RENDERED: October 11, 1996; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
NO. 95-CA-002356-MR COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE WILLIAM L. KNOPF, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 94-CI-003504
HOLLY L. LAY and PRO SYSTEMS II, INC. APPELLEES
OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: DYCHE, GUDGEL and HUDDLESTON, Judges.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE. After voluntarily terminating her employment with Pro Systems II, Inc. ("Pro Systems"), Holly Lay filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits. The Division of Unemployment Insurance determined that Lay was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because she voluntarily quit her job without good cause. See Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 341.370(1)(c). Lay appealed to a referee who decided that she had good cause for terminating the employment and set aside the decision of the Division of Unemployment Insurance. Pro Systems then appealed to the Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission ("KUIC"). The Commission held that Lay quit without good cause and set aside the referee's decision. Lay appealed to Jefferson Circuit Court which reversed KUIC's decision prompting KUIC to appeal to this Court.
Judicial review of unemployment issues "is governed by the rule that if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence of probative value, then they must be accepted as binding and it must then be determined whether or not the administrative agency has applied the correct rule of law." Raines v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, Ky.App., 669 S.W.2d 928, 929 (1983). As the circuit court explained, the facts surrounding the termination of Lay's employment are not in dispute:
Lay was employed by Pro Systems . . . as a receptionistsecretary for eighteen months. Lay was scheduled for an annual performance review in July 1993. However, there was no review as Lay was scheduled for surgery in August for a chronic illness. Nevertheless, there was some discussion between Lay and her supervisor, Al Pollock (hereinafter Pollock). As Lay was having a difficult [time] performing her work, she requested that a parttime person be employed to lighten the workload. Pollock was noncommittal as he felt Lay's difficulty was the result of her illness and she would be able to do all the work once she had her surgery.
Lay was off for six weeks following the surgery. After returning to work in September, she still felt she was overworked and underpaid. However, Lay did not restate her concerns about the hectic work schedule to her supervisors.
Approximately two weeks prior to her leaving her job, Lay sought counseling from Maria Hines (hereinafter Hines). Lay confided to Hines that she felt excessive demands were being placed on her at work, that she was overworked and under-compensated, and that the work place surroundings left much to be desired. Hines observed Lay to be very distraught and in a state of acute anxiety, and recommended that Lay quit her job to preserve her mental and physical health. As a result of her employment conditions and on the advice of her counselor, Lay terminated her employment on January 25, 1994.
Since the facts are undisputed, the only issue before us is the correct application of KRS 341.370(1)(c) to this case.
In relevant part, KRS 341.370(1)(c) provides that a worker is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if "[h]e [or she] has left his [or her] most recent suitable work or any other suitable work which occurred after the first day of the worker's base period and which last preceded his most recent work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employment." (Emphasis supplied.) Interpreting the statutory "good cause" requirement, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has explained that "[g]ood cause for voluntarily quitting work exists only when the worker is faced with circumstances so compelling as to leave no reasonable alternative but loss of employment." Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Murphy, Ky., 539 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1976). See also Raines, 669 S.W.2d at 928; and Nichols v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, Ky.App., 677 S.W.2d 317, 321 (1984).
The circuit court found that the KUIC misapplied the KRS 341.370(1)(c) "good cause" requirement:
The evidence is clear that Lay complained about the workload, her employer did nothing to alleviate the workload but rather adopted a wait-and-see policy, Lay became anxious and distressed with her job, and ultimately Lay terminated her employment based on the advice of her counselor. The referee construed these circumstances to constitute good cause attributable to work. This Court concurs. This Court could find no language in KRS Chapter 341 which would require an employee to notify her employer of egregious work conditions prior to her termination in order to allow the employer to rectify the matter. All that is required is that the work conditions
be so compelling as to leave the employee no choice but to quit. As an employer has a duty to oversee the work environment and the work load of its employees, this Court finds the KUIC erred when it held that the onus was on the employee to inform the employer of intolerable work conditions. As such, this Court finds there is no basis in law for the KUIC to find that Lay is denied unemployment benefits merely because she failed to inform her employer of the intolerable work conditions. (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree. Where an employee has made an honest attempt to adjust to unreasonably hectic working conditions and discovers that it is impossible to cope with the working conditions, he or she may well have good cause to terminate the employment. See generally Nichols, 6 77 S .W.2d a t 3 21, w hich o bserves t hat " the C ommission itself has consistently granted benefits on the basis of good cause when a claimant was faced with an increased workload with no corresponding increase in compensation".
After Lay informed her supervisor that her workload had become overwhelming and her request for assistance was denied, she attempted to continue performing her duties. Lay even sought counseling to help her deal with the admittedly hectic work conditions and excessive demands placed upon her. When Lay's counselor advised her that continuing the employment relationship could be detrimental to her mental and physical health, she was left with no reasonable alternative but to terminate her employment. The fact that she did not again request relief from her supervisor is not sufficient to disqualify her from receiving unemployment benefits.
Accordingly, the judgment from which this appeal is prosecuted is affirmed.
GUDGEL, JUDGE, CONCURS. DYCHE, JUDGE, DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE OPINION. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Randall K. Justice WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT CABINET Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Scott M. Miller MILLER & MEADE Louisville, Kentucky