ANN T. SCHWARTZ
v.
UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE COMMISSION et al.
CLIFFORD, J.
[¶1] Ann T. Schwartz appeals from a judgment
of the Superior Court (Hancock County, Mead, J.) affirming the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Commission in
which the Commission concluded that Schwartz is not entitled to receive
unemployment benefits because her former employer, the Maine Sea Coast
Missionary Society (the Mission), is exempt from unemployment taxation pursuant
to 26 M.R.S. § 1043(11)(F)(21)(a) (2005). Schwartz contends that she should be entitled to benefits
because (1) the Mission is not operated primarily for religious purposes, and
(2) the Mission is not principally supported by an association of
churches. Although the Commission
did not err in concluding that the Mission is operated for religious purposes,
because the findings of the Commission that the Mission is principally
supported by an association of churches are not sufficiently clear, we vacate
the judgment of the Superior Court and remand for the Commission to clarify its
decision.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The Mission is a nonprofit organization
serving coastal communities. Eight
of its staff members are ordained members of the clergy who serve as pastors
for island congregations. Gary
DeLong, an ordained minister, serves as the executive director of the
Mission. He describes the
Mission's programs as being "at the very heart of the essence of the religious
enterprise." DeLong, as well as
many of the Mission's employees, view their work as a form of ministry and as
doing the work of the church.
[¶3] The Mission provides programs to coastal
communities to demonstrate "God's love and compassion to marginalized
people in the area [it] serve[s]."
The Mission was founded as an inclusive Christian ministry, and,
over the years, it has never downplayed its Christian roots. More than fifty percent of its income
comes from individual donors, who contribute to the organization because
of its Christian nature. The
Mission also receives contributions of money and services from ninety-six
churches. It is affiliated
with both the United Church of Christ and the American Baptist Congregation.
The Mission's employees are eligible for United Church of Christ
benefits, including its pension, healthcare, and retirement plans, except
that its Baptist clergy are instead eligible for American Baptist Congregation
benefits.
[¶4] The Mission provides various religious
and secular services to the coastal communities. One featured program is the telemedicine program, which uses
a boat named the "Sunbeam" to bring a nurse to the islands to care for those
who cannot afford other health services.
The Sunbeam also transports ministers to the islands to lead religious
services and to provide counseling.
Additionally, the Mission sponsors an after‑school program in
Washington County. The program
does not teach religious doctrine directly, but it does emphasize character
building, leadership, and academic achievement. The Mission also runs a used clothing shop and food pantry,
as well as a church revitalization program.
[¶5] In May of 2000, the Mission hired
Schwartz to serve as its director of development. In December of 2002, the Mission terminated Schwartz's employment,
following which Schwartz sought unemployment benefits from the State.[1]
Schwartz's application was initially approved by a Commission field
supervisor. The Mission appealed
from this decision, and the Tax Section manager overturned the field supervisor's
determination and found Schwartz to be ineligible for unemployment benefits.[2]
[¶6] Schwartz appealed the decision of the
Tax Section manager to the Division of Administrative Hearings. A Division hearing officer issued a
decision finding that Schwartz was not eligible for unemployment benefits based
on her insufficient wages.
Schwartz then appealed to the Commission. See 26 M.R.S.
§ 1194 (2005). Following a
hearing, the Commission denied benefits to Schwartz based on its finding,
pursuant to section 1043(11)(F)(21)(a), that the Mission is: (1) a church
organization; (2) operated primarily for religious purposes, because,
although not all of its programs involve religious teachings, they are for
religious purposes and are part of the Mission's religious activities and
religious programs; and (3) principally supported by an association of
churches.
[¶7] Schwartz petitioned for review of the
Commission's decision in the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C. The court affirmed the Commission's
findings that the Mission is both operated for religious purposes and
principally supported by an association of churches. The court concluded, however, that the Commission erred as a
matter of law in finding that the Mission is a church organization exempt from
employer contributions pursuant to the first prong of 26 M.R.S. §
1043(11)(F)(21)(a).[3] Schwartz appealed to this Court.
II.
Discussion
[¶8] When an appeal is taken from a decision
of the Superior Court, acting as an intermediate appellate court, we review a
final Unemployment Insurance Commission decision "directly to determine whether
there exists any competent evidence to support the agency findings and then
ascertain whether upon those findings the applicable law has been correctly applied." Lewiston Daily Sun v. Unemployment
Ins. Comm'n, 1999 ME 90, ¶ 7, 733 A.2d 344,
346 (quotation marks omitted). We
will not overrule findings of fact supported by competent evidence, and where
the appellant is the party with the burden of proof before the Commission, we
will not disturb a decision of the Commission on issues of fact, unless the
record before the Commission compels a contrary result. Id.
[¶9] The Commission's findings of fact will
be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Gulick v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 452 A.2d 1202, 1207-08 (Me. 1982). Moreover, "we defer to an agency in those areas within its
expertise unless a statute or regulation compels a contrary result." Green v. Comm'r of the Dep't
of Mental Health, Mental Retardation & Substance Abuse Servs., 2001 ME 86, ¶ 9, 776 A.2d 612, 615; see
also Imagineering, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 593 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Me. 1991) ("On questions involving the
interpretation and application of technical statutes or regulations, this court
gives deference to the administrative agency unless the statutes or regulations
plainly compel a contrary result.").
[¶10] Findings required by statute must be
stated with sufficient specificity to permit understanding and meaningful
appellate review. 5 M.R.S. § 9061
(2005); 1 M.R.S. § 407(1) (2005); Hannum v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 123, ¶ 12, 832 A.2d 765,
769. Findings may be insufficient
if they merely state a conclusion using the terms of the relevant statute. See Bayley v. Bayley, 602 A.2d 1152, 1154 (Me. 1992); In re
Amber B., 597 A.2d 937, 938 (Me. 1991).
A. Operated
Primarily for Religious Purposes
[¶11] Schwartz contends that the Commission
erred in finding that the Mission is operated primarily for religious purposes
within the meaning of 26 M.R.S. § 1043(11)(F)(21)(a). We disagree. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the
finding that the Mission's purposes are primarily religious, including: (1) the
Sunbeam, a boat prominently featuring a cross on its hull, brings pastors to
island communities to lead religious services and to provide religious
counseling; (2) the Mission pays ministers' salaries in conjunction with
coastal and island churches; (3) the Mission offers a Christmas program; (4)
the executive director of the Mission is an ordained minister whose ministry is
an authorized ministry of the Maine Conference of the United Church of Christ;
and (5) eight of the Mission staff members are clergy who have come from the
Baptist and Congregational tradition.
[¶12] The fact that an organization has a
charitable purpose and does charitable work does not require the conclusion
that its purposes are not primarily religious pursuant to section 1043. Cf. Salvation Army v. Town of
Standish, 1998 ME 75, ¶ 5, 709 A.2d
727, 729 (holding that a charitable organization's religious purposes will not
remove it from the purview of a property tax exemption); see also
Kendall v. Dir. of the Div. of Employment Sec.,
473 N.E.2d 196, 199 (Mass. 1985) (holding that a center for mentally
retarded children established by the Sisters of St. Francis of Assisi was
exempt from unemployment taxation, and emphasizing that allowing children of
any religious belief to enroll in the program was consistent with its purpose
to promote the spiritual, social, and physical welfare of mentally retarded
children).
[¶13]
The Mission was originally
established to help build congregations on the islands, to bring pastors to the
islands, and to provide services to the island communities. Even as the Mission has adopted new
ways to meet the needs of the communities it serves, it has maintained its
religious emphasis and function.
The fact that the Mission provides health care to islanders and an
after-school program for students does not diminish its continuing religious
purpose. The Commission's finding
that the Mission is operated primarily for religious purposes is not clearly
erroneous.
B. Principally Supported
by an Association of Churches
[¶14] Schwartz also contends that the
Commission's finding, pursuant to section 1043(11)(F)(21)(a), that the Mission
is principally supported by an association of churches is erroneous for two
reasons. First, Schwartz argues
that the only criteria that should be used to determine and measure the term
"supported" within the meaning of the statute is financial. She contends that the direct financial
support the Mission receives from churches, totaling only $26,000 of the
Mission's $1.7 million annual budget, is insufficient to justify the
Commission's finding that the Mission is principally supported by an
association of churches.
[¶15] The language of section
1043(11)(F)(21)(a) leads to a conclusion that financial support is not the only
kind of support that may be considered in determining whether an organization
is "principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches"
pursuant to section 1043. "The
cardinal rule of statutory construction is that when the words of the
Legislature are clear, they are to be given their plain meaning and further
judicial interpretation is not necessary." Bureau of Employee Relations v. Me. Labor Relations Bd., 611 A.2d 59, 61 (Me. 1992). The language of the statute does not
restrict the meaning of "principally supported" to direct financial support, and
the Commission did not err when it construed "support" to include more than
just financial support. Support
may also include contributed goods and services, and organizational backing and
support. Thus, the Commission's
interpretation of section 1043 is not contrary to its plain language and is not
erroneous.
[¶16] Schwartz also challenges the
Commission's factual finding that the Mission is "principally supported" by an
"association of churches," and argues that there is insufficient evidence in the
record that the ninety-six churches that do provide financial support to the
Mission constitute an "association of churches" within the meaning of the
statute. Schwartz also contends
that even if support is not limited to financial support, the evidence of
support is insufficient. We
disagree. The churches providing
support can be said to be an association of churches, and because support
within the meaning of section 1043(11)(F)(21)(a) is not limited to financial
support, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the evidence in the record
is insufficient to justify a finding that the Mission is principally supported
by an association of churches.
[¶17] Nevertheless, the Commission's finding
on the "principally supported" issue is flawed because it is in reality a
restatement in conclusory form of the terms of the governing statute. Following this conclusory statement,
the Commission's decision cited some of the evidence in the record which
indicated that more than fifty percent of the Mission's income is derived from
endowments given mostly by individuals motivated by the fact that it is a
Christian organization,[4]
that Baptist and Congregational churches provide financial support to the
Mission, that ninety‑six churches donated money or services to the
Mission, and that those financial contributions totaled about $26,000. Aside from these financial
contributions, the Commission's findings make no mention of the services on
which the Commission relies in concluding that the Mission is principally supported
by an association of churches.
Moreover, there was no mention of "services or in-kind services"
provided, including the loaning of personnel, and the services flowing from the
Mission's affiliation with churches, such as the use of a pension program, as
well as the value of participation in church meetings and conventions, and the
churches' encouragement of donations from their own parishioners. On remand, the Commission should
therefore articulate the extent to which the provision of such services to the
Mission was a factor in its conclusion that the Mission is principally
supported by an "association of churches."
[¶18] Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of
the Superior Court and remand to the Superior Court with instructions to remand
to the Commission in order for the Commission to clarify its decision, and
determine anew whether the Mission is "principally supported by . . . [an]
association of churches" pursuant to 26 M.R.S. § 1043(11)(F)(21)(a).
The
entry is:
Judgment
vacated. Remanded to the Superior
Court with instructions to remand to the Unemployment Insurance Commission for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DANA, J., with
whom CALKINS, J., joins, dissenting.
[¶19] Although I agree we must vacate,
because the record does not and could not support a finding that the Mission is
"principally supported by . . . [an] association of churches," I would remand
and direct a judgment for the plaintiff.
First, there is no evidence that the ninety-six churches are an association
(unless every time multiple churches give money to an entity they become an
"association") and, there is undisputed evidence that the Mission is
principally supported by funds currently contributed by individuals and by
income from funds previously contributed by individuals (endowments). Second, there is no evidence in the
record from which the Commission, on remand, could value the "goods and
services" provided by the ninety-six churches or by the two national entities
(again assuming that the churches and the entities form an "association"). Finally, there is no evidence from
which the Commission could possibly divine the extent to which advocacy by the
ninety-six preachers in the ninety-six churches motivated the donors of the
current gifts and the endowment funds.
For all these reasons, I would not invite the Commission to do the
impossible, and would remand with instructions to award the plaintiff her
unemployment benefits.
Attorneys for plaintiff:
Arthur J. Greif, Esq. (orally)
Julie D. Farr, Esq.
Gilbert & Greif, P.A.
P.O. Box 2339
Bangor, ME 04402-2339
Attorneys for defendants:
G. Steven Rowe, Attorney
General
Elizabeth J. Wyman, Asst.
Atty. Gen. (orally)
Pamela W. Waite, Asst. Atty.
Gen.
6 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333-0006
Kevin M. Cuddy, Esq. (orally)
Cuddy & Lanham
470 Evergreen Woods
Bangor, ME 04401
(for Maine Sea Coast
Missionary Society)
* Justice Paul L. Rudman participated in the initial conference, but retired before this opinion was certified.
[1] In 2001, the Mission published a personnel handbook that incorrectly stated that unemployment insurance was provided to employees. That provision has since been deleted from the handbook.
[2] In order to be eligible to receive unemployment benefits, a claimant must have earned wages for insured work, which is defined as "employment by employers." 26 M.R.S. §§ 1043(15), 1192(5) (2005). Pursuant to section 1043, however, "employment" does not include:
(21) Service performed in the employ of any organization which is excluded from the term "employment" as defined in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act solely by reason of section 3306(c)(7) or (8) if:
(a) Service performed in the employ of a church or convention or association of churches, or an organization which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches . . . .
26 M.R.S. § 1043(11)(F)(21)(a) (2005).
[3] The Mission does not challenge the Superior Court's conclusion that the Mission is not a church within the meaning of 26 M.R.S. § 1043(11)(F)(21)(a), and we do not address it.
[4] The Commission's findings do not indicate the extent to which the Commission considered the individual endowments to have resulted from efforts of churches in encouraging or exhorting numbers to contribute to the Mission.