STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 
LORAIN COUNTY AUDITOR, 
et al. 
Appellees 
v. 
OHIO UNEMPLOYMENT 
REVIEW COMMISSION, et al. 
C. A. No. 05CA008679 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 
ENTERED IN THE 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 
CASE No. 03CV136461 
Appellants 
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 
Dated: November 2, 2005 
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned 
has been reviewed and the following disposition is made: 
WHITMORE, Judge 

{¶1} Appellant, the Director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family 
Services has appealed the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas 
reversing the ruling of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review 
Commission (“Review Commission”) granting benefits to claimant Kristie L. 
Brinkman (“Brinkman”). This Court affirms. 

{¶2} Brinkman, a registered nurse working for the Lorain County 
Sheriff’s Department pursuant to an “intermittent employment contract,” filed for 
unemployment benefits on November 1, 2002, after exhausting her contract 
commitment of 1,000 hours. Subsequently, the Ohio Department of Job and 
Family Services (“ODJFS”) determined that Brinkman was entitled to benefits. 
Her employer, the Lorain County Auditor/Sheriff’s Department (Appellees) 
requested reconsideration of the decision and ODJFS affirmed the initial 
determination. Appellees appealed to the Review Commission and a hearing was 
held on July 23, 2003. 

{¶3} Upon hearing the evidence, the Review Commission awarded 
Brinkman unemployment compensation benefits. Pursuant to R.C. § 4141.282(H), 
Appellees appealed to the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court 
reversed the Review Commission’s ruling and vacated the award of benefits to 
Brinkman. ODJFS has timely appealed the trial court’s decision, asserting one 
assignment of error. 

II 

Assignment of Error Number One 
	“THE LORAIN COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN 
	REVERSING THE REVIEW COMMISSION’S FINDING THAT 
	CLAIMANT WAS DISCHARGED WITHOUT JUST CAUSE 
	AND THUS ELIGIBLE FOR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
	WHERE SUCH FINDINGS WERE LAWFUL, REASONABLE 
	AND SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE 
	RECORD.” 

{¶4} In his sole assignment of error, Appellant has argued that the trial 
court erred in reversing the Review Commission’s decision because its findings 
were lawful, reasonable and supported by the evidence. Specifically, Appellant 
has argued that Brinkman was separated from her employment through no fault of 
her own due to lack of work and therefore, the Review Commission’s award of 
benefits was lawful. We disagree. 

{¶5} It has been widely accepted that an “appellate court may only 
reverse an unemployment compensation eligibility decision by the Review 
Commission if the decision is unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest 
weight of the evidence.” Markovich v. Employers Unity, Inc., 9th Dist. No. 21826, 
2004-Ohio-4193, at ¶10, citing Tzangas v. Administrator, Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 696. In such cases, this Court is “required to focus on 
the decision of the Review Commission, rather than that of the common pleas 
court[.]” Id., citing Barilla v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 9th Dist. No. 
02CA008012, 2002-Ohio-5425, at ¶ 6. 

{¶6} In the case sub judice, the Review Commission based its grant of 
unemployment benefits on the determination that Brinkman had been separated 
from employment due to a lack of work. Appellant has echoed that argument in 
his briefs. Appellees have countered that Brinkman voluntarily entered into a 
fixed term contract for 1,000 hours per fiscal year. Therefore, Appellees argued, 
pursuant to O.A.C. 123:1-47-01(44), Brinkman was classified as an intermittent 
employee and simply not scheduled to work until the start of a new fiscal year. 

Accordingly, Appellees have argued Brinkman should not be eligible for 
unemployment benefits for the interim period. 

{¶7} In Ohio, an individual must be involuntarily unemployed to be 
eligible for unemployment compensation. R.C. 4141.29. Appellant has argued 
that although Brinkman voluntarily entered into a fixed term contract, she was not 
at fault for the term’s expiration and was therefore involuntarily unemployed. To 
support his position, Appellant has relied on Lexington Township Trustees v. 
Stewart (Mar. 17, 1986), 5th Dist. No. CA-6766, 1986 WL 3925. In Lexington 
Township Trustees, the Fifth District Court of Appeals held that “[t]he fact that the 
unemployment is the result of the expiration of a contract for employment is 
irrelevant[.]” Id. at *2, citing Mathieu v. Dudley (1967), 10 Ohio App.2d 169, 
174. Both the Seventh and Eighth Districts have adhered to this principle. See 
Case W. Res. Univ. v. Ohio Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 8th Dist. No. 81773, 
2003-Ohio-2047, at ¶5. 

{¶8} This Court rejects Appellant’s arguments and the rulings of the Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eighth Districts. We cannot agree that parties who knowingly enter 
into fixed term contracts become “involuntarily unemployed” at the expiration of 
the fixed term. It is our opinion that as a matter of statutory interpretation and 
public policy, such a conclusion runs contrary to the intent of the Unemployment 
Compensation Act (“Act”). 

{¶9} It has long been held in Ohio that the purpose of the Act is “to 
enable unfortunate employees, who become and remain involuntarily unemployed 
by adverse business and industrial conditions, to subsist on a reasonably decent 
level and is in keeping with the humanitarian and enlightened concepts of this 
modern day.” (Quotations omitted) Irvine v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review 
(1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17. Furthermore, the Act was intended to “‘provide 
financial assistance to an individual who had worked, was able and willing to 
work, but was temporarily without employment through no fault or agreement of 
his own.’” Id., quoting Salzl v. Gibson Greeting Cards (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 35, 
39. 

{¶10} First, we note that being without gainful employment at the 
conclusion of a fixed term contract does not constitute involuntary unemployment 
by adverse business conditions. See Irvine, 19 Ohio St.3d at 17. Rather, it is 
simply a position that the claimant put themselves in by agreeing to the fixed term 
contract, and a position that claimant was aware they would be in at the conclusion 
of the contract. This Court disagrees with the proposition that just because an 
individual reaches the extent of their fixed term contract, they necessarily must 
have been separated because of lack of work. See Case Western Reserve, at ¶5 
(stating “[i]n Ohio a presumption exists that the employee separated for lack of 
work”). 

{¶11} Secondly, we find the overarching policy of the Act is to protect 
those workers who find themselves without employment through no fault or 
agreement of their own, and to temporarily provide them with financial assistance 
until they are able to find adequate employment. See Irvine, 19 Ohio St.3d at 17. 
Such is not the case with regards to the expiration of fixed term contracts. In the 
case of an employee who finds herself temporarily without work due to the 
expiration of a fixed term contract voluntarily entered into, this Court declines to 
say that such unemployment is through no agreement of her own. In fact, the 
opposite is true; it is unemployment anticipated and agreed to by the employee, 
and therefore, we cannot conclude that such an employee is entitled to 
unemployment benefits. 

{¶12} We find it illustrative that Appellant cites Tzangas, Plakas & 
Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 694 for the proposition 
that the Act “does not exist to protect employees from themselves, but to protect 
them from economic forces over which they have no control.” Id. at 697. Here, 
Brinkman had a measure of control over the terms of her employment. She 
voluntarily entered into an agreement which limited her to 1,000 hours and she has 
made no argument that she didn’t know or understand the terms. That said, she is 
“no longer the victim of fortune’s whims, but is instead directly responsible for 
[her] own predicament.” Id. at 698. 

{¶13} Thirdly, we find that the rule adhered to by the Fifth, Seventh, and 
Eighth Districts is against public policy in that it infringes upon businesses’ 
freedom to contract with a potential employee for fixed term employment. 
Furthermore, it is foundational that businesses must be allowed to allocate their 
resources in the way that best serves their business judgment. Granting 
unemployment benefits to every worker who reaches the culmination of their fixed 
term contract would eviscerate the purpose and benefit of employers using fixed 
term contracts. This Court refuses to handcuff business in such a manner, and 
therefore cannot support the position held by our sister districts. 

{¶14} Finally, while it is crucial to the analysis to determine what the 
purpose of the Act is, we find it equally compelling to determine what the purpose 
of the Act is not. The Act is not legislation to “subsidize the vacation periods of 
those who know well in advance that they may be laid off for certain specified 
periods.” (Quotation omitted) Univ. of Toledo v. Heiny (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 143, 
146. In the instant matter, Brinkman was fully aware, pursuant to her contract, 
that she was limited to 1,000 hours per year. Additionally, the contract made it 
clear that Brinkman was required to complete a 2,000 hour probationary period. 
That being the case, Brinkman must have been or should have been aware that 
after completion of her first 1,000 hours, she would have a hiatus before being 
called back to complete her second 1,000 hour period. Essentially, it appears that 
Brinkman, through Appellant, is asking the State of Ohio to provide her with 
supplemental income during a known hiatus period, simply because she chose to 
enter into an agreement for such employment. See, generally, Id. This Court 
cannot agree with such a proposition. 

{¶15} Regardless of Appellant’s argument that the Court adopt the rulings 
of the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Districts, we find that the Review Commission’s 
decision granting Brinkman unemployment benefits was unlawful and 
unreasonable. There is competent and credible evidence in the record that 
Brinkman was never terminated, nor separated, nor laid off. Additionally, 
evidence exists that demonstrates that neither lack of work, nor lack of funds 
precipitated Brinkman’s lull in scheduled hours. 

{¶16} Captain John Reiber, administrative officer for the Lorain County 
Sheriff’s Department, testified that the jail had sufficient work and sufficient funds 
to pay registered nurses. Captain Reiber also testified that Brinkman was not 
“fired” as a result of her reaching the 1,000 hour plateau, she was not separated or 
terminated, and was not laid off in accordance with Ohio’s civil service laws. 
Additionally, Captain Reiber testified that Brinkman was never removed from the 
county payroll. Captain Reiber averred that the sole reason Brinkman was 
removed from the work schedule was she had reached the maximum allowable 
hours pursuant to her intermittent employment contract. 

{¶17} Based on the foregoing, we find that the Review Commission’s 
decision granting Brinkman unemployment benefits because her separation from 
employment was due to lack of work, was unlawful, unreasonable and against the 
manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Appellant’s sole assignment of 
error is without merit. 

III 

{¶18} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of 
the trial court is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed.