RENDERED: February 21, 1997; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
95-CA-2522-MR MARY J. BRUMFIELD APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-0603
DOE RAMEY CORPORATION APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * BEFORE: BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON, and SCHRODER, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Floyd Circuit Court reversing an award of unemployment compensation benefits to the appellant by the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission. For reasons set forth hereinafter, the judgment will be affirmed.
The appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Brumfield") was employed by the appellee (hereinafter referred to as "Ramey") in the insurance business. After approximately three months on the job, Brumfield got into a heated argument with Ramey's owner over the fragrance of Brumfield's perfume or cologne and Brumfield quit. Claiming that she resigned because Ramey reneged on its promise to send her to insurance school so that she could 2
get a license and become an associate agent, Brumfield applied for unemployment compensation benefits. A referee denied her claim, but the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (hereinafter referred to as "KUIC") reversed the referee's decision and held that Ramey failed to honor the conditions of hire when it did not send Brumfield to insurance school as it had promised. Ramey appealed to the Floyd Circuit Court which held that there was not substantial evidence to support the findings of KUIC and reversed its decision. Brumfield then filed this appeal.
Ramey alleges that this appeal should be dismissed on either of two procedural grounds; however, neither has merit. First, it was not necessary that KUIC be named as a party to this appeal. J.T. Nelson Co. v. Comstock, Ky. App., 636 S.W.2d 896 (1982). Second, the notice of appeal is not jurisdictionally defective. Armstrong v. McGuire, Ky., 283 S.W.2d 366 (1955). Substantial compliance with notice of appeal procedures is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction herein except in instances of tardy appeals and naming of indispensable parties. Johnson v. Smith, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 944 (1994). Brumfield's notice of appeal substantially complied with the procedural requirements.
Addressing the merits of the case, we note that the findings of fact of KUIC must be accepted by the trial court if supported by substantial evidence of probative value. Kosmos Cement Co. v. Haney, Ky., 698 S.W.2d 819 (1985). Noting that the record contained no evidence that the parties ever agreed on a
time or date certain when Ramey would incur the expense of sending Brumfield to insurance school, and noting that there was no evidence in the record that Ramey did not intend to comply with its obligation to provide Brumfield with insurance schooling or that Brumfield was hired under false pretenses, the trial court held that there was not substantial evidence of probative value to support the KUIC decision. We agree that the evidence in this regard is lacking and that Brumfield voluntarily left her employment without good cause attributable to the employment and should be disqualified from receiving benefits.
The judgment of the Floyd Circuit Court is affirmed. SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS; HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, DISSENTS BY SEPARATE OPINION.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, DISSENTING. Respectfully, I dissent. Mary J. Brumfield held a West Virginia insurance agent's license entitling her to work as an associate agent with her prior employer, Nationwide Insurance. After Brumfield moved to Kentucky, she was employed by the Doe Ramey Corporation with assurances that she would be sent to an insurance school in order that she might qualify for an agent's license in Kentucky.
After some time had passed, Brumfield was put to work carrying out some agent's duties which she was not licensed to perform. When she pressed the issue of her employer-funded schooling, she was told, contrary to the initial terms of her
employment, that she would have to earn the right to be sent to school.
I agree with the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (KUIC) that in this case the employer failed to honor the conditions of hire when it did not send Brumfield to insurance school as it had promised. I also agree that the employer unilaterally changed the conditions of hire when it told Brumfield that she would have to "earn the right" to go to insurance school. Thus, I agree with KUIC that Brumfield acted reasonably and with good cause in quitting unsuitable work. See Nichols v. Kentucky Unemployment Commission, Ky.App., 677 S.W.2d 317 (1984).
Although KUIC did not specifically address this issue, I believe Brumfield also had good cause to quit when she was directed by her employer to illegally perform the work of an agent without being properly licensed. See Cobb v. King Kwik Minit Market, Inc., Ky., 675 S.W.2d 386 (1984).
I would reverse the judgment and reinstate the award made by KUIC.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: Mary J. Brumfield, Pro Se Dansville, NY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: David H. Neeley Prestonsburg, KY