RENDERED: NOVEMBER 9, 2006; 10:00 A.M. Commonwealth Of Kentucky Court of Appeals KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION APPELLANT v. OHIO VALLEY AUTO SALES, INC., D/B/A EARL FLOYD FORD; AND WARREN C. NOBLE APPELLEES OPINION REVERSING AND REMANDING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: ACREE, SCHRODER, AND VANMETER, JUDGES. ACREE, JUDGE: The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (Commission) brings this appeal from an Opinion and Order of the Carroll Circuit Court, reversing a Commission decision granting unemployment benefits. Because we agree that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s findings and that it correctly applied the applicable law, we reverse the circuit court’s decision. Warren C. Noble (Noble) began working for Earl Floyd Ford (the employer) on June 9, 2004, as a floater, with wash-bay and clean-up duties, earning $6.00 per hour, in full-time, nonunion employment. In the last month or so of his employment, Noble was assigned to his own quick-lube and oil change bay at a similar hourly rate of pay, but received additional compensation equal to thirty-five (35) percent of the profit from work he performed. Several days before Noble was discharged on August 19, 2004, Matt Smith, the manager, asked him if he wanted his old job back at his former rate of pay. Noble elected to remain where he was because of the decrease in pay. Two or more days later, Noble was discharged. He was told that there had been complaints with his work. Noble claims he was not given this information when he was asked if he wanted to return to his prior job assignment. Noble also claims he did not know that he was offered the demotion in lieu of termination. The employer was not satisfied with Noble’s level of performance while he was working in the bay, as the employer received several customer complaints. It is the employer’s contention that Noble knew he was going to be terminated, but could avoid the firing if he went back to his old position. Noble was terminated on or about August 19, 2004. On August 22, 2004, Noble filed for unemployment insurance benefits. The Division of Unemployment Insurance granted Noble benefits on the grounds that he had refused, with good cause, an offer of unsuitable work. The employer appealed and a referee hearing was conducted. The referee set aside the October 22 determination, finding that Noble had refused an offer of suitable work without good cause. Noble appealed this decision to the Commission who reversed the Referee’s Decision and found in Noble’s favor. The employer’s January 19, 2005, request for reconsideration was denied. The employer then filed a complaint with the Carroll Circuit Court pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 341.450(1) seeking judicial review of the Commission’s Order. On October 7, 2005, the Carroll Circuit Court set aside the Order of the Commission as arbitrary and not based upon substantial evidence and ordered Noble’s unemployment benefits terminated. The Commission now appeals the circuit court’s order. We find the circuit court erred in holding the Commission’s findings were arbitrary. This Court holds the Commission properly performed a de novo review of Noble’s unemployment case and appropriately weighed the facts and based its findings upon substantial evidence. Upon review of an administrative agency’s adjudicatory decision, an appeal court’s authority is somewhat limited. See American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm’n, 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964)(stating judicial review involves whether an administrative agency’s decision is arbitrary). If an administrative agency’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence of probative value, then they are binding on the reviewing court. See Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm’n v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Kentucky, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Ky. 2002). Substantial evidence is defined as evidence, taken alone or in light of all the evidence, that has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998). If the administrative agency decision was not supported by substantial evidence, then it was arbitrary or clearly erroneous. Landmark, at 579. However, if there was substantial evidence to support the agency’s decision, it cannot be said to be arbitrary. Id. The agency’s findings must be upheld if based on substantial evidence “even though there exists evidence to the contrary in the record.” Id. at 578. A court may not substitute its opinion as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight given the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Burch v. Taylor Drug Store, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Ky.App. 1998). A court’s function in administrative matters is one of review, not reinterpretation. See Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm’n v. King, 657 S.W.2d 250, 251 (Ky.App. 1983). The fundamental question before us is whether the facts found by the Commission are “supported by substantial evidence,” Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm’n v. Springer, 437 S.W.2d 501,502 (Ky. 1969), and, if so, whether the Commission “incorrectly applied the correct use of law to the facts presented to it.” Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm’n v. Stirrat, 688 S.W.2d 750, 751-52 (Ky.App. 1984). This Court has stated that the Commission has the authority to perform a de novo review of unemployment case appeals, which includes judging the weight of evidence and witness credibility. Burch, 965 S.W.2d 830. Accordingly, upon its review the Commission made factual findings that 1) Noble was asked several days before his termination if he would like to return to his prior position at his former pay rate; 2) Noble declined the job transfer because it would mean a decrease in pay; 3) Noble was fired a few days later due to complaints pertaining to his work; 4) Noble was unaware the demotion was offered in lieu of termination. As the reviewing court, we must accept these findings as correct if supported by substantial evidence. Regardless of whether we would have held the same, we are not permitted to substitute our judgment for the Commission’s. Although there was conflicting testimony before the referee, the Commission had sufficient evidence to find that Noble did not refuse an offer of suitable work, and thus was not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Therefore, we conclude that the facts as found by the Commission are supported by substantial evidence and as such are not arbitrary or clearly erroneous. Having determined that the Commission’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, we next review as to whether the Commission applied the correct rule of law. Our decision in the present case turns on the application of KRS 341.370(1)(a), which provides that a worker shall be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if he or she refused an offer of suitable work without good cause. The Commission found and we cannot refute that Noble was unaware of the circumstances surrounding his employer’s offer to transfer him back to his former position in the wash-bay. Without this knowledge, Noble had no reason to know that refusing the offer would lead to his eventual discharge.1 We agree with the Commission in their position that “no disqualification may be imposed on a worker for refusing an offer of work, whether the work be suitable or unsuitable work, if the worker is employed and unaware that loss of employment will result by refusing the offer.” We hold that the Commission’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and that it correctly applied the law to the facts as found. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Carroll Circuit Court and remand this matter to the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission with directions to enter an order consistent with this opinion. ALL CONCUR.