O P I N I O N

Rendered on March 21, 2006
Voorhees & Levy, LLC, and Howard S. Levy, for appellant.
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Patria V. Hoskins, for
appellee Director, Ohio Department of Job and Family
Services.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
SADLER, J.

{ś1} Appellant, All Star Personnel, Inc. ("All Star"), appeals from the April 28,
2005 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, in which that court
affirmed the decision of appellee, Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review
Commission ("the commission"), which determined that All Star is the successor-ininterest
to Gloria Sustar Agency, Inc. ("the Sustar Agency").

{ś2} This case began on December 24, 2001, when the director of the Ohio
Department of Job and Family Services ("ODJFS"), mailed to All Star a Determination of
Employer's Liability and Contribution Rate in which the director determined that All Star is
the successor-in-interest to the Sustar Agency. After the director refused to reconsider
the determination, All Star appealed to the commission, which conducted a hearing.

{ś3} The record from the proceedings before the commission reveals the
following facts. The Sustar Agency was a Cincinnati-based temporary employment
agency and was owned and operated by Gloria Sustar ("Mrs. Sustar"). By the beginning
of the year 2001, the Sustar Agency had accumulated unpaid unemployment
compensation premiums in excess of $300,000.

{ś4} After ODJFS notified the Sustar Agency that the monthly payments it had
been making were insufficient to adequately service the debt, and following notification
that the Ohio Attorney General's office would press for dissolution of the company, the
Sustar Agency filed a certification of dissolution on May 22, 2001. According to Mrs.
Sustar, the Sustar Agency ceased operations on May 19, 2001. When she filed the
certificate of dissolution with the Ohio Secretary of State, Mrs. Sustar submitted therewith
her own affidavit, in which she averred that the Sustar Agency held no personal property
in any county in Ohio.
{ś5} Prior to its dissolution, the Sustar Agency was a party to vendor contracts
with the city of Cincinnati ("the city") and the University of Cincinnati ("UC"), pursuant to
which the Sustar Agency provided temporary employees to those entities. The Sustar
Agency was one of only a few temporary employment agencies authorized by the city and
UC to provide such services to those entities. According to Mrs. Sustar, the contracts
with the city and UC were "transferred" on May 14, 2001, to All Star, a newly formed
entity owned by Mrs. Sustar's daughter, Lucy Sustar. However, the Sustar Agency billed
the city and UC for temporary services provided through May 18, 2001, the day before
the Sustar Agency ceased doing business. Beginning on May 20, 2001, All Star billed the
city and UC for provision of temporary services under the transferred contracts.

{ś6} Mrs. Sustar testified that her daughter, Lucy, resides in California. Pursuant
to a consulting contract, Mrs. Sustar and her husband, Frank, run All Star's day-to-day
operations. Mr. and Mrs. Sustar operate as a sole proprietorship under the fictitious
name "Professional Management Group of Cincinnati." In this capacity, they book
temporary placements and perform other day-to-day functions of All Star. This includes
oversight of all daily financial operations, such as paying temporary employees, making
deposits into All Star's operating account, and writing checks to themselves for their
services.

{ś7} According to Mrs. Sustar, though she and her husband now perform All
Star's daily operations, it was Lucy who secured the contracts with the city and with UC
through an application process. Mrs. Sustar testified that Lucy had worked for the Sustar
Agency since high school, and was knowledgeable about the temporary employment
business. Moreover, according to Mrs. Sustar, the Sustar Agency provided no startup
funding, equipment or furniture to All Star.

{ś8} At the commission hearing, Mrs. Sustar testified that, at the time it ceased
doing business, the Sustar Agency had over $30,000 in receivables and over $11,000 in
cash. On cross-examination, however, she admitted that she had averred otherwise in
her affidavit submitted with the certificate of dissolution, and had repeatedly denied to
ODJFS' auditors that the company had any cash or other assets at the time of its
dissolution.

{ś9} Following the hearing, the commission issued a decision, including findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The commission concluded that the Sustar Agency had
transferred its business to All Star and, therefore, All Star is liable as the successor-ininterest
to the Sustar Agency, pursuant to R.C. 4141.24(F). The commission affirmed the
ODJFS' director's decision on that basis.

{ś10} All Star timely appealed to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
which affirmed the commission's decision. All Star then filed the instant appeal, and
asserts one assignment of error for our review, as follows:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT
WAS A SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST PURSUANT TO
SECTION 4141.24(F) OF THE OHIO REVISED CODE.

{ś11} We begin our discussion by calling to mind the appropriate standard of
review. "The court [of common pleas] may affirm the determination or order complained
of in the appeal if it finds, upon consideration of the entire record, that the determination
or order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance
with law. In the absence of such a finding, it may reverse, vacate, or modify the
determination or order or make such other ruling as is supported by reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law." R.C. 4141.26(D)(2).

{ś12} In Kate Corp. v. Ohio State Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 10th Dist. No.
03AP-315, 2003-Ohio-5668, we set forth the standard of review applicable to this court as
follows:

[A]n appellate court's role in reviewing the order of an
administrative agency is more limited than that of a common
pleas court. This court does not weigh the evidence. Childs
v. Oil & Gas Comm. (Mar. 28, 2000), Franklin App. No. 99AP-
626, citing Lorain City Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd.
(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 257, 260-261, 533 N.E.2d 264. This
court determines only if the common pleas court abused its
discretion. Id. However, this court's review of questions of
law is plenary. Childs, supra, citing Univ. Hosp., Univ. of
Cincinnati College of Medicine v. State Emp. Relations Bd.
(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 339, 343, 587 N.E.2d 835.
Id. at ś7.

{ś13} Therefore, this appeal presents the question whether the court of common
pleas abused its discretion in affirming the commission's decision imposing successor-ininterest
liability upon All Star. When considering appeals involving questions of
successor-in-interest liability, this court has defined "abuse of discretion" as connoting
more than an error in judgment, but implying a decision that is without a reasonable basis
and clearly wrong. WLS Stamping Co., Inc. v. Admr., Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs. (Dec. 14,
1993), 10th Dist. No. 93AP-278, citing Angelkovski v. Buckeye Potato Chips Co. (1983),
11 Ohio App.3d 159, 11 OBR 242, 463 N.E.2d 1280.

{ś14} We begin with an examination of the relevant statute. Section 4141.24(F)
of the Ohio Revised Code provides:

If an employer transfers the employer's business or otherwise
reorganizes such business, the successor in interest shall
assume the resources and liabilities of such employer's
account, and continue the payment of all contributions, or
payments in lieu of contributions, due under this chapter. If
an employer acquires substantially all of the assets in a trade
or business of another employer, or a clearly segregable and
identifiable portion of an employer's enterprise, and
immediately after the acquisition employs in the employer's
trade or business substantially the same individuals who
immediately prior to the acquisition were employed in the
trade or business or in the separate unit of such trade or
business of such predecessor employer, then, upon
application to the director signed by the predecessor
employer and the acquiring employer, the employer acquiring
such enterprise is the successor in interest. * * *

{ś15} By the language of the statute, there are three methods by which a
business may acquire successor-in-interest status. Kate Corp., supra, at ś8. The second
and third methods, described by the second sentence of R.C. 4141.24(F), require that
both the predecessor employer and the acquiring employer submit an application for such
status to the director. Hartzell Propeller, Inc. v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs. (1989), 65 Ohio
App.3d 575, 578, 584 N.E.2d 1263. Because neither the Sustar Agency nor All Star
made such application, the second and third methods do not apply.

{ś16} The first method of acquiring successor-in-interest status is by operation of
law, and is described in the first sentence of R.C. 4141.24(F). Pursuant to this first
method, successor-in-interest status arises automatically upon the transfer of the entire
business of the predecessor. Makkas v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev. (1985), 18 Ohio
St.3d 349, 350, 18 OBR 389, 481 N.E.2d 603. See, also, Apex Smelting Co. v. Cornell
(1955), 164 Ohio St. 369, 371-372, 58 O.O. 153, 130 N.E.2d 817; In re Lord Baltimore
Press, Inc. (1965), 4 Ohio St.2d 68, 33 O.O.2d 436, 212 N.E.2d 590; Readmate
Automotive Sys., Inc. v. Bd. of Rev., Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs. (Jan. 8, 1982), 10th Dist.
No. 81AP-344; Hospitality Health Care of Bowling Green, Inc. v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of
Rev. (Mar. 5, 1991), 10th Dist. No. 90AP-1276.

{ś17} In the present case, the court of common pleas determined that reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence existed in the record to support the commission's
finding that the Sustar Agency had transferred its entire business to All Star and, that, as
a result, All Star became the successor-in-interest to the Sustar Agency by operation of
law. Specifically, the Sustar Agency transferred its vendor contracts to All Star, with no
discernible interruption of the furnishing of temporary employees to the city and to UC.
Moreover, Mrs. Sustar and her husband continue to maintain nearly exclusive control
over all day-to-day aspects of All Star's business operations, just as they formerly did with
respect to the Sustar Agency.

{ś18} The court recognized that Mrs. Sustar had provided conflicting evidence on
the issue of whether the Sustar Agency held any cash or assets, other than the vendor
contracts, at the time of its dissolution. In her affidavit submitted with the Sustar Agency's
certificate of dissolution she averred that the company had no assets; in her testimony at
the hearing, she maintained that the company did have cash and accounts receivable
following its dissolution. She repudiated her earlier sworn statement by stating that she
did not understand what the affidavit meant when she signed it. Despite this conflicting
evidence, the trial court found that reliable, probative, and substantial evidence existed in
the record to support the commission's conclusion that the Sustar Agency had no assets
following its dissolution and, thus, had transferred its entire business to All Star.

{ś19} On appeal, appellant argues that the court should have discounted the
affidavit evidence and should have focused instead on Mrs. Sustar's testimony.
Appellant's position is that if the Sustar Agency failed to transfer its cash and receivables
to All Star, then the Sustar Agency cannot be said to have transferred its business in toto,
and All Star cannot be said to be the successor-in-interest by operation of law.

{ś20} In response, the commission argues that Mrs. Sustar's self-serving
testimony at the commission hearing does not overweigh or render insubstantial her
earlier affidavit and the multiple occasions upon which she unequivocally told
investigators that the Sustar Agency held no assets upon dissolution. Specifically, the
record reveals that, during a 2001 meeting with ODJFS' auditors, at which her counsel
was present, Mrs. Sustar repeatedly stated that the Sustar Agency had no assets. The
commission argues that the court was not required to reject the commission's reliance
upon this evidence simply because Mrs. Sustar told a different story at the hearing. We
agree.

{ś21} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held, "the Court of Common Pleas must
give due deference to the administrative resolution of evidentiary conflicts. For example,
when the evidence before the court consists of conflicting testimony of approximately
equal weight, the court should defer to the determination of the administrative body,
which, as the fact-finder, had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
and weigh their credibility." Univ. of Cincinnati v. Conrad (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 108, 111,
17 O.O.3d 65, 407 N.E.2d 1265. See, also, Leon v. Ohio Bd. of Psychology (1992), 63
Ohio St.3d 683, 687, 590 N.E.2d 1223.

{ś22} We perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding that the
commission's decision was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
demonstrating that the Sustar Agency transferred its entire business to All Star, thereby
rendering All Star the successor-in-interest to the Sustar Agency, pursuant to R.C.
4141.24(F). Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole assignment of error and affirm the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

KLATT, P.J., and FRENCH, J.