JOSE G. SANTIAGO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondent-Respondent,
and PLUS OF NEW JERSEY, a/k/a PROGRESSIVE LIVING UNITS,
Respondent.

_________________________________________________

Argued March 7, 2006 - Decided March 22, 2006 Before Judges Skillman and Payne. On appeal from a Final Decision of the Board of Review, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 51-279.

Jose G. Santiago, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

John C. Turi, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General, attorney; Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, Mr. Turi on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Petitioner Jose Santiago, who was formerly employed by respondent Plus of NEW JERSEY as a life skills trainer working with brain-damaged individuals, appeals from a final agency decision that found him disqualified from receipt of unemployment benefits on the ground that he had left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work because he had failed to exhaust all reasonable opportunities to resolve problems with his employer before leaving. We affirm.

The record demonstrates that Santiago worked for Plus of NEW JERSEY from May 1999 to April 29, 2004, when he quit his employment without notice because his immediate supervisor, Gus Dweh, had failed to timely provide him with his yearly evaluation. Although Santiago had spoken to Dweh's supervisor, Lauren Ditzel, regarding the missing evaluation, he did not contact the company's human resources department or request in writing that an evaluation be prepared, as company policy dictated. He instead quit.

At the hearing in the matter, Santiago testified that he sought the evaluation in order to qualify for a raise. However, he also testified that the lack of a raise would not have caused him to resign, and that his resignation was precipitated solely by the absence of a timely evaluation. Santiago stated that in November 2003, he notified Ditzel that his evaluation had not been received. According to Santiago, Ditzel contacted Dweh and ordered one to be prepared. Santiago was then absent from work for approximately three months as the result of a work-related accident occurring in mid-December. Upon his return in April 2004, Santiago again spoke to Ditzel regarding the missing evaluation, and he reportedly was assured by her that he would receive a raise as soon as the evaluation was completed. When the evaluation was not forthcoming, on April 29, 2004, Santiago notified Dweh that he was resigning at the end of his shift. The company's Human Resource Administrator, Tanya Fowler, testified that she was unaware until the date of the unemployment hearing that Santiago had not received an evaluation, and that its absence caused him to leave the employment of Plus of NEW JERSEY.

Following the hearing in the matter, the hearing officer held Santiago ineligible for unemployment benefits. Santiago appealed the decision to the Appeal Tribunal, which in a decision dated November 30, 2004 affirmed the determination of the hearing officer that Santiago was disqualified for unemployment benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5a, but modified the determination to establish the inception of the disqualification as April 25, 2004. In its decision of January 27, 2005, the Board of Review affirmed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal on the basis of the record below.

We affirm substantially on the basis of the decision of the Appeal Tribunal as adopted by the Board of Review. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) disqualifies a petitioner from receipt of unemployment benefits for a specified period after the petitioner has "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work." The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that his departure from employment was, in fact, for good cause. Morgan v. Bd. of Review, 77 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 1962); N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c).

A showing sufficient to establish good cause has been construed as requiring evidence that the petitioner was "compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances" to leave his employment. Domenico v. Labor & Indus. Dept. Review Bd., 192 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983). "[I]t is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." Ibid.; see also Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 214-15 (1997); N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) (stating that good cause "means a reason related directly to the individual's employment which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment."). The Board of Review found that Santiago had failed to meet his burden.

We decline to disturb that decision, finding it to have been reasonably based upon sufficient credible evidence present in the record. Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210.

On appeal, Santiago presents a factual basis for his decision to quit that is different from that set forth in his hearing testimony. We decline to consider on appeal this unsworn evidence, which was not a part of the hearing record and was not tested by cross-examination at that time, as grounds for reversal. Middle Dep't Insp. Agency v. The Home Ins. Co., 154 N.J. Super. 49, 56 (App. Div. 1977), certif. denied, 76 N.J. 234 (1978). We also find no reversible error to have occurred as the result of the Appeal Tribunal's determination not to subpoena Santiago's employment file and to review documents contained in it regarding "pay increments (raises and retraction of raises)." A subpoena will only be issued in an Appeal Tribunal or other proceeding upon a showing of necessity for the information requested. N.J.A.C. 1:12A-11.1(b). Santiago did not establish at the hearing that the failure of Plus of NEW JERSEY to grant him a raise constituted a reason for quitting his employment. Moreover, since there is no evidence that the company was contractually obligated to provide a raise, any failure to do so would not constitute good cause. Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 214; DeSantis v. Bd. of Review, 149 N.J. Super. 35, 38 (App. Div. 1977). Santiago's personnel file was thus irrelevant to the proceedings.

Affirmed.