callahan, Gloppert, Latanick, 
Sauter & Washburn, 225 East Broad Street, Columbus, OH 43215 (For Appellants 
Thomas G. Burns and Perry McClain). 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Charlett Bundy, Assistant Attorney General, State 
Office Building, 11th Floor, 615 West Superior Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44113-1899 
(For Appellees, Director of Ohio Department of Job and Family Services and State of 
Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission). 
Barbara J. Leukart and Laura R. Anderson, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, North Point, 
901 Lakeside Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44114-1190 (For Appellees, General Motors). 
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J. 

{¶1} This case involves consolidated appeals by Thomas G. Burns and Perry 
McClain, on behalf of General Motors Corporation employees, (collectively 
“appellants”). This court consolidated the appeals sua sponte on July 27, 2004. 

Appellants appeal from a judgment of the Trumbull County Common Pleas Court 
affirming a decision of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission 
(“Review Commission”), in which it affirmed a determination by the Director of the Ohio 
Bureau of Employment Services, disallowing appellants’ claims for unemployment 
compensation benefits for the week ending July 4, 1998. 

{¶2} The following background facts are undisputed. In 1998, employees at 
General Motors Corporation (“GM”) facilities in Michigan went on strike. Eventually, the 
strike caused a shortage of parts at GM’s Trumbull County facilities. Production was 
halted and 8,136 employees (appellants within this appeal) were laid off. Appellants 
were on lay off status during the week ending July 4, 1998. Appellants filed for 
unemployment compensation, and were not recalled to return to work until sometime 
after August 1, 1998. 

{¶3} As a part of the settlement of the Michigan strike, GM and the United Auto 
Workers Union (“UAW”), entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) on July 
28, 1998. The MOU provided: 

{¶4} “MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ONE TIME SPECIAL PAYMENT” 

{¶5} “As a result of these negotiations and without prejudice to the position 
taken by either party, and without setting any precedent in the disposition of any other 
case involving similar circumstances, the parties agree to the following: 

{¶6} “Employees who were on strike or layoff status at General Motors 
locations due to the labor dispute at the Flint Metal Center and Delphi E. Flint East and 
who did not receive Independence Week Shutdown and Holiday Pay as a result of 
being on said layoff or strike and were otherwise entitled to these pay provisions as 
stipulated in the GM-UAW National Agreement, shall receive a one time special 
payment in the amount they would have been entitled to had they not been on strike or 
layoff. This payment will be made in an expeditious manner and taxed as a regular 
wage payment in accordance with Document No. 81 of the GM-UAW National 
Agreement. This payment shall initially be made by General Motors. Thereafter, 
payments otherwise required by Paragraph IIIA of the Memorandum of Understanding 
Joint Activities, 1996 GM-UAW National Agreement, shall be waived until General 
Motors is reimbursed for the total amount paid to employees as a result of this 
Memorandum. Further, the parties recognize that these payments may result in 
employees being ineligible for unemployment compensation already received. 
Employees impacted by such overpayment of unemployment compensation will be 
responsible to repay the State that provided the unemployment compensation.” 

{¶7} Appellants were advised of the holiday pay restoration, pursuant to the 
MOU, by union fliers distributed on August 5, 1998, and a UAW newsletter. Payments 
for the Independence Holiday Shutdown were made on August 13, or August 14, 1998, 
calculated to equal thirty-two hours of a claimant’s base salary for the period of June 29 
through July 3. Payment for the July 4th holiday made at the same time, represented 
eight hours at the same rate of pay as that of the same week. The replacement holiday 
pay was identified separately from regular wages on appellants’ pay stubs and was 
separately subjected to payroll taxes. All payments were subject to payroll withholding 
taxes. 

{¶8} Appellants became eligible to receive unemployment compensation 
benefits when they were laid off by GM, from the date each was laid off until he or she 
was recalled to work. GM subsequently objected to payment of benefits for the period 
June 29 through July 3, 1998, arguing that the one time special payment each claimant 
received pursuant to the MOU was remuneration that disqualified them from receiving 
benefits. On review, the Director of the Department of Job and Family Services 
(“Director”) agreed and disallowed benefits for the period June 29 through July 3, 1998. 

{¶9} Appellants and other claimants appealed the Director’s decision to the 
Review Commission. On December 12, 2002, the Review Commission rendered a 
decision disallowing benefits for the period concerned, pursuant to R.C. 4141.31(A)(5). 
In its decision, the Review Commission stated: 

{¶10} “The question to be determined by the Review Commission is whether the 
monies received by claimants are deductible as remuneration in the form of holiday pay. 
This special payment was negotiated by General Motors Corporation and the United 
Auto Workers. The weight of the evidence before the Review Commission is that the 
purpose of this payment was to replace the lost Independence Week Shutdown Period 
pay and Independence Holiday pay. Certain prerequisites for receiving this pay could 
not be met by employees because of the strikes and layoff situations existing at the 
time. In the negotiation process, it appears that the parties agreed to waive these 
impossible prerequisites and pay the unemployed workers a special payment calculated 
to make them whole for loss of the holiday payments. Deductions were made by the 
employer in the same manner as regular holiday payments would have been handled 
and employees received credit, including additional vacation entitlement, under the 
National Agreement for these monies. The circumstances which allowed the employer 
to recoup these monies via reduced contributions to another fund does not alter the 
nature of the payments. That the parties believed and intended these payments to 
replace the Independence Week Holiday pay is evidenced by Employer Exhibit #1, 
Shop Committee-Information Flyer, issued August 5, 1998, wherein the following 
statement was made: ‘Independence Week Holiday Pay. The International Union and 
Corporation have agreed to pay the negotiated settlement concerning the 
Independence Week Shutdown Week. This payment will be included in the regular 
payroll checks on August 14, 1998. Even though you only receive one check, taxes will 
be deducted from the individual amounts of the two weeks, as per your regular payroll 
tax status.’ Based upon the weight of the evidence before the Review Commission, it is 
held that the Director properly disallowed all claims for the weeks in issue because 
claimants received remuneration in the form of holiday pay or allowance in excess of 
their weekly benefit amount.” 

{¶11} Appellants appealed the Review Commission’s decision to the Trumbull 
County Court of Common Pleas. On May 20, 2004, the court entered a judgment entry 
affirming the decision of the Review Commission. Appellants filed a timely notice of 
appeal. In their consolidated appeal, appellants present five assignments of error for 
our review: 

{¶12} “[1.] The trial court erred in affirming the Decision of the Review 
Commission denying benefits to claimants because they were totally unemployed under 
Revised Code Section 4141.01(M). 

{¶13} “[2.] The trial court erred in affirming the decision of the Review 
Commission denying benefits to claimants because the one-time special payment was 
not holiday pay under section 4141.31(A)(5) and could not be allocated to the week 
ending July 4, 1998. 

{¶14} “[3.] The Trial Court erred in affirming the Decision of the Review 
Commission denying benefits to claimants because the special payment was not 
remuneration under Revised Code Section 4141.01(H). 

{¶15} “[4.] The Trial Court erred in affirming the Decision of the Review 
Commission denying benefits to claimant’s, where the special payment was a form of 
bonus, that could not be used to reduced benefits under Section 4141.31(A)(5). 

{¶16} “[5.] The Trial Court did not liberally construe under R.C. 4141.46 the 
Appellants’ claims for unemployment benefits.” 

{¶17} Appellants’ five assignments of error are intertwined and will be 
considered together. At the outset, it should be noted that, in Ohio, unemployment 
compensation is a statutory scheme governed by R.C. 4141. The standard of review in 
cases arising under Ohio’s Unemployment Compensation Statute is set forth in R.C. 
4141.282(H) and states as follows: “If a trial court, upon appeal of a decision of the 
commission, finds that the commission’s decision was “unlawful, unreasonable, or 
against the manifest weight of the evidence, it shall reverse, vacate, or modify the 
decision, or remand the matter to the commission.” The same standard applies to an 
appellate court’s review. 

{¶18} An appellate court may reverse the Unemployment Compensation Board 
of Review’s decision only if it is unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of 
the evidence. Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Services (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 694, at paragraph one of the syllabus. In Simon v. Lake Geauga Printing 
Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 41, the Supreme Court of Ohio reasoned that the Review 
Commission is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess the credibility of the 
witnesses. See, also, Shaffer v. State of Ohio Unemployment Rev. Comm., 11th Dist. 
No. 2003-A-0128, 2004-Ohio-6956; Boos v. Admr, Ohio Bur. of Unemployment 
Services, 11th Dist. No. 2003-T-0174, 2004-Ohio-6693. 

{¶19} In their first assignment of error, appellants argue that they were “totally 
unemployed” according to R.C. 4141.01(M), which provides as follows: “an individual is 
‘totally unemployed’ in any week during which the individual performs no services and 
with respect to such week no remuneration is payable to the individual.” Thus, “if a 
claimant either performs services, or receives remuneration, he is not unemployed 
within the foregoing statute.” In re DeLuca (June 19, 1979), 10th Dist. No. 79AP-28, 
1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 11570, at 7. See, also, Rini v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of 
Rev. (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 214, at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶20} Pursuant to R.C. 4141.01(H), “‘[r]emuneration’ means all compensation for 
personal services, including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all 
compensation in any medium other than cash[.]” 

{¶21} We note that subsequent to the filing of briefs, the Fifth District in Futey v. 
Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Services, 5th Dist. No. 04-CA-14, 2004-Ohio-5400, the 
Second District in Ashwell v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Services, 2nd Dist. No. 20522, 
2005-Ohio-1928, and the Tenth District in Nicolas v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family 
Services, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-771, 2005-Ohio-2635, all rendered decisions affirming 
trial court decisions that affirmed the Review Commission’s determination that GM’s one 
time special payment in August 1998 was holiday pay remuneration for the Fourth of 
July holiday. Thus, appellants were denied unemployment compensation benefits for 
the week ending July 4, 1998. We also note that the appellants in Futey appealed that 
decision, but the Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. 

{¶22} Here, the trial court found that the language of the MOU, as well as other 
factors, supported the Review Commission’s determination that the parties intended to 
have the one time special payment replace the lost Independence Week Holiday pay, 
and that it was properly allocated to the Independence Day Holiday week. The court 
concluded that “the determination of the Review Commission *** was lawful, 
reasonable, and not contrary to law.” The court found that the evidence, including 
stipulated facts in the record, supported the Review Commission’s determination that 
the parties to the MOU intended to have the one time special payment replace the 
Independence Day shutdown. The court further held that “the ODJFS believed as does 
this Court, that there is no evidence that appellants’ employers intended to make a gift 
of the one time ‘special payment’.” The court also found that the terms of the MOU 
“clearly set forth the employees obligation to re-pay any over payments to the state and 
that the payment may make them ineligible for benefits for the week in question.” In 
affirming the decision of the Review Commission, the court concluded that “this 
payment is indeed holiday pay and the contractual shutdown pay [a]ppellants would 
have received had they worked the obligated day before and after the holiday.” 

{¶23} Upon a review of the record in this case, we agree. Here, the MOU 
specifically referenced the fact that the one time special payment was for employees on 
strike or layoff status due to the Flint labor dispute “who did not receive Independence 
Week Shutdown and Holiday Pay as a result of being on said layoff or strike and were 
otherwise entitled to these pay provisions as stipulated in the GM-UAW National 
Agreement[.]” The MOU further provided that the parties “recognize that these 
payments may result in employees being ineligible for unemployment compensation 
already received.” 

{¶24} GM classified the 32-hour payments in its records as “MISCIWSP,” and 
the eight-hour payment as “MISCHOSP,” which the court in Futey reasonably 
interpreted as “miscellaneous independence week special pay” and “miscellaneous 
holiday special pay.” Futey at ¶21. 

{¶25} Appellants contend that no remuneration was “payable” to them during the 
week ending July 4, 1998, because they could not meet, under the national agreement, 
the prerequisites for receiving the payments, i.e., due to the strike, they were unable to 
work the scheduled workday prior to and following the shutdown period and holiday. 

{¶26} Appellants maintain that it was not until after the MOU was executed (on 
July 28, 1998) that any amount was payable and that GM “allocated” the payment to the 
week of August 9, 1998, when the checks were issued. Thus, appellants assert that the 
one time special pay cannot be allocated to the work week ending on July 4, 1998. 

{¶27} Appellants urge this court to follow the decision in General Motor’s Corp. 
v. Buckner (Mo.App. 2001), 49 S.W.3d 573, wherein a Missouri Court of Appeals held 
that unemployment compensation claims arising out the same circumstances should be 
paid. However, in Buckner, the court relied upon a statutory provision not present in 
Ohio’s Unemployment Statutory Scheme providing that “[v]acation pay and holiday pay 
shall be considered as wages for the week with respect to which it is payable.” 
Mo.Rev.St. 288.036.1. Ohio’s statutory scheme provides in part that “[r]emuneration in 
the form of holiday pay will be applied to the week during which the holiday occurs *** 
regardless of when such remuneration is actually received.” Ohio Adm.Code 4141-9- 
05. Further, we agree with the Buckner court that “[d]ue to the fact that the types of 
statutes involved in the various states are not uniform, but frequently divergent, we do 
not consider authorities from other jurisdictions decisive of this matter.” Id., at 759. 

{¶28} Under Ohio law, the date of allocation is not determined by the date on 
which the payment was received. Pursuant to R.C. 4141.31(A)(5), benefits otherwise 
payable for any week are to be reduced by the amount of remuneration a claimant 
receives with respect to “[v]acation pay or allowance payable under the terms of a labormanagement 
contract or agreement *** which payments are allocated to designated 
weeks.” 

{¶29} The Director is authorized to “[a]dopt rules with respect to the collection, 
maintenance, and disbursement of unemployment and demonstrative funds[.]” R.C. 
4141.13(C). Such rules must be approved by the Review Commission before they 
become effective. R.C. 4141.14(A). These rules are set forth at Ohio Adm.Code 4141- 

{¶30} Ohio Adm.Code 4141-9-04(B) provides in part: “[r]emuneration may be *** 
denominated by terms such as vacation pay or allowance, separation pay, holiday pay, 
paid absence allowance, downtime paid absence allowance, or short workweek pay.” 

{¶31} Ohio Adm.Code. 4141-9-05(A) further provides that “remuneration in the 
form of holiday pay will be applied to the week during which the holiday occurs as 
specified by state or national declaration, regardless of when such remuneration is 
actually received. If, however, there exists a written labor-management agreement to 
observe a holiday on a date other than the one specified by state or national 
declaration, the holiday pay will be applied to the week during which the date specified 
in the agreement occurs.” 

{¶32} In construing the above statutory provisions to the same stipulated facts 
as the instant case, the court in Ashwell, held in relevant part: “The Independence 
Week Shutdown pay period identified in the National Agreement is the period of 
Monday, June 29 through Thursday, July 2, 1998. One of the holidays for which 
payment is specified by the National Agreement is July 4, 1998. The July 4 holiday was 
observed on Friday, July 3 in 1998. The MOU provides that eligible employees ‘shall 
receive a one time special payment in the amount they would have been entitled to 
receive had they not been on strike or layoff’ during the Independence Week Shutdown 
and Holiday. Per O.A.C. 4141-9-05(A), the pay for the Independence Day holiday 
necessarily must apply to July 3, 1998, the last day of the Independence Week 
Shutdown and Holiday period that year.” Id. at ¶¶ 57-59. 

{¶33} Here, as in Ashwell and Nicolas, the one time special payment was 
apportioned and paid to employees, who, but for their inability to work the required 
prior and subsequent shifts due to the layoff, would have been entitled to receive 
Independence Week Shutdown and Holiday Pay in 1998. 

{¶34} Further, there was evidence supporting the Review Commission’s finding 
that the parties, through the MOU, agreed to waive certain prerequisites under the 
national agreement in order to provide these workers Independence Week Shutdown 
and Independence Day Pay. It is from the employment relationship that payment to the 
appellants arose. As a result of negotiation with the UAW, GM agreed that appellants 
would receive a payment that was intended to replace, in the same manner as the 
Independence Week Shutdown and Holiday Pay that appellants would have been 
eligible to receive for the week ending July 3, 1998, if the strike had not occurred and 
layoffs ensued. 

{¶35} We agree with the Ashwell court and Nicolas court that, under the facts of 
this case, the Review Commission could have reasonably concluded that the one time 
special payment was allocated to the Independence Week shutdown and Independence 
Day holiday, thereby constituting remuneration for purposes of R.C. 4141.31(A)(5) for 
the week ending July 4, 1998. 

{¶36} Appellants’ reliance on Akzo Salt, Inc. v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Services 
(1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 567, is misplaced. Unlike the case sub judice, in Akzo Salt, 
there was no evidence before the Review Commission of an MOU labor-management 
agreement that specifically allocated the payment to a designated week. 

{¶37} We further disagree with appellants’ claim that the one time payment was 
a “bonus,” that could not be used to reduce unemployment compensation pursuant to 
R.C. 4141.31(A)(5). Under “R.C. 4141.01(H)(2), a ‘bonus’ is a form of remuneration, 
[and] therefore, payment of a bonus renders an employee, even one who is laid-off, 
ineligible for benefits because he is not then unemployed.” Nicolas at ¶31, quoting 
Ashwell at ¶53. 

{¶38} Further, the express language of the MOU recognizes that both GM and 
the UAW were aware that appellant’s receipt of this payment would affect eligibility for 
benefits for the week ending July 3, 1998. The MOU stated in pertinent part: “The 
parties recognize that these payments may result in employees being ineligible for 
unemployment compensation ***.” At the Review Commission hearing, GM 
representative Cheryl Ollila testified that the purpose of the special one time payment 
was to make appellants whole for the Independence Week Shut down period, and the 
intent of the MOU’s phrase warning of ineligibility for unemployment benefits was: “[i]f it 
was determined by the state that they were ineligible as a result of an overpayment, 
they would have to pay this back.” Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that both the UAW 
and GM, as parties to the MOU, intended the one time special payment as replacement 
holiday pay and recognized that the payment may result in reduced eligibility of 
employee recipients for unemployment compensation. 

{¶39} Appellants further raise the contention that, if the payment actually 
constituted holiday pay, GM would have been required to pay claimants from its general 
revenue. Appellants maintain, instead, that GM was “excused” from payment of its 
contractual obligation to the Joint Activities Fund. 

{¶40} The court in Ashwell also addressed and rejected this argument, noting, 
“R.C. 4141.31(A)(5) takes no account of the source of vacation pay or allowances, so 
long as the amount is payable under the terms of a labor-management agreement and 
allocated to designated weeks.” Ashwell at ¶70. The court reasoned, “[r]eliance on the 
fact that the payment is the product of a labor-management agreement, as it was here, 
demonstrates that questions such as the source, amount, or payment terms are matters 
committed to the negotiating process, not ones that affect the application of R.C. 
4141.31(A)(5).” Id. 

{¶41} Similarly, the Review Commission found that “the circumstances which 
allowed the employer to recoup these monies via reduced contributions to another fund 
does not alter the nature of the payments.” 

{¶42} Appellants further contend that the Review Commission erred in relying 
upon evidence in the form of information contained in fliers distributed by the union and 
describing the payments as “Independence Week Shutdown.” Although appellants do 
not present a specific argument on this issue, the Ashwell court found that this 
contention involved a claim of inadmissible hearsay. Ashwell at ¶75. 

{¶43} The hearing officer is not bound by “common law or statutory rules of 
evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure.” R.C. 4141.28(J); Simon at ¶43. 
“The aim of this portion of R.C. 4141.28(J) is to avoid the rigid formality imposed by 
technical rules of evidence, while constructing an efficient method for ascertaining a 
claimant’s entitlement to unemployment compensation benefits.” Id. Therefore, 
hearsay evidence which is inadmissible in a court or hearing required to apply stringent 
rules of evidence, is admissible in the Review Commission’s hearings on whether to 
affirm or reverse a decision granting or denying unemployment benefits. Id. at ¶44. 

{¶44} We further find that it is undisputed that a local union representative 
distributed the flyer to union members. On this point, the Ashwell court held that the 
statements in the union flier qualified as non-hearsay admissions of a party-opponent 
under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(d), and the trial court properly viewed the admission of the flier 
as evidence of what the UAW, as appellants’ representative, thought and intended with 
respect to the MOU and one time special payments. Id. at ¶76. We agree. 

{¶45} Furthermore, as this court has previously stated “we are required to give 
great deference to the hearing officer’s findings of fact.” Boos at ¶22, citing Todd v. 
Admr, Ohio Dept. of Job and Family Services, 4th Dist. No. 03 CA 2894, 2004-Ohio- 
2185, at ¶26. Thus, it would be inappropriate to disregard the findings of the Review 
Commission because they are based partially on the union fliers. 

{¶46} Appellants’ final assignment of error is that the Review Commission failed, 
pursuant to R.C. 4141.46, to liberally construe R.C. 4141. 

{¶47} Although unemployment compensation statutes are to be liberally 
construed, neither the agency nor the trial court has a duty to construe facts more 
favorably to either party. Dailey v. Admr. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Services, 8th Dist. No. 
52633, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 5607. Further, “[a] direction to liberally construe a 
statute in favor of certain parties will not authorize a court to read into the statute 
something which cannot be reasonably be implied from the language of the statute.” 
Thomas v. Stringer, (May 27, 1995), 11th Dist. No. 5-127, 1975 Ohio App. LEXIS 8389, 
at 4, quoting Szekely v. Young (1963), 174 Ohio St. 213, 218. 

{¶48} This court recognizes the commitment of the UAW in its representation on 
behalf of the appellants. However, under Tzangas, we are unable to speculate as to the 
reason why appellants did not fully appreciate the terms of the MOU and that such 
payment may result in reduction of unemployment compensation benefits. 

{¶49} In its application of the statutes and regulations to the facts, we agree with 
the trial court that the Review Commission’s decision was not unreasonable, unlawful, 
or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, we do not find that the Review 
Commission violated the principle of R.C. 4141.46. 

{¶50} For the foregoing reasons, appellants’ five assignments of error are 
without merit. 

{¶51} The judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 
DONALD R. FORD, P.J., 
WILLIAM M. O’NEILL, J., 
concur.