REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 5848
September Term, 1998
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
LICENSING AND REGULATION, ET AL.
v.
EDWARD J. WOODIE
Davis,
Eyler,
Thieme,
JJ.
Opinion by Thieme, J.
Filed: October 1, 1999
#12C9832271
The Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation ("DLLR" or
the "Department") and Richard B. Rudy, Inc. (the "employer" or
"Rudy"), appeal the December 1, 1998, order of the Circuit Court
for Harford County remanding this case to a DLLR Hearing Examiner
"for the purposes of taking additional evidence and testimony."
The Department and the employer each noted a timely appeal to this
Court and present the following question:
Did the circuit court err in remanding this
case for a "supplemental hearing" to allow the
appellee to present additional evidence, when
the appellee was on notice that his only
absolute opportunity to present evidence was
before the DLLR Hearing Examiner, and the
appellee had no legitimate justification for
his failure to present the evidence in the
first hearing?
We answer "yes" and explain.
Facts
Woodie began working as a truck driver for Rudy, a trucking
company based in Frederick, Maryland, on July 13, 1997. On
February 5, 1998, without giving his employer any notice, Woodie
quit. While en route to a customer's site, Woodie telephoned the
employer's dispatcher and said that he was abandoning the truck and
leaving the keys on one of the wheels of the tractor. He left the
truck sitting on the road with the payload still in it and did not
report back to work with Rudy after that incident. Woodie applied
for insurance benefits on February 11, 1998, after leaving his job
with Rudy.
On March 6, 1998, a DLLR Claims Examiner made an initial
determination that the claimant voluntarily quit, but with good
cause, and awarded benefits accordingly. Rudy appealed that
determination, and the Department scheduled an evidentiary
hearing.1
At the evidentiary hearing before a DLLR hearing examiner,
Woodie, appearing pro se, testified that he was forced to quit
because he was being overworked. He alleged that the number of
hours that he was required to work violated the federal regulations
governing truck drivers. When questioned, however, the appellee
was unable to direct the Hearing Examiner to any specific provision
that the employer had violated. Rather, the appellee's only
exhibit consisted of driving logs, which he claimed supported his
contention that his hours were excessive.
Rudy's vice-president testified that the company does not
allow its truck drivers to work beyond the guidelines prescribed in
the Federal Motor Carrier's Safety Regulations Handbook, codified
at 49 C.F.R. § 395.3, and that the company closely monitors the
drivers' schedules. To ensure compliance with the regulations, the
company hired a safety consultant whose sole task it is to oversee
The
1 employer's witnesses failed to appear in a timely manner
for the initial hearing because of inclement weather. The hearing
was rescheduled, and both parties appeared. The Hearing Examiner
concluded that the witnesses had an "unavoidable emergency which .
. . prevented [them] from appearing at the [initial] hearing in a
timely fashion." Accordingly, the Hearing Examiner reopened the
case pursuant to § 09.32.06.02N of the Code of Maryland Regulations
(COMAR). This issue is not before the Court in this appeal.
2
the drivers' hours. Rudy's vice-president stated that the
employer's records showed that the appellee's hours never exceeded
70 within an eight-day period, and added that, on at least one
occasion, the appellee did not use his allotted time off, but
instead pushed himself to make a delivery much earlier than his
schedule required.
The Hearing Examiner found that "[t]he preponderance of the
credible evidence produced at the hearing failed to satisfactorily
demonstrate that . . . the employer permitted or required the
claimant to work an excess of hours," and that, therefore, the
claimant failed to show good cause or valid circumstances for his
resignation and reversed the Claims Examiner. The DLLR thus
denied unemployment benefits to appellee, on the ground that he
voluntarily quit his employment without good cause or valid
circumstances. Md. Code, (1991 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.), Lab. &
Empl. Art., § 8-1001. The Board affirmed that ruling.
Woodie then retained counsel and filed a petition for judicial
review in the Circuit Court for Harford County. In addition to the
memorandum required by Md. Rule 7-207, he also submitted an
"Application of Petitioner for Leave to Offer Additional
Evidence." Woodie purportedly based his motion on Md. Rule 7-
208(c) and § 10-222(f) of the State Government Article (the
Administrative Procedure Act). In it, he requested that the
circuit court allow him to offer an assortment of evidence that he
failed to present at the administrative hearing. The court
3
addressed the appellee's motion to present additional evidence.
Woodie's motion stated, inter alia:
Mr. Woodie would like this Court to see trip
information concerning all his destinations,
which would show the routes and driving times
for each trip. ...
Mr. Woodie would also like to present record
evidence for Rudy's which would show, for the
six month period prior to Mr. Woodie's
quitting, the number of trips made by Rudy's
drivers and the number of different drivers.
Mr. Woodie also contends that [another]
driver, Tom Marley, would support Mr. Woodie's
contention that Rudy was operating with
minimal drivers....
The motion stated that "[t]he reasons that this evidence was not
offered before the Hearing Examiner are, it is proffered, because
Mr. Woodie did not know how to go about doing it." The motion did
not proffer, however, that Woodie had attempted to secure the
witness Marley or to gather the documents he sought to present.
The court initially noted that it did not have the authority
to hear evidence itself, but then stated that it did have the
authority "to remand it to the Board and Hearing Officer to take
additional testimony." Counsel for the appellee supported the
court's position and, during argument on the motion, cited § 10-
222(f) of the State Government Article as the statute that
authorizes a remand for additional evidence.
Appellant contended that the circuit court's sole function in
a judicial review proceeding is to review the record for
4
substantial evidence and that it had no authority to remand for
additional evidence. Nevertheless, the court remanded the case for
a "supplemental hearing to allow [the Board] to take additional
testimony to supplement the issues that are currently before the
Board...." Further, the Administrative Procedure Act, by its own
express terms, does not pertain to unemployment insurance (UI)
proceedings. The appellants also argued that Woodie was properly
notified that the evidentiary hearing before the DLLR Hearing
Examiner was the parties' final opportunity to present evidence and
that Woodie had no legitimate justification for his failure to
present evidence in that forum. Counsel for the employer pointed
out that the scheduling notice sent to both parties prior to the
evidentiary hearing contained the following statement under the
heading:
NOTE TO PARTIES: "This hearing is the last
step at which either the claimant or the
employer has the absolute right to present
evidence."
In addition, the reverse side of the notice advised the parties
that they "should arrange for all necessary witnesses to attend the
hearing, and for all necessary documents to be presented at the
hearing," and instructed the parties on the procedures for
subpoenaing witnesses and documents.
Nevertheless, the court remanded for a "supplemental hearing."
The court cited "inherent fairness" and the fact that "a layman is
always sort of at a disadvantage understanding the procedures and
5
understanding the law" as its reasons for remanding the case. The
court added that "it's clear that there's a good deal of
information that he does have to present and possibly he didn't
know what was going to be said by the Employer because he didn't
understand what he needed, what the legal standard was."
Discussion
By remanding Woodie's case to the Department, the circuit
court exceeded its authority for review under § 8-512(d) of the
Labor and Employment Article. Furthermore, § 2(f) Administrative
Procedures Act (APA), Md. Code, (1995 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.) State
Gov. Art., § 10-222(f), on which it also relied, does not apply to
UI claim determinations. Finally, the appellee's obligation to
follow procedural guidelines is no less simply because he proceeds
pro se. We thus remand this case to the circuit court for review
of the DLLR proceedings consistent with its role under § 8-512(d).
I
Section 8-512(d) of the Labor and Employment Article controls
the circuit court's scope of review of appeals from the Department
of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation. That section provides:
In a judicial proceeding under this section,
findings of fact of the Board of Appeals are
conclusive and the jurisdiction of the court
is confined to questions of law if-
(1) findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence that is competent,
6
material, and substantial in view of the
entire record; and
(2) there is no fraud.
This Court repeatedly has stated that "judicial review of a
decision of an administrative agency is narrow." Blaker v. State
Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 123 Md. App. 243, 254, 717 A.2d 964
(1998) (citing United Parcel Serv. Inc. v. People's Counsel, 336
Md. 569, 576, 650 A.2d 226 (1994)). The reviewing court simply
determines where there exists substantial evidence in the record as
a whole to support the agency's final decision. Id.
With substantial evidence and absent fraud, agency decisions
are presumed valid. The reviewing court merely asks whether
"reasoning minds could reach the same conclusion from the facts
relied upon by the Board." Department of Labor, Licensing &
Regulation v. Hider, 349 Md. 71, 78, 706 A.2d 1073 (1998) (citing
Baltimore Lutheran High School Ass'n v. Employment Sec. Admin., 302
Md. 649, 661-62, 490 A.2d 701, 708 (1985)). Further, the reviewing
court may not "substitute its judgment for the expertise of those
persons who constitute the administrative agency from which the
appeal is taken." Board of Education of Montgomery County v.
Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 35, 491 A.2d 1186, 1193 (1985) (emphasis in
original). Instead, the administrative agency's decision is
considered prima facie correct, and an appellate court must view
that decision in the light most favorable to the agency. Id. at
35-36, 491 A.2d at 1193.
7
In this case, the circuit court ignored these well-settled
principles and overstepped its limited jurisdiction. The court
correctly noted that "the unemployment law is silent on the
[remand] issue," but erroneously assumed that silence conveys tacit
authority. It does not. Instead, unemployment insurance law is
silent on the issue of remands because it simply does not
contemplate them, absent extraordinary circumstances.
Although Maryland Rule 7-209 grants nominal remand authority
to circuit courts acting in an appellate capacity,2 the case law
delineates strict limits for such authority. In Juiliano v. Lion's
Manor Nursing Home, 62 Md. App. 145, 488 A.2d 538 (1985), this
Court held that a remand to the administrative agency is
appropriate "only after [the court] reviews the record for
substantial evidence and finds it lacking." Id. at 155, 488 A.2d
at 544. The Court went on to say:
The circuit court ... recognized that it did
not have jurisdiction to conduct additional
fact finding itself, but its remand order was
inappropriate because it had not yet
determined whether the evidence supported the
agency findings.... Thus, in unemployment
compensation cases, the court must review the
record -- if it supports the agency findings,
no further fact-finding is warranted and the
court may proceed to review the law.
"Unless
2 otherwise provided by law, the court may dismiss the
action for judicial review or may affirm, reverse, or modify the
agency's order or action, remand the action to the agency for
further proceedings, or an appropriate combination of the above."
Md. Rule 7-209.
8
Id. at 156-57, 488 A.2d at 544. Furthermore, in Holiday Spas v.
Montgomery County Human Relations Comm'n, 315 Md. 390, 554 A.2d 197
(1989), the Court of Appeals stated that "[a] court ordinarily
should not ... remand an administrative proceeding before
initiating any review whatsoever. . . . Remanding a case without
any review is tantamount to denying review." Id. at 400, 554 A.2d
at 1202.
In this case, the circuit court did not conduct the required
review of the record before deciding to remand for what it termed
a "supplemental hearing." In so doing, the court failed to carry
out its primary statutory obligation to review the record for
substantial evidence. Circuit courts sitting in judicial review
are essentially appellate courts and, as such, must act only to
correct errors. Here, the circuit court declined to review the
record for error before it decided to allow the appellee a second
opportunity to present evidence.
Finally, cases construing the predecessor to Rule 7-209 could
be read to limit remand prior to review in the circuit court to
situations "where it is made to appear that the agency itself
desires to take additional testimony and to reconsider the case."
Mid-Towne Plymouth, Inc. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation,
228 Md. 66, 70, 178 A.2d 422, 424 (1961). Agencies request such
remands to cure factual ambiguities and other defects in the
record. In those circumstances, a remand serves to enhance the
9
circuit court's eventual review of the case and to protect the
interests of the parties.
Here, however, the Department has made no such request.
Although Judge Carr cited this principle when he granted the
appellee's motion, the state has made no such request here; neither
are there cognizable defects in the record. Instead, the only end
served by a remand is to allow the appellee a second opportunity to
present evidence: evidence he was free to present at his first
hearing. Consequently, the court's ruling in this case is
prejudicial to the appellants because it needlessly vacates the
Board's decision and requires the employer to appear before the
Department for a second evidentiary hearing. Thus, for this reason
and those stated above, we reverse its decision on the appellee's
motion and remand this matter so that the circuit court might
perform its primary function in accordance with the law.
II
In remanding this case to the Board, the court relied, at
least in part, on § 2(f) of the Maryland APA, Md. Code, State Gov.
Art., § 10-222(f):
[The Court]: Preliminarily, there's a motion
to take additional testimony. I'm not sure
that the Court has authority to do that, but I
do have the authority to remand it to the
Board and Hearing Officer to take additional
testimony. What's your position on that?
[Appellee's Counsel]: I believe you certainly
do, Your Honor, pursuant to, I think it's, 10-
222.
10
[The Court]: Of the Administrative Procedures
Act?
[Appellee's Counsel]: Right. On 2(f)[3 it says
]
that judicial review of disputed issues of
fact shall be confined to the record for
judicial review supplemented by additional
evidence taken pursuant to this section.
While this provision no doubt permits the taking of
supplemental evidence in some administrative appeals, the
Administrative Procedure Act, by its own express terms, does not
apply to UI cases. Section 10-203 of the APA plainly states the
statute's scope:
The
3 full text of the provision cited by appellee's counsel at
the time reads as follows:
(f) Additional evidence before agency. -- (1)
Judicial review of disputed issues of fact
shall be confined to the record for judicial
review supplemented by additional evidence
taken pursuant to this section.
(2) The court may order the presiding
officer to take additional evidence on terms
that the court considers proper if:
(i) before the hearing date in court, a
party applies for leave to offer additional
evidence; and
(ii) the court is satisfied that:
1. the evidence is material; and
2. there were good reasons for the
failure to offer the evidence in the
proceeding before the presiding
officer.
Md. Code, State Gov. Art., § 10-222(f). "Presiding officer" is
defined elsewhere in the subtitle as "the board, commission, agency
head, administrative law judge, or other authorized person
conducting an administrative proceeding under this subtitle." Md.
Code, State Gov. Art., § 10-202(g).
11
(a) General Exclusions. -- This subtitle does
not apply to:
(5) unemployment insurance claim
determinations, tax determinations, and
appeals in the Department of Labor,
Licensing, and Regulation, except as
specifically provided in Subtitle 5 of
Title 8 of the Labor and Employment
Article . . . .
Md. Code Ann., State Gov. Art. § 10-202(g) (emphasis added); see
also Board of Education of Montgomery County v. Paynter, 303 Md. at
34, 491 A.2d at 1192 ("Board of Appeals [of the then-Employment
Security Administration] is excluded from the Administrative
Procedure Act....").
Under the plain meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act,
the statute generally does not apply in UI proceedings. See, e.g.,
McGraw v. Loyola Ford, 124 Md. App. 560, 592, 723 A.2d 502 (1999)
(holding that the statute itself is the primary source for
determining the intent of the legislature, and the Court is to
"`give[ ] that language its natural and ordinary meaning'") (quoting
Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523, 683 A.2d 448
(1994)). The phrase "except as specifically provided" means that
the APA applies only in those limited circumstances provided in the
UI statute itself. The part of the UI statute dealing with judicial
review, Md. Code Ann., Labor & Employ. Art., § 8-512, however, does
not reference the APA, and nothing in the UI statute indicates that
it should incorporate the APA's "supplemental evidence" provisions
in § 222(f). Accordingly, the circuit court erred in relying on the
12
APA as a basis for remanding this case, and we must remand this case
for review consistent with the plain language of the APA.
III
Finally, in his motion to offer additional evidence in the
circuit court, Woodie's counsel claimed that his client did not
present evidence to the Hearing Examiner because he "did not know
how to go about doing it." The court sympathized with appellee's
claim, stating at the hearing that "[e]ven the best layman get [sic]
confused and doesn't understand. There's the discovery that he
doesn't know about and what's going to be said." Indeed, the
court's decision seemed to be based in large part on the notion that
because pro se litigants lack training and experience in the rules
of procedure, they are entitled to procedural leeway in proving
their cases. According to the court, "a layman is always sort of
at a disadvantage understanding the procedures and understanding the
law."
The court, however, erred by giving the appellee a "second bite
at the apple" simply because he was not represented by counsel
during the administrative hearings. It is a well-established
principle of Maryland law that pro se parties must adhere to
procedural rules in the same manner as those represented by counsel.
Indeed, this Court has stated that "[t]he principle of applying the
rules equally to pro se litigants is so accepted that it is almost
self-evident." Tretick v. Layman, 95 Md. App. 62, 68, 619 A.2d 201,
13
204 (1993); see also Pickett v. Noba, Inc., 122 Md. App. 566, 568,
714 A.2d 212, 213 (1998) ("While we recognize and sympathize with
those whose economic means require self-representation, we also need
to adhere to procedural rules in order to maintain consistency in
the judicial system.").
In this case, the appellee did not follow DLLR's rules
regarding the presentation of evidence at the de novo hearing. When
the employer appealed the determination of the Claims Examiner,
DLLR's Appeals Division mailed a scheduling notice to both parties
informing them of the date, time, and location of the de novo
hearing. Just below that information, on the front page of the
scheduling notice, DLLR advised the parties that "[t]his hearing is
the last step at which either the claimant or the employer has the
absolute right to present evidence. The decision will be made on
the evidence presented." In addition, the notice stated, in bold
print, that additional "important information" could be found on the
reverse side. There, under the heading Witnesses and Subpoenas, the
notice read:
Each party should arrange for all necessary
witnesses to attend the hearing, and for all
necessary documents to be presented at the
hearing. If witnesses will not appear or
documents will not be produced voluntarily,
you may request a subpoena from the Appeals
Division.
Finally, the notice advised that "[a] party may be represented by
an attorney, or other authorized agent."
14
The appellee thus had clear notice of his obligation to present
his case before the DLLR Hearing Examiner. The rules cited above
4
are simple and clear, and even if the appellee needed clarification,
he could have obtained that information in the weeks preceding the
hearing. In fact, Woodie had additional time to gather evidence and
obtain witnesses after Rudy's representatives failed to attend the
first scheduled evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, the appellee's
contention that he "did not know how to go about [presenting
evidence]" is implausible in light of the fact that he did submit
portions of his driving logs. The Hearing Examiner admitted the
logs for February 1998 (Claimant's Exhibit 1), and January 1998
(Claimant's Exhibit 2), but rejected logs for earlier months as
being too remote in time from the termination and, therefore,
irrelevant. Thus, regardless of his unsupported statements, the
5
appellee's conduct shows that he was aware of his obligation to
4The appellee never alleged that he did not receive the
scheduling notice, and the record shows that it was mailed to the
appellee's correct address.
5There is no merit to Woodie's argument that the Hearing
Examiner should have considered the earlier months as part of the
totality of the circumstances. Hearing examiners have discretion
to accept or reject evidence based on the reliability and probative
value of the evidence to satisfy procedural due process. See
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services v. Cole, 342
Md. 12, 32, 672 A.2d 1115 (1996). In this case, moreover, the
Hearing Examiner, applying the same standard, also rejected some
evidence proffered by the employer's representatives. The Hearing
Examiner did not admit a document offered by Rudy, which purported
to contain an inter-office conversation regarding the appellee, on
the grounds that it occurred post-separation and was therefore
irrelevant.
15
present evidence, and he simply failed to obtain the documents or
compel the attendance of the witness raised in his motion to the
circuit court. Because nothing in the record indicates that Woodie
even tried in good faith to present evidence supporting his own
interests, the circuit court erred when it granted him a second
chance.
Conclusion
Because of the high volume of UI cases filed in the Department
of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, the Department must maintain
a streamlined process for the disposition of those cases. The
legislature supported this goal by narrowing the focus of judicial
review for UI eligibility cases in the circuit courts. Under this
regime, the Department requires that all parties present their
evidence in the de novo hearing before the DLLR Hearing Examiner,
and sets forth this requirement clearly in the scheduling notice
mailed to the parties in advance of the hearing.
The circuit court in this case did not find that the
Department's requirements were unreasonable or that the Department
failed properly to advise the appellee of its requirements.
Nevertheless, it sent the case back to DLLR in order to give the
appellee a second bite at the UI apple. Thus, the circuit court's
order infringes on the Department's legislatively granted power to
manage its docket in an orderly manner. Accordingly, we cannot
ratify the circuit court's action in this case. We thus vacate the
16
court's order and remand this case with instructions to review the
case in accordance with § 8-512 of the Labor and Employment Article
of the Maryland Code.
JUDGMENT VACATED. REMANDED TO
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HARFORD
COUNTY.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING,
AND REGULATION.
17