NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

DONALD POYNTER    JEFFREY A. MODISETT
Poynter & Bucheri    Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
             RANDI F. ELFENBAUM
            Deputy Attorney General
            Indianapolis, Indiana


IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

YVETTE VANDALSEN,              )
                                    )
    Appellant-Claimant,             )
                                    )
        vs.                         )    No. 93A02-9702-EX-102
                                    )
REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA         )
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE             )
DEVELOPMENT and GEN CORP., INC.     )
                                    )
    Appellee.                       )


APPEAL FROM THE REVIEW BOARD OF THE
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Case No. 96-19378 96-R-3125

September 15, 1997

MEMORANDUM DECISION* - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

KIRSCH, Judge

     * Pursuant to Appellate Rule 15, this memorandum decision shall not be regarded as precedent nor cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel or the law of the case.

    Yvette VanDalsen appeals a decision rendered by the Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (the Board) denying her claim for unemployment benefits. The Board's decision was based upon IC 22-4-15-1(c)(1)(A) which provides in pertinent part:
    "An individual shall not be subject to disqualification [from unemployment benefits] because of separation from his prior employment if . . . he left to accept with another employer previously secured permanent full-time work which offered reasonable expectation of betterment of wages or working conditions and thereafter was employed on said job for not less than ten (10) weeks . . . ."

VanDalsen left her prior employment to accept previously secured permanent full-time work which offered a reasonable expectation of betterment of wages or working conditions, but she worked at the latter employment for less than ten weeks. On appeal, she contends that the ten-week requirement of IC 22-4-15-1(c)(1)(A) violates the equal protection guarantees found in the Indiana and United States constitutions.See footnote 1
    We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The findings of fact made by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and adopted by the Board are:
    "[VanDalsen] was employed by [appellee Gen Corp.] from April 26, 1994 until the last work day on September 13, 1996. [VanDalsen] was a production worker, whose duties were to paint and pack out automotive parts. [VanDalsen] earned $9.56 per hour as a full-time employee. [VanDalsen] voluntarily left the employment on September 19, 1996 to accept a better paying position which was closer to home. [VanDalsen] accepted a better

paying position with Square D, Peru, Indiana. The position was previously secured permanent full-time work, which paid $13.03 per hour. [VanDalsen] began her employment with the second employer on September 16, 1996 which continued until the last work day on October 17, 1996. [VanDalsen] was not simultaneously employed with the two employers despite an overlap of time due to the fact that [VanDalsen] took four vacation days with [Gen Corp.]. [VanDalsen] did not work with the second employer ten weeks."

Record at 7-8. The ALJ determined that even though VanDalsen left her job with Gen Corp. to accept previously secured permanent full-time work which offered a reasonable expectation of betterment of wages , she was not entitled to unemployment benefits because she did not work in the new job for the ten weeks required by IC 22-4-15-1(c)(1)(A).
    VanDalsen appealed the ALJ's decision to the Board. The Board affirmed the ALJ's decision, which VanDalsen appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    VanDalsen does not challenge the substance of the Board's decision. Rather, she claims that the ten-week requirement contained in IC 22-4-15-1(c)(1)(A) violates her constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. This court has had several occasions to consider this precise issue, and, on each occasion, has upheld the constitutionality of the ten- week requirement. See Pazzaglia v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Employment and Training Servs., 608 N.E.2d 1375 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied; Lafferty v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Employment and Training Servs., 600 N.E.2d 1378 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied; Wade v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Employment and Training Servs. , 599 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Vicari v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Dep't of Employment and Training Servs. , 568 N.E.2d 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied. The

ten-week requirement satisfies equal protection principles because the requirement is rationally related to the legitimate State interests of employment stability and protection of the first employer's interest. Pazzaglia, 608 N.E.2d at 1377-78 (employment stability); Lafferty, 600 N.E.2d at 1383 (employment stability and protection of the first employer's interest).
    VanDalsen acknowledges this precedent, but asks this court to revisit the issue "due [to] the length of time since those decisions and based upon the reasoning stated in the holdings of those cases[.]" Appellant's Brief at 2. She relies on the dissenting opinion of Judge Shields in Lafferty, which sets forth compelling public policy reasons for preventing employees from having to bear the entire loss when their better employment is terminated in less than ten weeks. The enforcement of such public policy goals, however, would take a revision of the statute, a task reserved for our legislature.
    Changing jobs is always a risky undertaking. Placing such risk on employees for ten weeks before passing it on to the first employer is rationally related to the State's legitimate interests in promoting employment stability and protecting the first employer's interest. As stated in Pazzaglia, which was decided less than five years ago, "[w]e decline [the] invitation to disregard our prior precedent." 608 N.E.2d at 1378.
    Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and GARRARD, J., concur.

Footnote:     1 See U.S. C ONST. amend. XIV, § 1; I ND. C ONST. art. 1, § 23.

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