RENDERED: MAY 9, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-000995-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, WORKFORCE
DEVELOPMENT CABINET, KENTUCKY
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE DENNIS A. FRITZ, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00276
WILLIAM H. SIMPSON; AND OLDHAM
COUNTY CAB COMPANY, INC. APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BUCKINGHAM, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE. Appellants, Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Workforce Development Cabinet, and the Kentucky Unemployment
Insurance Commission, appeal from an opinion of the Oldham
Circuit Court which declared Appellee William H. Simpson
eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. We affirm.
In September 1997, Simpson began working for Appellee
Oldham County Cab Company, Inc. as a part-time driver. During
his tenure at the cab company, Simpson=s eyesight began to
deteriorate. Realizing that his days of driving might be
numbered, Simpson inquired about continuing his employment at
the company as a dispatcher. His employer informed him that
there was no position available as a dispatcher; however, he
might be able to continue his employment by lending a hand
around the garage with cleaning duties.
On January 17, 2000, Simpson=s failing eyesight caused
him to give up driving for good. Three days later, Simpson
called the cab company seeking work, so his employer sent a cab
to pick him up and bring him in to the garage where he could
work washing the company=s limousines. According to Appellants,
after just two hours of work Simpson left to go home, informing
his employer that he did not want to come back to wash
limousines anymore. Simpson denied that he said that, and
asserted that after that day he was never scheduled to work or
otherwise informed of any other duties to perform at the cab
company.
Simpson filed a claim for unemployment insurance on
January 25, 2000, based on his inability to work because of his
visual impairment. A few weeks later, the Division of
Unemployment Insurance (Division) determined that Simpson was
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disqualified from receiving insurance benefits because he had
voluntarily left his work with the cab company without good
cause attributable to the employment. Simpson appealed the
Division=s decision to an unemployment insurance referee, who set
the decision aside after a hearing. The cab company appealed to
the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (Commission),
which disagreed with the referee and again determined Simpson
was disqualified from receiving benefits. Simpson=s motion for
reconsideration was denied, and thereafter he filed a complaint
with the Oldham Circuit Court seeking judicial review of the
Commission=s order. That court reversed, determining that
Simpson was eligible for the benefits. This appeal followed.
The standard of review on appeal in the case sub
judice is the same standard that applied on the circuit court
level; we are obligated to uphold the Commission=s decision if
there is substantial evidence of probative value upon which the
Commission could base its decision, and if the Commission
applied the correct rule of law to the facts as found. H & S
Hardware v. Cecil, Ky. App., 655 S.W.2d 38, 40 (1983).
Substantial evidence is that which taken alone or in light of
all the evidence has sufficient probative value to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable persons. Blankenship v.
Lloyd Blankenship Coal Co., Ky., 463 S.W.2d 62, 64 (1971). If
there is substantial evidence in the record to support an
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agency=s findings, the findings will be upheld, even though there
may be conflicting evidence in the record. Secretary of Labor
v. Boston Gear, Inc., Ky., 25 S.W.3d 130, 134 (2002). A
reviewing court may not substitute its opinion as to the weight
of the evidence given by the Commission. McCracken County Health
Spa v. Henson, Ky. App., 568 S.W.2d 240, 242 (1977).
In the case sub judice, Appellants argue that the
circuit court erroneously substituted its own judgment for that
of the Commission, and that any conflicting evidence in the
record does not justify the court=s making its own findings of
fact. We disagree. The Commission=s findings included that:
AThe weight of the evidence in this case C the testimony of the
two employer witnesses versus that of the claimant C shows that
claimant left the employment telling the employer he no longer
wanted to wash limousines.@ The trial court found that this
conclusion was incorrect because only one of the employer=s
witnesses offered testimony on this issue, and the statement was
not made when appellee left employment but after appellee filed
for unemployment. Thus, we do not agree that the Oldham Circuit
Court merely substituted its judgment for that of the
Commission, but instead we conclude that it properly assessed
whether there was substantial evidence to support the
Commission=s decision as to the weight of the evidence.
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The court noted that Simpson was only offered work one
time after he retired from his cab driving duties.
Additionally, the court found that the only testimony indicating
that Simpson refused to wash limousines came from the cab
company=s owner. Simpson denied making such a statement in his
testimony, and another employee who testified did not remember
hearing Simpson tell his employer that he refused to come back
and wash limousines. Our review of the record of this case,
which consists only of a transcript of the aforementioned
testimony, bears out the court=s interpretation. Thus we agree
with the court that there was not substantial evidence of
probative value in the case sub judice to show that Simpson
refused to return to work. The court did not err in failing to
uphold the Commission=s decision on that issue.
Next, Appellants argue that the court erred in holding
that the Commission misapplied the law to the facts of this
case. Appellants argue on appeal that appellee=s failing eyesight
was not Aattributable to the employment@ with the cab company,
pursuant to KRS 341.370(1)(c). The Oldham Circuit Court stated
that the standard for Agood cause for voluntarily quitting work@
is defined by the Kentucky Supreme Court as existing Aonly when
the worker is faced with circumstances so compelling as to leave
no reasonable alternative but loss of employment.@ Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Murphy, Ky., 539 S.W.2d
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293, 294 (1976). Appellants argue that the court did not
construe the phrase Aattributable to the employment@ which was
added to the statute after the Murphy opinion was rendered.
Appellants contend that appellee did not establish that his loss
of eyesight was in any way attributable to the employment.
Appellees counter that Aattributable@ means only that Simpson=s
reason for leaving is related in some way to the duties he must
perform in his job.
We find no case which construes this phrase. However,
we believe that appellant=s construction distorts the phrase as
it is found in the statute. The standard in KRS 341.370(3)(c)
does not require direct causation from the work, as appellant
argues. It does not require that the claimant=s reason for
leaving work be in some way caused by the work itself. We
believe the Oldham Circuit Court correctly applied the law when
it concluded that claimant could no longer perform the work of a
cab driver due to the deterioration in his eyes, and so his
reason for leaving was attributable to the work itself. Thus,
we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Randall K. Justice Glenna Jo Curry
Frankfort, Kentucky LaGrange, Kentucky
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