IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 12 / 00-0340
Filed February 27, 2002
TITAN TIRE CORPORATION,
Appellant,
vs.
EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD,
Appellee. 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk CountRobert 
y, D. Wilson, Judge.
Employer appeals district court’s decision on judicial 
review affirming agency’s determination that striking 
workers were eligible for unemployment benefits.  
AFFIRMED.
Gene R. La Suer and Becky S. Knutson of Davis, BroShors 
wn, Koehn, & Roberts, P.C., Des Moines, for appell
ant.
Richard R. Ramsey, Des Moines, for appellee.
Mark T. Hedberg and Joseph L. Walsh of Hedberg, OwDes 
ens, & Hedberg, P.C., Moines, for United Steel Workers 
of America, Local 164.
TERNUS, Justice.
            In this appeal, we must decide whether
 the appellee, Employment Appeal Board, correctly determined 
that striking workers of appellant, Titan Tire Corwere 
poration, eligible for unemployment benefits.  Although 
striking employees are normally disqualified from receiving 
benefits, see Iowa Code § 96.5(4) (1997), the agency 
determined that Titan Tire had severed its employment 
relationship with the strikers, ending their disquThis 
alification.  determination rested on the agency’s
 findings that the employer had, to some extent, permanently 
replaced its striking workforce and had not notified 
the replaced workers that jobs were still available 
to them should they choose to return to work.
The agency’s ruling was affirmed by the district court 
on judicial review.  Finding no error in the legal
 principles applied by the agency and finding substantial 
evidence in the record to support its factual detewe 
rminations, affirm. 
I.  Scope of Review.
Iowa’s Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code chapter 
17A, governs our review of unemployment benefit caIowa 
ses.  Dico, Inc. v. Employment Appeal Bd., 576 N.W
.2d 352, 354 (Iowa 1998).  Section 17A.19(8) provides 
that a party may successfully challenge an agency decision 
when the party’s substantial rights have been prejudiced 
because the agency action “is unsupported by substantial 
evidence” or “is affected by other error of law.” 
 Iowa Code § 17A.19(8).  The court may “affirm, reor 
verse, modify, grant any other appropriate equitable 
or legal relief.”  Schoenfeld v. FDL Foods, Inc., 560 
N.W.2d 595, 598 (Iowa 1997).
Our review is for correction of errors of law.  PanDa 
Eng’g v. Eng’g & Land Surveying Examining Bd., 621
 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Iowa 2001).  Because it is not de 
novo, we do “not reassess the weight to be accorded 
various items of evidence.  Weight of evidence remains 
within the agency’s exclusive domain.”  Burns v. Bof 
d. Nursing, 495 N.W.2d 698, 699 (Iowa 1993).  Consf 
equently, “[i]the agency’s findings of fact are supported 
by substantial evidence, those findings are binding 
on judicial review.”  PanDa Eng’g, 621 N.W.2d at 1Evidence 
98.  “is substantial if a reasonable person would find 
it adequate for reaching a conclusion, even though
 a reviewing court might reach a contrary inferencOscar 
e.”  Mayer Foods Corp. v. Tasler, 483 N.W.2d 824, 830 
(Iowa 1992).  In determining whether substantial evidence 
exists, the court considers all the evidence, including 
that offered in opposition to the agency’s finding495 
s.  Burns, N.W.2d at 699.  “We apply agency findings 
broadly and liberally to uphold, rather than to dean 
feat, agency’s decision.”  Organic Techs. Corp. v.
 State ex rel. Iowa Dep’t of Natural Res., 609 N.W
.2d 809, 815 (Iowa 2000). 
II.  Background Facts and Proceedings.
The following facts are supported by substantial eOn 
vidence.  May 1, 1998, approximately 650 members of 
the United Steel Workers of America, Local 164 walked 
off the job at the Titan Tire factory in Des MoineThe 
s.  company asserted the strike was the result of economic 
issues upon which the company and the union could not 
agree; the union, however, maintained that the strike 
was the result of unfair labor practices committed
 by Titan Tire.
In the weeks after the strike began, Maurice Taylochief 
r, executive officer of Titan International Inc., held 
various press conferences in which he discussed the 
continuing strike at the Des Moines plant.  In a press 
conference on May 14, 1998, he stated if a settlement 
is not reached with the union, “we will start moving 
equipment out of the Des Moines facility to the Brlocation 
ownsville[, Texas] and it will be irreversible.”  At 
a subsequent press conference in early June 1998, Taylor 
made similar statements.  Taylor announced that Titan 
Tire would move tire-making equipment to Texas because 
of the ongoing strike in Des Moines.  This shift in 
production, according to Taylor, would permanently
 move as many as 300 jobs out of the Iowa plant.  He 
stated that his decision was “irrevocable.”  
Two weeks after Taylor’s second press conference, on 
June 17, 1998, all bargaining unit members of the union 
were sent a certified letter from Gary Carlson, president 
of Titan Tire.  In this letter, Carlson stated that 
the company would be submitting to the union “its and 
last, best, final offer” on June 22, 1998. Carlson
 enclosed the offer for the members to review.  After 
generally stating the terms of the new offer, the letter 
continued: 
We ask that you now return to work in accordance with 
the attached schedule.  You will be paid in accordance 
with the new agreement and we will immediately begin 
to use the new contract language.  If you fail to report 
back to work in accordance with the enclosed schedTitan 
ule, Tire will hire permanent replacement workers to 
fill your position and you may lose your right to return 
to work.
(Emphasis added.)  The attachment scheduled employees 
to return to work between June 21 and June 24, 199This 
8.  letter was the last written communication between 
the company and the striking union members concerning 
the availability of jobs.
Despite the company’s request that the striking workers 
return to work, nearly all of the union members remained 
on strike.  After the certified letter was sent, John 
Peno, president of the union, learned from company
 management that jobs were being moved out of the Des 
Moines plant to Texas and that new hires had replaced 
union members.
In late July, Taylor appeared at a rally in front of 
Titan International’s headquarters in Illinois and
 was quoted in the newspaper as saying:
“It’s a tragedy, because we’re running in Des Moines 
with 200-some (new) employees, so most of the people 
on that line don’t have jobs, even if they had a c
ontract.”
“They’re out of jobs.              They don’t understand 
this, and the union is not telling them the truth.
”
“They got their best and final offer and that’s where 
it is.  If they’re coming back, they’re coming back 
under the terms that we’ve set.  If they decide to
 come back, then what happens is, they only get the 
jobs that are left, by seniority.”
(Emphasis added.)
Based on information it had received, the Unemployment 
Insurance Bureau sent a letter of inquiry to Titan
 Tire on August 10, 1998.  The Bureau stated that it 
had learned that Titan Tire had reduced the Des Moines 
workforce by 200 to 300 jobs and had started to resume 
production at the plant with replacement workers. 
 It asked for specific information concerning the elimination 
of jobs at the Des Moines plant and the hiring of The 
replacements.  company responded, denying that the
 transfer of equipment to Texas had eliminated any
 more then 25 jobs and asserting that there were “many 
jobs available to striking workers who are willing
 to return to work.”  The company also stated in its 
response that approximately 250 workers had been granted 
permanent replacement status and that the hiring of 
replacement workers was an ongoing process.  Titan
 Tire claimed it later revoked the permanent status 
of the replacement workers to avoid having to provide 
their names and addresses to the union.  Neither the 
union nor its members were advised that the replacement 
workers were no longer considered permanent until the 
hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ).

Prior to the strike, Titan Tire had provided its employees 
with a 401(k) retirement plan, which the company held 
in each employee’s name until the employee retired
 or separated from the company.  After the strike,
 the company turned over only three accounts to strikers 
who had formally quit or retired, or who had been Other 
discharged.  striking employees were not given access 
to their retirement accounts because Titan Tire considered 
the striking workers to be employees in good stand
ing.  
            On August 31, 1998, the Bureau determined 
that striking workers who had made application for
 unemployment compensation were eligible for benefThe 
its.  decision stated that a stoppage of work had occurred 
at the Titan Tire plant due to a labor dispute.  It 
further stated that the strikers had been notified
 that they were being replaced, which terminated the 
employment relationship.  Therefore, concluded the
 Bureau, the strikers were entitled to benefits “as 
long as [they] met all the other eligibility requiThis 
rements.”  decision affected approximately 400 workers 
who had applied for unemployment compensation.
            Titan Tire appealed and an evidentiary
 hearing was held before an ALJ.  The ALJ found that 
Titan Tire had notified the strikers in its June letter 
that they would be replaced if they did not return
 to work as scheduled.  The ALJ concluded the employment 
relationship between the workers and Titan Tire was 
severed by the company’s hiring of permanent replacement 
workers unless the company proved that work was actually 
available to the strikers and that it had notified
 the strikers that jobs were still available.  The
 ALJ held that Titan Tire had in essence laid off 200 
workers when it transferred production to Texas anin 
d, addition, had hired 250 permanent replacements.
  In addition, the ALJ held that Titan Tire had not 
notified the union or its members that work was avthe 
ailable.  Accordingly, ALJ ruled that the claimants 
were eligible for benefits.  This decision was affirmed 
on appeal by the Employment Appeal Board and by the 
district court on judicial review.[1]  
Titan Tire has appealed to this court.  Because we
 think it is helpful to consider the issues raised
 on appeal in the context of the law applicable to
 unemployment compensation claims of striking workwe 
ers, briefly review the governing legal principles
 before reaching the merits of the employer’s appe
al.
III.  Law Governing Claims of Striking Workers.
An employee who is not working “due to a stoppage of 
work which exists because of a labor dispute” is disqualified 
from receiving unemployment benefits. Iowa Code § The 
96.5(4).  work stoppage must be the cause of the unemployment 
to result in disqualification.  Bridgestone/FirestEmployment 
one, Inc. v. Appeal Bd., 570 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa 1
997).
In Bridgestone/Firestone, we held that “when an employer 
permanently replaces striking workers, it thereby severs 
the employment relationship unless the employer can 
show work remained despite the replacement and the
 claimant was so advised.”  Id. at 95-96.  Thus, where 
striking workers have been permanently replaced and 
the employer fails to show that work remained and that 
workers were advised that work remained, “the labor 
dispute and its consequent work stoppage is no longer 
the cause of the claimants’ unemployment.”  Id. at
 95.  In those circumstances, the disqualification
 imposed by section 96.5(4) is removed.  Id.  We turn 
now to the issues on appeal. 
IV.  Issues on Appeal.
Titan Tire claims on appeal that the Board erred in 
determining that the striking workers were eligible 
for unemployment benefits.  There is no dispute that 
the striking workers were initially disqualified from 
receiving benefits pursuant to section 96.5(4).  The 
issue here is whether the employer severed the employment 
relationship by hiring replacement workers, thereby 
removing the disqualification.  The specific dispute 
with respect to this issue centers on whether the agency 
correctly determined that Titan Tire had not met its 
burden of proof under Bridgestone/Firestone to show 
that work was available and that it had so advised
 its employees.
On appeal, the employer asks this court “to determthat 
ine” the striking workers understood that work was
 available to them and that they had not been permanently 
replaced.  Because our review is at law, however, we 
are not at liberty to determine these facts anew. 
 The most that we can do is examine the record to assess 
whether there is substantial evidence to support the 
findings made by the agency.
Titan Tire also challenges a decision made by the ALJ 
at the hearing to admit certain newspaper articles
 offered by the claimants.  We will address this evidentiary 
ruling first.  
V.  Admission of Newspaper Articles. 
Titan Tire argues on appeal that evidence in the form 
of newspaper articles should not have been admitted 
by the ALJ.  It claims this evidence is inadmissible 
hearsay and that the requirements of Iowa Code section 
17A.14, governing the admission of evidence in a contested 
case hearing, were not met.  We find it unnecessary 
to determine whether the ALJ erred or abused its discretion 
in admitting this evidence because Titan Tire has not 
shown that any error prejudiced its substantial riSee 
ghts.  Iowa Code § 17A.19(8) (requiring party challenging 
contested case decision to show that its substantial 
rights were prejudiced).
The challenged evidence consists of newspaper accounts 
of statements made by Taylor at various press conferences 
that production had been moved to Texas, that this
 transfer of equipment eliminated jobs in Des Moinand 
es, that, in addition, the company was hiring replacements 
for the striking employees.  We do not think this evidence 
can be deemed prejudicial in view of the other evidence 
before the agency.  The company stated in response
 to the Bureau’s inquiry that it had hired 250 permanent 
replacements and that hiring of replacements was oAt 
ngoing.  the hearing, Titan Tire’s company represeWilliam 
ntative, Campbell, testified that “people were hired 
to come in and fill the jobs that were previously being 
done by bargaining unit employees.”  He confirmed that 
over 300 replacement workers had been employed by the 
date of the hearing.  Thus, the fighting issue in this 
case was not whether replacement workers were hirethe 
d—company admitted they were.  The determinative issue 
was whether the striking workers, who were notified 
that they would be permanently replaced, were also
 told that even if they did not return in accordance 
with the company’s schedule, there would be jobs available 
to them should they decide to come back to work after 
the June 24 deadline.  
In view of the fact that the challenged evidence did 
not impact the determinative issue in this case, we 
conclude any error or abuse of discretion in the admission 
of the newspaper articles did not prejudice the cos 
mpany’substantial rights.  Therefore, it is not necessary 
to determine the correctness of the ALJ’s ruling on 
this evidentiary matter.  We proceed now to consider 
whether the Board’s finding that Titan Tire did not 
notify the strikers that jobs were available despite 
the strikers’ failure to report to work as requested 
by the company is supported by substantial evidenc
e.
VI.  Notice to Strikers of Available Work.  
The parties agree that when the union workers walked 
off the job on May 1, 1998, there was a stoppage of 
work due to a labor dispute.  At that point in timthe 
e, claimants were disqualified from receiving unemployment 
benefits because the cause of their unemployment was 
the strike.  See Iowa Code § 96.5(4).  The contested 
issue here is whether the strikers continued to be
 unemployed due to the labor dispute after they failed 
to return to work in accordance with the schedule attached 
to the company’s June letter.  In that letter, Titan 
Tire told the claimants the company was making its
 “last, best, and final offer,” and if the strikers 
did not return as requested by the company, permanent 
replacements would be hired.
As noted previously, the agency concluded that Titan 
Tire had not proved the requirements established by 
Bridgestone/Firestone to continue the claimants’ dthat 
isqualification, namely, work was available and the 
strikers were so advised. 570 N.W.2d at 95-96.  The 
agency found that although some jobs still existed
 for striking workers after the deadline for the sreturn 
trikers’ to work had expired, the company had failed 
to show how many and which jobs remained.  See id.
 at 93 (discussing Canonsburg Gen. Hosp. v. Unemployment 
Compensation Bd. of Review, 628 A.2d 503, 510 (Pa.
 Commw. Ct. 1993), aff’d, 658 A.2d 790 (Pa. 1995),
 which stated “that should the employer choose to replace 
only some employees the burden is on it to demonstrate 
what employees it is replacing”).  In addition, the 
agency found that Titan Tire had not notified the striking 
employees collectively or individually that work was 
available.  On appeal, Titan Tire challenges both factual 
findings.  We find it necessary, however, to address 
only the finding that the strikers had not been told 
that “despite the hiring of permanent replacements
 work was still available to them.”  Id. at 95.  That 
is because “[e]ven if such work [was] available, failure 
to so advise the claimants will result in removing
 the section 96.5(4) disqualification.”  Id. 
Turning then to the record, we agree with the district 
court that there is substantial evidence to support 
the agency’s finding that the company did not notify 
the striking workers that jobs were available.  Titan 
Tire admitted at the hearing that no further contact 
was made with the striking workers concerning the availability 
of jobs after the June 17 letter indicating that workers 
would be replaced if they did not return as set forth 
in the attached schedule.  Union president Peno testified 
the union was never informed that permanent replacements 
had not been hired.  In fact, Peno testified that on 
August 20, 1998, in response to his demand that replacement 
workers would have to come out as a condition of any 
agreement, Taylor and Carlson “adamantly” said that 
would never happen because “those people have replaced 
your members.”  Thereafter, testified Peno, he told 
strikers who inquired about their employment status 
that they had been permanently replaced.
Titan Tire argues that the agency misinterpreted the 
June 17 letter and that Carlson, the company presiclearly 
dent, indicated in that letter that work was available 
for those wishing to return.  Although it is true that 
Titan Tire asked the strikers to return to their jimplying 
obs, that jobs were available at that time, the company 
stated in the same letter that “[i]f [the striking
 employees] fail to report back to work in accordance 
with the enclosed schedule, Titan Tire will hire permanent 
replacement workers to fill [their] position[s] and 
[the striking employees] may lose [their] right to
 return to work.”  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, the relevant 
question is not whether jobs were available on June 
17, but rather whether jobs were available upon expiration 
of the company’s return-to-work schedule on June 2
4.
The company also argues that, unlike the employer in 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Titan Tire never told its employees 
that they had actually been replaced.  See Bridges570 
tone/Firestone, N.W.2d at 87 (quoting letter from employer 
in which employer tells employees that they “had been 
permanently replaced”). We do not find this distinction 
to have any significance.  Titan Tire’s statement that 
it would hire permanent replacements if the employees 
did not return to work by June 24 amply supports the 
agency’s finding that a reasonable person in the striking 
workers’ position would understand that upon expiration 
of the scheduled resumption of work on June 24, 19permanent 
98, replacement workers would be hired for those strikers 
who failed to return.  This interpretation of the June 
letter is also supported by Union president Peno’s
 testimony concerning the later negotiations between 
the company and the union, at which time Taylor and 
Carlson indicated that permanent replacements had been 
hired.  In addition, in response to the Bureau’s ithe 
nquiry, company admitted in August 1998 that it had 
already hired 250 permanent replacements.  Even the 
company’s witness at trial conceded that the replacement 
workers had been considered permanent employees unfor 
til, unrelated reasons, they were subsequently reclassified 
as temporary.  Significantly, the record shows that 
Titan Tire never notified the union or the claimants 
that the status of the replacements had been changthe 
ed.  Thus, record shows that, until the hearing in
 late October 1998, the strikers reasonably believed 
the company had permanently replaced them just as it 
had stated it would.  We conclude, therefore, that
 there is substantial evidence to support the agens 
cy’interpretation of the June letter to striking ethat 
mployees, namely, after the June 24 deadline, jobs
 would no longer be available to the claimants.  Athis 
ccordingly, letter effectively terminated the employment 
of strikers who did not return as requested, unless 
jobs continued to be available and the employer notified 
the claimants of that fact as required by our BridFirestone 
gestone/decision.   
Titan Tire seeks to avoid the requirement that it must 
inform strikers that jobs remained available despite 
the employment of replacements on the basis that the 
strike here was alleged by the union to be the result 
of unfair labor practices committed by Titan Tire.
  The company argues that under the National Labor
 Relations Act an employer cannot legally permanently 
replace a worker who is striking due to unfair labor 
practices.  See Pirelli Cable Corp. v. NLRB, 141 F
.3d 503, 510 n.1 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[u
]nfair labor practice strikers are entitled to immediate 
reinstatement upon their unconditional offer to return 
to work regardless of whether replacement workers have 
been hired by the employer during the strike” (citing 
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278, 76 
S. Ct. 349, 355-56, 100 L. Ed.  309, 319 (1956))).
  While this prohibition may exist, it does not impact 
the present dispute.  The issue here is not whether 
Titan Tire could legally replace the striking workthe 
ers; issue here is whether Titan Tire informed the
 strikers that it had not permanently replaced them 
after having told them it would do so if they did not 
return to work by June 24, 1998. 
The company also argues that it should not be held
 to the notification requirement adopted in BridgeFirestone 
stone/because it is prohibited by federal law from
 contacting striking workers. The employer relies on 
cases that hold it is a violation of the National Labor 
Relations Act to solicit workers to abandon an unfpractices 
air-labor-strike and return to work.  See, e.g., NLRB 
v. Robin Am. Corp., 654 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. NLRB 
1981); v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 192 F.2d 144, 53 
152-(7th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.
, 133 F.2d 676, 681-82 (9th Cir. 1943).  The persuasiveness 
of this argument is somewhat undermined by the fact 
that this prohibition apparently did not discourage 
Titan Tire from communicating with the striking union 
members on June 17.  Nonetheless, even if the company 
was prohibited by federal law from asking striking
 workers to return to work, it could have informed
 the union that jobs were still available to the strikers 
despite the employment of replacement workers.  We
 think that under the circumstances here, where the 
union claimed the strike was based on the company’s 
unfair labor practices, notice to the union that job 
openings continued to exist for all workers on strike 
would have met the employer’s notification responsibility 
under Bridgestone/Firestone.  Consequently, we do not 
think the nature of the strike involved in this case 
relieved Titan Tire of its responsibility to advise 
the strikers via notification to the union that work 
remained available.
VII.  Conclusion.
In summary, we find error, if any, in the admission 
of newspaper accounts of statements made by company 
representatives did not prejudice Titan Tire’s substantial 
rights.  In addition, there is substantial evidence 
to support the agency’s finding that the employer did 
not notify its striking workers that they still had 
jobs after informing them they would be replaced if 
they did not return to work as scheduled.  As a cothe 
nsequence, company’s hiring of replacement workers
 terminated the employment relationship and removed 
the disqualification imposed on the strikers by section 
96.5(4).  Finding no error in the Board’s decision
 that the striking employees were eligible for unemployment 
compensation, we affirm.  
AFFIRMED.
[1] Throughout these proceedings the union has participated 
on behalf of the claimants.