Kentucky Revised Statutes.1

RENDERED: DECEMBER 27, 2002; 2:00 p.m.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

C o m m o n w e a l t h O f K e n t u c k y

C o u r t O f A pp e a l s

NO. 2001-CA-002481-MR

RICHARD MEYNARD APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE THOMAS McDONALD, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 00-CI-002327

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; SCHRODER and TACKETT, JUDGES.

EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE: The single question in this appeal is whether KRS 341.450(1) requires verification under oath in order1 to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court. Appellant argues that the plain language of the statute requires only that the complaint be verified "by the plaintiff or his attorney" and thus no oath is required. The trial court disagreed, holding that the opinion of this court in Fischer v.

Ky. App., 880 S.W.2d 891 (1994).2 Ky. App., 697 S.W.2d 952 (1985). 3 Id. at 893.4 Kentucky Unemployment Commission, is dispositive of appellant's2 contentions. Finding no error in the decision of the trial court, we affirm.

On remarkably similar facts, the court in Fischer held that an attorney's signature on a petition for review did not comply with the verified complaint requirement of KRS 341.450. In so holding, this court rejected Fischer's contention that she was in substantial compliance with the statutory mandate and that she should be granted leave to amend the petition in order to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Appellant in this case advances a similar contention, relying upon Shamrock Coal Co., Inc. v. Taylor, which held that "a clear attempt at3 verification" constituted "sufficient compliance" with KRS 341.450(1). We find this reliance misplaced for two reasons.

First, we are not persuaded that merely styling the complaint "verified" or inserting that word above the attorney's signature can be legitimately construed as a "clear attempt at verification." As Judge Huddleston points out in his dissenting opinion in Fischer, the attorney's signature in and of itself adds "nothing more than his signature currently represents under CR 11." Second, Fischer's reliance upon Shamrock did not4 convince that court that it could ignore clear precedent adhering to the principle that "statutes providing for judicial review of the decisions of administrative agencies are to be strictly observed."5

Like the court in Fischer, we note our duty to defer to precedent regardless of our view of the advisability of the policy, and conclude here, as we did in that case, that "we are precluded from simply choosing not to follow the law." We6 therefore hold that appellant's failure to strictly comply with the mandatory provisions of KRS 341.450(1) is a jurisdictional defect, fatal to his appeal.

The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Thomas M. Williams OGDEN, NEWELL & WELCH PLLC Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Tamela A. Biggs CABINET FOR WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Frankfort, Kentucky