THOMAS M. WEINLAND STEPHEN R. CARTER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
JOBY JERRELLS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ABDINASIR ABDIRIZAK, )
)
Appellant-Claimant, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-0406-EX-462
)
REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA )
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE )
DEVELOPMENT and ELWOOD STAFFING )
SERVICES INC., )
)
Appellee-Employer. )
APPEAL FROM THE INDIANA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
The Honorable Susan K. Kelly, Chairperson
The Honorable George H. Baker, Member
The Honorable Sheri L. Clark, Member
Cause No. 04-R-887
APRIL 28, 2005
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
BARTEAU, Senior Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Appellant Abdinasir Abdirizak appeals the determination of the Defendant-Appellee Review Board of the
Indiana Department of Workforce Development (Review Board) denying his claim for unemployment benefits.
We reverse the Review Boards decision and remand to the Review Board for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ISSUE
Abdirizak presents two issues for our review, one of which is dispositive:
whether the Review Board erred by affirming the administrative law judges (ALJ) decision
denying Abdirizak unemployment benefits where Abdirizak claimed he never received notice of the
hearing.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Abdirizak was employed by Elwood Staffing Services, Inc. from July 2002 until July
2003, when he was discharged. Abdirizak was terminated for failing to come
to work and failing to call his employer to inform his employer he
would not be there. Thereafter, Abdirizak filed for unemployment benefits. In
August 2003, a claims deputy determined that Abdirizak was eligible to receive benefits.
Elwood Staffing Services appealed this determination, and the Department of Workforce Development
mailed notices on October 17, 2003, that a hearing was set for the
appeal filed by Elwood Staffing Services. Abdirizak marked the box on the
second page of the notice that stated I will participate in the hearing
and returned the page to the ALJ, as indicated on the form.
On October 27, 2003, the Department of Workforce Development mailed another notice stating
that Elwood Staffing Services had requested that the hearing be postponed. The
notice additionally informed the parties that the ALJ had granted the postponement and
that the ALJ would notify the parties at a later time of the
date and time for the re-scheduled hearing. Subsequently, on November 18, 2003,
the Department of Workforce Development allegedly mailed a notice to the parties informing
them that the hearing on Elwood Staffing Services appeal was re-scheduled for December
8, 2003. This time the second page of the notice where the
parties indicate whether they will participate at the hearing was not marked and
returned to the ALJ by Abdirizak.
The hearing was held on December 8, 2003, at which time Elwood Staffing
Services appeared. Abdirizak was not present for the hearing. The ALJ
reversed the original determination and found that Abdirizak had been discharged for cause
such that he was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. On December 15,
2003, the Department of Workforce Development mailed notices to the parties notifying them
of the decision of the ALJ. On December 31, 2003, Abdirizak filed
with the Department of Workforce Development his application for leave to introduce additional
evidence to the review board indicating that he had not received notice of
the re-scheduled hearing. The Review Board denied Abdirizaks request to submit additional
evidence on March 30, 2004. From that determination, Abdirizak now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Abdirizak contends that the Review Board erred by affirming the ALJs decision denying
him unemployment benefits in light of his claim that he had not received
notice of the hearing.
When reviewing a decision by the Review Board, our task is to determine
whether the decision is reasonable in light of its findings. Stanrail Corp.
v. Unemployment Ins. Review Bd., 734 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Our review of the Review Boards findings is subject to a substantial
evidence standard of review. Stanrail Corp. v. Review Bd. of Dept. of
Workforce Development, 735 N.E.2d 1197, 1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). In this
analysis, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility, and we consider
only the evidence most favorable to the Review Boards findings. Id.
Further, we will reverse the decision only if there is no substantial evidence
to support the Review Boards findings. Id.
The Indiana Employment Security Act ("the Act") is given a liberal construction in
favor of employees. Scott v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dept. of Workforce
Development, 725 N.E.2d 993, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). It merits such
a construction because it is social legislation with underlying humanitarian purposes. Id.
The Act provides that parties to a disputed claim for unemployment benefits
are to be afforded "a reasonable opportunity for fair hearing." Ind. Code
§ 22-4-17-3. We interpret this provision to include reasonable notice, which requires
that parties receive actual, timely notice. Id. Where an administrative agency
does in fact send notice through the regular course of mail, a presumption
arises that such notice is received. Id. However, that presumption is
rebuttable. Id.
In Carter v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dept. of Employment and Training Services,
526 N.E.2d 717 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), Carter filed a claim for unemployment
benefits after he was discharged from his employment. The claims deputy found
him eligible for benefits. Carters employer appealed, and notices of the hearing
date were sent to the parties. Although the notice was not returned
to the sender, Carter claimed he never received the notice. The employer
appeared for the hearing, but Carter was not present. The hearing was
conducted in Carters absence, and the earlier decision was reversed by the referee.
Carter appealed from this determination on the basis that he had no
notice of the hearing. The Review Board affirmed the referees decision to
deny Carter benefits without addressing his claim of lack of notice.
See footnote
A panel of this Court determined that because there was a factual dispute
about whether Carter had received notice of the hearing, the case had to
be reversed and remanded for a hearing on Carters claim of inadequate notice.
In remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing, this Court stated:
Carter cannot be found to have been afforded an opportunity to be heard
as mandated by the doctrine of procedural due process, if he was not
apprised of the time and place of the referees hearing. If, on
the other hand, Carter is unable to overcome the presumption that he did
receive notice through the mail, then he was afforded an opportunity to be
heard which he effectively waived by failing to be present at the hearing.
Id. at 719.
In Carter, it was uncontested that notice was sent to Carter; the only
fact in dispute was whether Carter actually received notice of the evidentiary hearing.
Here, it is disputed both whether the notice was actually sent and
whether Abdirizak received notice of the hearing. As occurred in Carter, the
notice in the present case was not returned to the sender. However,
it is interesting to note that the second page of the notice where
each party indicates their intent to participate or not participate in the hearing
was not returned to the ALJ by Abdirizak as was the second page
of the original notice of October 17, 2003, on which Abdirizak had indicated
he would participate in the hearing. Moreover, the form of the Department
of Workforce Development entitled Docket Notes contains, under the category labeled Mailed, a
date stamp for the mailing of the notice of the continuance on October
27, 2003, as well as a date stamp for the mailing of the
December 15, 2003 notice of the ALJs decision. Appellants Appendix at 35.
Notably, however, there is no date stamp or other indication of the
mailing of the notice dated November 18, 2003, which provided the date and
time of the re-scheduled evidentiary hearing.
There are two facets of due process at work in this case.
The first is Abdirizaks opportunity to be heard on his lack of notice.
See Carter, 526 N.E.2d at 719. Abdirizak has not had an
opportunity to present evidence on the notice issue because his Application for Leave
to Introduce Additional Evidence to Review Board was denied without hearing. If
Abdirizak is able to show that he did not receive notice of the
hearing, then he was not afforded an opportunity to be heard and, thus,
he was not afforded due process on his underlying substantive claim. This
brings us to the second facet of due process with which we are
concerned: Abdirizaks right to be heard on the underlying substantive claim.
See id. Therefore, given the circumstances, an evidentiary hearing on Abdirizaks claim
of inadequate notice is necessary in order to determine whether the requirements of
due process have been met in this case.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing discussion and authorities, we conclude that the Review Board
erred by affirming the administrative law judges (ALJ) decision denying Abdirizak unemployment benefits
where Abdirizak claimed he never received notice of the hearing.
Reversed and remanded to the Review Board for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
NAJAM, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
Footnote:
We note that in reversing and remanding Carters case for an evidentiary
hearing on the notice issue, this Court stated that the information contained in
Carters Request for Appeal to the Review Board was sufficient to meet the
conditions under which the Review Board will hear additional evidence on a claim
even though Carter did not file an Application for Leave to Introduce Additional
Evidence to Review Board. In the instant case, it was an Application
for Leave to Introduce Additional Evidence to Review Board that Abdirizak filed in
which he stated that he did not have notice of the hearing.