RENDERED: February 4, 2005; 10:00 a.m. 
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 
Commonwealth Of Kentucky 
Court of Appeals 
NO. 2003-CA-002346-MR 
WILLIAM V. THOMASON APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT 
v. HONORABLE TOM MCDONALD, JUDGE 
ACTION NO. 02-CI-003703 
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE COMMISSION 
AND YOUNGBLOOD CONSTRUCTION APPELLEES 
OPINION 

AFFIRMING 
** ** ** ** ** 

BEFORE: TACKETT, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES. 
TACKETT, JUDGE: 

William A. Thomason appeals from the decision 
of the Jefferson Circuit Court, which affirmed the findings of 
the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission that he was 
dismissed for cause and thus ineligible for unemployment 
benefits. Thomason argues that the Commission's findings were 
not supported by substantial evidence, and that if they were 
supported by substantial evidence, then in the alternative that
the Commission misapplied the standard for determining when an 
employee is discharged for cause. We hold that the Commission's 
findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the 
Commission applied the correct standard, and affirm. 
Thomason was a welder working for Youngblood 

Construction. On October 29, 2001, Thomason and other welders 
were informed that they would be working ten-hour shifts five or 
six days that week. Thomason worked every day that week, and on 
November 3, he was asked to work the next day as well. Thomason 
had made arrangements for a repairman to come to his house and 
repair the switch on his water well so that his family could 
have water service, and needed to be home that day. Thomason 
informed his supervisor, Cheyenne Youngblood, that he could not 
work that day for personal reasons. Exactly how Thomason 
communicated this information to Youngblood is disputed; 
Thomason states that he told his supervisor twice that day that 
he could not work because of personal reasons. Youngblood, on 
the other hand, said that Thomason was very sarcastic and 
refused to work, at one point saying that "he might do his 
laundry" as a reason. Witnesses for Youngblood said that 
Thomason's refusal to work was communicated as early as the 
October 29 safety meeting at which weekly schedules were 
distributed. Witnesses for Youngblood testified about a Friday 
morning encounter between James Gage, superintendent of
Youngblood Construction, and the welders on the job. Gage told 
the welders that they would be needed both days on the weekend 
because of the nature of the job. Gage testified that Thomason 
simply said that he would not work Sunday, and that when he 
asked him why all he said was that he might do his laundry; 
another witness, boilermaker Larry Adkins, confirmed this 
version of events. The Commission held that Thomason's refusal 
to work and subsequent firing by Youngblood when he reported to 
work on November 5, constituted misconduct, specifically failure 
to obey a reasonable request. The Commission's order reversed 
the finding of a referee, who had determined that Thomason was 
not terminated for cause. Thomason appealed the decision of the 
Commission to the Jefferson Circuit Court, which affirmed. This 
appeal followed. 

The issues presented on appeal are whether the 
findings of the Commission were supported by substantial 
evidence and if so, whether the Commission applied the proper 
standard in determining whether he was fired for cause. We hold 
that the Commission's findings were proper. 
First, the Commission's findings were supported by 
substantial evidence. It is clear to us that in hindsight, 
Thomason could have stated a very clear reason for his need to 
be absent from work. Instead, even viewing the evidence in the 
best light for Thomason, we cannot say that he did so. Even by
his own words, all he told his employer was that he had to be 
off work for unspecified personal reasons. Taking into account 
the testimony presented by the employer's witnesses, there was 
ample testimony on which to base a finding that he did not 
properly communicate his need to be off work, and that his need 
to be off work came across as a refusal rather than a reasonable 
request for time off. As the Commission and the circuit court 
both noted, Thomason's proof that a repairman did in fact 
perform work on his well on that Sunday does not prove that he 
informed his employer of the reason he needed to be off work. 
Substantial evidence, as we have long held, is all that is 
required for the findings of fact to be affirmed. Substantial 
evidence is defined as evidence, taken alone or in light of all 
the evidence, that has sufficient probative value to induce 
conviction in the minds of reasonable people." Thompson v. 
Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm., 85 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Ky.App. 
2002). A reviewing court is not permitted to weigh the 
credibility of the witnesses. That is precisely what Thomason 
asks us to do, in describing Youngblood's testimony as "selfserving" 
and arguing that "his testimony and filings are not 
credible." The Commission apparently chose to believe that 
testimony, and we are not permitted to substitute our judgment 
for that of the finder of fact. Burch v. Taylor Drug Store, 
Inc., 965 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Ky.App. 1998). Even where
conflicting evidence is in the record, we must accept a 
reviewing court's findings as binding where they are supported 
by substantial evidence. Urella v. Kentucky Bd. Of Medical 
Licensure, 939 S.W.2d 869 (1997). 

Likewise, we must conclude that the Commission applied 
the proper standard. Kentucky Revised Statute 341.370(6) 
defines misconduct as including "refusing to obey reasonable 
instructions." As the Commission notes, "great deference is 
always given to an administrative agency in the interpretation 
of a statute which is within its specific province." 
Commonwealth ex rel Beshear v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 648 
S.W.2d 535, 537 (Ky.App. 1982). The fact that a reviewing court 
may not have come to the same conclusion does not warrant a 
substitution of a court's discretion for that of an 
administrative agency. Ky. Unemployment Ins. v. Landmark Comm. 
News, 91 S.W.3d 575, 582 (Ky.App. 2002). The Commission held 
that Thomason's refusal to work on November 4, 2001, constituted 
a refusal to obey a reasonable instruction, given that Thomason 
was aware of the need for welders on the job site and that he 
did not adequately inform his employer of his need to be off 
work that day. Regardless of whether we would have held the 
same, we are not permitted to substitute our judgment for the 
Commission's. Our review is confined to the question of whether 
the Commission misapplied the statute, and we cannot say that it
did. Given the evidence before it, it was reasonable for the 
Commission to conclude that Thomason refused to obey a 
reasonable instruction and was therefore terminated for cause. 

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the 
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed. 

VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURS. 
TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE OPINION. 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: 
Margo A. Burnette 
Teresa E. Logsdon 
Elizabethtown, Kentucky 
BRIEF FOR KENTUCKY UNEMLOYMENT 
INSURANCE COMMISSION, 
APPELLEE: 
Randall K. Justice 
Assistant General Counsel 
Frankfort, Kentucky 
BRIEF FOR YOUNGBLOOD 
CONSTRUCTION, APPELLEE: 
Kenneth S. Handmaker 
Amy E. Shoemaker 
Louisville, Kentucky