CIPARICK, J.:

This is an appeal by employees of Barnard College from an order of the Appellate Division which affirmed a determination of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board that denied them benefits. The employees had gone on strike against Barnard six weeks before the end of the spring semester in 1996. They claim that the Appeal Board, in denying them unemployment insurance benefits, improperly relied on Labor Law § 590 (11), which prohibits payment of benefits during an academic recess or holiday if the employee has a “reasonable assurance” of employment for the following academic term. Petitioners contend that Labor Law § 590(11) has no application here as they were not on academic recess, but on strike. In their view, only Labor Law § 592 applies. The section suspends unemployment insurance benefits for a period of seven weeks in the event of a strike. We disagree with petitioners and conclude that under the circumstances presented Labor Law sections 590(11) and 592 can be harmonized, and that § 592 does not preclude the application of § 590(11).

Nevertheless, we conclude that it was error for the Appeal Board and the Appellate Division to rely on the parties' expired collective bargaining agreement through the operation of the "Triborough Doctrine." They used this public employee doctrine to support the conclusion that each claimant had a "reasonable assurance” of fall semester employment. Since this constitutes an error of law in arriving at the decision, we remit for consideration of the "reasonable assurance" question, free of reliance on the expired collective bargaining agreement.

Petitioners were employed by Barnard College during the 1995/1996 academic year in various non-professional capacities, including desk attendant positions. All petitioners were members of Technical Office and Professional Union Local 2110, UAW, AFL- CIO (Union). The parties operated under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which prohibited Barnard from terminating petitioners without good cause. The CBA expired on December 31, 1995. According to the CBA, petitioners were designated as hourly wage, permanent employees of Barnard. Some had been employed by the college for over ten years. Barnard worked on a traditional two-semester system, fall and spring, and although the school had a summer session, petitioners were not required to work during the summer. In past years, Barnard inquired as to who among the desk attendants would be interested in working during the summer and also typically sent letters to those in desk attendant positions informing them of when they were expected to report to work in the fall. Barnard did not send such letters to the non-desk attendants.

During 1996, the Union and Barnard attempted to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement. Failing to reach agreement, however, petitioners struck on February 22, but returned to work on March 5. On March 15, Barnard sent a letter to all desk attendants, inquiring as to who would be interested in working during the summer session and that such assignments would be made based on seniority.

With no new agreement, petitioners again struck on April 10, six weeks before the end of the spring semester. The strike lasted until September 13, approximately one month into the fall semester. During the strike, Barnard did not send letters to the desk attendants regarding work during the fall semester. Barnard was under the impression that communicating directly with the striking employees would have violated the National Labor Relations Act.

In late May and early June 1996, petitioners filed for unemployment insurance benefits. Labor Law § 592 provides that for unemployment due to an industrial controversy, including a strike, “benefit rights * * * shall be suspended during a period of seven consecutive weeks beginning with the day after” the employee lost employment due to the strike (Labor Law § 592[1]). The local unemployment insurance office determined that benefits were appropriate. Barnard, however, objected and requested a hearing on the ground that Labor Law § 590(11) precluded benefits. Section 590(11) prohibits payment of benefits to non- professional employees of educational institutions for “any week commencing during the period between two successive academic years or terms provided there is a reasonable assurance that the claimant will perform services in such capacity for any such institution or institutions for both of such academic years or terms” (emphasis added). As relevant to petitioners, the benefit calculation rules that apply where there is “reasonable assurance” of employment for the following semester require that the wages during the past academic year -- on which unemployment insurance benefits are based -- must be disregarded. In other words, no unemployment insurance benefits can be distributed to a claimant, still employed, but on summer break.

After a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) overruled Barnard's objections and held that for all petitioners “there must be an affirmative expression of intent to rehire made to the claimants in order to establish the [reasonable] assurance.” In the ALJ's view, although an actual letter was not required, the evidence and testimony failed to establish that such an affirmative expression had been communicated to the petitioners to support a finding of “reasonable assurances.”

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board disagreed and reversed the ALJ's determination. Based on the record before the ALJ, it concluded that each claimant had a “reasonable assurance” of employment for the fall semester because (1) claimants were considered permanent and not temporary employees; (2) as a matter of past practice, claimants historically had “a right to return to work at the start of the fall semester”; (3) the terms of the expired CBA continued in effect by virtue of the “Triborough Doctrine” (see, Matter of La Mountain, , 51 NY2d 318), thus supporting their right to return to work for the fall semester; and (4) during the strike, although Barnard had the right under Federal law to hire replacement workers, it took no steps to do so.

On petitioners' appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed. It noted that issue “distil[led] to whether claimants received 'reasonable assurance' of employment” (259 2 907, 908), and concluded that past practices as well as the expired CBA which remained in effect until a new one was negotiated, gave claimants the requisite “reasonable assurance” of fall semester employment. We granted petitioners leave to appeal and reverse because of the error of law in applying the "Triborough Doctrine" to this private sector labor-management dispute.

Petitioners primarily contend that Labor Law § 11) and § 592 cannot be reconciled, and that only § 592 applies here. We disagree. It is true that the two statutory provisions address different situations, with § 590(11) guarding against the distribution of unemployment insurance benefits merely because employment was interrupted by an academic recess and with § 592 maintaining the “principle of government neutrality” in the face of an industrial controversy by suspending benefits for seven weeks if the claimant-worker is unemployed due to a strike (Matter of Heitzenrater v Hooker Chem. Co., , 19 NY2d 1, 7 [citations omitted]). This case, however, gives us both situations, and nothing in the statutes themselves, the unemployment insurance legislative scheme, or the legislative history of these statutes suggests that one is to have primacy over the other. Expressed another way, “[i]t is not the function of the court * * * to declare one statute the victor over another if the statutes may be read together, without misdirecting the one, or breaking the spirit of the other” (Matter of Foley v Bratton, , 92 NY2d 781, 787; see, Morris Plan Indus. Bank of N.Y. v Gunning, 295 NY 324, 330-331; Matthews v Matthews, 240 NY 28, 36).