RENDERED: May 7, 2004; 2:00 p.m. TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth Of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2003-CA-001463-MR TERRY BUTLER APPELLANT APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JOSEPH F. BAMBERGER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 03-CI-00602 KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION; AND DURO BAG MANUFACTURING APPELLEES OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON AND MINTON, JUDGES. JOHNSON, JUDGE: Terry Butler has appealed from an order of the Boone Circuit Court entered on June 26, 2003, which, after determining that Butler had failed to perfect his appeal from the decision of the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Having concluded that the trial court did not err by dismissing Butler’s complaint, we affirm. The facts of this case are simple and are not in dispute. Butler began working for Duro Bag Manufacturing Company in Florence, Boone County, Kentucky, in June 1999. It is undisputed that in mid-January 2003, Butler left the premises of the workplace during his shift without first asking permission from his supervisor, which was in violation of a plant rule. As a result of Butler’s actions, he was discharged from Duro Bag in late January 2003. Following Butler’s termination of employment from Duro Bag, he filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits with the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Workforce Development Cabinet. After a hearing was conducted before a referee with the Cabinet, Butler’s claim was denied on grounds that "benefits are not payable when a worker is discharged for misconduct connected with the work." Butler appealed the referee’s decision to the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission. On April 22, 2003, the Commission upheld the referee’s decision denying Butler’s claim. On April 30, 2003, Butler filed a complaint in the Boone Circuit Court appealing the Commission’s decision. Among other things, Butler alleged that the actions which resulted in his termination from Duro Bag did not constitute misconduct. On June 3, 2003, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Butler had failed to comply with KRS4 341.450(1), which requires a party seeking judicial review of a Commission’s decision to file a verified complaint in circuit court. On June 26, 2003, the trial court entered an order dismissing Butler’s complaint with prejudice, after determining that Butler’s complaint "was not verified as required by KRS 341.450(1)," and that the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction. This appeal followed. Butler’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by dismissing his complaint. Butler first argues that his attorney’s signature on the complaint was sufficient to comply with the verification requirements of KRS 341.450(1).5 Alternatively, Butler claims that if his attorney’s signature is deemed not to be sufficient to comply with KRS 341.450(1), he should have been granted leave to file an amended complaint, since, according to Butler, the verification requirement is merely directional and not mandatory. We disagree with both of Butler’s contentions. (note: It is undisputed that Butler’s complaint was not "verified" as contemplated by KRS 341.450(1), i.e., Butler’s attorney’s signature on the complaint was not accompanied by an indication that his attorney signed the complaint under oath.) In Fisher v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission,6 this Court considered and rejected identical arguments as those made by Butler in the case sub judice: In her appeal to this Court, Ms. Fisher argues that her attorney’s signature on the complaint sufficiently complies with the statutory mandate and that her complaint must, therefore, be reinstated. In the alternative, she asserts that she should be granted leave to amend the petition for review. We cannot agree. This Court, citing two prior cases addressing the same issue,7 went on to state that the verification requirement under KRS 341.450(1) was "mandatory and jurisdictional," and that the failure to comply with said requirement was fatal to the appeal.8 Accordingly, Butler’s claims that either his attorney’s signature was sufficient to comply with the verification requirements of KRS 341.450(1), or in the alternative, that he should have been granted leave to file an amended complaint are without merit. Finally, Butler asks that this Court en banc revisit the verification issue and overrule this Court’s prior decisions in Pickhart, Monyhan, and Fisher. We decline Butler’s request. In Kentucky, it is well-established that where a statute provides for the appeal of an administrative agency’s decision, a strict compliance with the statute’s procedural requirements is necessary in order to perfect the appeal. In Roberts v. Watts,10 the former Court of Appeals stated: The right of appeal in administrative as well as other proceedings does not exist as a matter of right. When the right is conferred by statute, a strict compliance with its terms is required. It is the general rule that where the conditions for the exercise of the power of a court are wanting the judicial power is not, in fact, lawfully invoked. The appeal, not having been properly perfected, the Franklin Circuit Court was without jurisdiction and properly dismissed the appeal. Furthermore, in Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Carter, our Supreme Court expressly rejected an argument calling for the adoption of a more lenient "substantial compliance" doctrine: It is argued by Carter that the mentioning of the employer (even though by an erroneous name) in the recitation of facts and the mailing of a copy of the complaint to the employer’s attorney created substantial compliance with the statute. Even if we agreed with the claim, we find no authority before the court to authorize the doctrine of substantial compliance in a case where the appeal process is statutorily created and implemented. Thus, the strict compliance doctrine applies in an appeal of a Commission’s decision under KRS 341.450(1), and Butler’s failure to verify his complaint as mandated by KRS 341.450(1) was fatal to his appeal. As the Court in Fisher noted, "[t]his view fully comports with the rationale utilized by our Supreme Court in rejecting a claim of substantial compliance in [Carter]." Accordingly, we decline Butler’s request to sit en banc to reconsider this Court’s previous decisions in Pickhart, Monyhan, and Fisher. Based on the foregoing, the order of the Boone Circuit Court is affirmed. ALL CONCUR.