Supreme Court of Iowa Decision
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Case Title: MICHELE SIERRA, Appellee, vs. EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD and EAGLE FOOD CENTERS, Appellants.
Date: 11/24/93
Bound Citation:
Summary: No. 364 / 92-1912
Decision: Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County,
J.L. Burns, Judge.

Appeal from district court review of agency action which
reversed the decision of the Employment Appeal Board denying
appellee unemployment compensation benefits. AFFIRMED.

Robert P. Boeye and Carl A. Walker of Califf & Harper,
P.C., Moline, Illinois, for appellant employer.

William C. Whitten, Employment Appeal Board, for
appellant board.

Tommy Miller of HELP Legal Assistance, Davenport, for
appellee.

Considered by Harris, P.J., and Carter, Lavorato, Snell,
and Ternus, JJ.

SNELL, J.
On this appeal we decide whether appellee, Michele
Sierra, who was placed on forced medical leave from her job
with Eagle Food Centers because she suffered from epileptic
seizures, is eligible for unemployment benefits. An
administrative law judge found Sierra unable to work and
thus ineligible for unemployment compensation under Iowa
law. The district court found Sierra able to work and
reversed the agency decision. The employer, Eagle Food
Centers ("Eagle"), along with the Employment Appeal Board,
appeal from the district court's reversal of the action
pursuant to the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. We
affirm.
I. Scope of Review.
The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act sets forth the
standards for judicial review of agency action. Iowa Code
Sec. 17A.19 (1991). "An aggrieved or adversely affected party
to the judicial review proceeding may obtain a review of any
final judgment of the district court under this chapter by
appeal." Id. Sec. 17A.20. "The appeal shall be taken as in
other civil cases . . . ." Id. In "other civil cases," our
standard of review is for errors at law. Id. Thus, our
duty in this case "is to correct errors of law made by the
district court." Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n,
318 N.W.2d 162, 164-65 (Iowa 1982). The district court when
reviewing final agency action is itself functioning as an
appellate tribunal. Id. at 165.
Thus, when this court reviews a decision of a
district court rendered pursuant to section
17A.19, the sole question is whether the district
court correctly applied the law. In order to make
that determination, this court applies the
standards of section 17A.19(8) to the agency
action to determine whether this court's
conclusions are the same as those of the district
court.
Jackson County Pub. Hosp. v. Public Employment Relations
Bd., 280 N.W.2d 426, 429-30 (Iowa 1979).
The factual findings of an administrative tribunal will
be upheld if supported by "substantial evidence in the
record made before the agency when that record is viewed as
a whole." Iowa Code Sec. 17A.19(8)(f). A reviewing court
gives deference to agency findings of fact. Cerro Gordo
County Care Facility v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 401 N.W.2d
192, 196 (Iowa 1987). However, we will set aside agency
findings if the record clearly shows the agency decision
unjustified. Id.
II. Issues.
Eagle raises two issues: first, whether there was
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support a
finding that Sierra is unable to work, and second, whether
the district court correctly applied this court's decision
in Foods, Inc., by holding that if "reasonably accommodated"
Sierra would be able to work. See Foods, Inc., 318 N.W.2d
at 167.
III. Factual Record.
The record before the administrative agency shows that
Sierra worked for Eagle for three years. Sierra started as
a grocery bagger for Eagle. Later she was promoted to a
position as a cashier. On July 29, 1991, she suffered an
epileptic seizure while working. Eagle placed Sierra on
forced medical leave. In the preceding eighteen weeks Eagle
documented six seizures suffered by Sierra. Sierra admits
periodically forgetting to take her medicine which controls
her condition. In the three years Sierra worked for Eagle,
however, Sierra never injured herself or injured another
person as a result of her seizures.
Sierra's physician, Dr. Daniel Johnson, believed Sierra
was able to work provided she did not drive, climb heights,
or operate dangerous equipment. Dr. Robert Milas also
medically evaluated Sierra at the request of Eagle.
According to Dr. Milas, Sierra had "a considerable problem
with compliance and this is a major factor in controlling
her seizure disorder." Dr. Milas also found Sierra a risk
to herself in an employment setting due to the danger of
"frequent falls." Dr. Milas concluded:

[W]hile it cannot be categorically stated it is
unsafe for this patient to have any form of
occupation I feel the frequent seizures do pose a
significant risk to the patient and this has to be
taken into account with regard to any employment
the patient engages in.

Sierra testified that she does not have grand mal
seizures and she can sense when her seizures are about to
occur. During the time she worked for Eagle, Sierra always
went to a fellow employee when she sensed an oncoming
seizure. The employee would relieve Sierra for five minutes
until her seizure passed. After her placement on forced
medical leave, Sierra filed for unemployment benefits with
the job service division of the Iowa Department of
Employment. A job service division representative found
Sierra unable to work and ineligible for unemployment
compensation. Her benefits were discontinued and she was
ordered to pay back some benefits she had received.
Sierra appealed the decision of the job service
representative. An administrative law judge (ALJ) held a
hearing on Sierra's eligibility for unemployment benefits.
In its decision the ALJ made three findings. First, the ALJ
found "[t]he claimant is an epileptic and has suffered
several seizures weekly." The ALJ found Sierra "did not
take her medication on a regular basis, which resulted in
seizures." Finally, the ALJ found "[t]here are no
employment opportunities for this claimant because of her
illness and because of her noncompliance with her
requirement to take medication." The ALJ also held, as a
matter of law, that this court's decision in Foods, Inc.,
requiring employers to reasonably accommodate workers with
disabilities, was inapplicable to this case. The ALJ held
Foods, Inc. applied only to discharge from employment
cases. It held Foods, Inc. inapplicable to cases involving
determinations of an employee's ability to work for the
purpose of determining the employee's eligibility for
unemployment compensation.
The district court, on appeal, reversed the decision of
the ALJ. First, the court took issue with the ALJ's factual
findings, particularly with regard to the medical evidence
in the case. The court also held the ALJ erred as a matter
of law for the reason that our decision in Foods, Inc., was
applicable to Sierra's case. The court found that with
reasonable accommodation Sierra was able to work and
eligible for unemployment benefits.
IV. Unemployment Compensation Law.
Iowa Code section 96.4 provides in relevant part:
An unemployed individual shall be eligible to
receive benefits with respect to any week only if
the division of job service finds that:
. . . .
3. The individual is able to work, is
available for work, and is earnestly and actively
seeking work.

Iowa Code Sec. 96.4(3).
An ability to work is the first of three prerequisite
findings that must be made in order for an individual to be
eligible for unemployment benefits. Id. To be found able
to work, "[a]n individual must be physically and mentally
able to work in some gainful employment, not necessarily in
the individual's customary occupation, but which is engaged
in by others as a means of livelihood." Geiken v. Lutheran
Home for the Aged Ass'n, 468 N.W.2d 223, 225-26 (Iowa 1991);
see also Iowa Admin. Code r. 345-4.22(1)(b) (1988) ("[T]he
individual must be physically able to work, not necessarily
in the individual's customary occupation, but able to work
in some reasonably suitable, comparable, gainful, full-time
endeavor, other than self-employment, which is generally
available in the labor market in which the individual
resides.").
V. Reasonable Accommodation Law.
Iowa Code section 601A.6 makes it an unfair or
discriminatory employment practice:

to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, or
refer for employment, to discharge any employee,
or to otherwise discriminate in employment against
any applicant for employment or any employee
because of the . . . disability of such applicant
or employee, unless based upon the nature of the
occupation. If a disabled person is qualified to
perform a particular occupation, by reason of
training or experience, the nature of that
occupation shall not be the basis for exception to
the unfair or discriminating practices prohibited
by this subsection.

Iowa Code Sec. 601A.6(1)(a).
In Foods, Inc., this court held that section 601A.6
requires employers to make "reasonable accommodations" for
employees with disabilities. Foods, Inc., 318 N.W.2d at
167. "Reasonable accommodation by the employer may take
many forms." Cerro Gordo County Care Facility, 401 N.W.2d
at 197. However, under Iowa law reasonable accommodation
"is only required to an extent that a refusal to provide
some accommodation would be discrimination itself." Id.
Employers are only bound to act reasonably. Id.
Reasonableness is a flexible standard and "must be measured
not only by the disabled employee's needs and desires, but
also by the economic and other realities faced by the
employer." Id.
VI. Contentions of Parties.
Eagle contends no accommodation could be made for Sierra
in light of her "refusal to take her medicine." Eagle
contends Sierra was "unqualified" for employment unless she
took her medication.
Eagle also contends substantial evidence exists in the
record to support the agency's finding of Sierra's inability
to work. Moreover, Eagle argues it was Sierra's burden to
prove her ability to work and contends she did not meet this
burden. According to Eagle, until Sierra proves she is
taking her medicine, she is unable to work.
Sierra contends the record made before the agency
clearly demonstrates her ability to work. Sierra points out
that her epileptic seizures never interfered with her
performance on the job when her condition was reasonably
accommodated. Sierra also notes her past successful work as
a janitor, a day care worker, and a food service worker.
Her epileptic seizures did not interfere in any way with her
performance of these duties.
Sierra also argues that under our decision in Foods,
Inc., an employer is required to reasonably accommodate
employees with disabilities. With reasonable accommodation,
Sierra claims she is able to work. Sierra also contends
there is no evidence she ever "refused" to take her
medications. She admits occasionally forgetting to take her
medications but contends the record does not show this
occasional forgetfulness caused an increase in the number of
seizures she suffered.
VII. Analysis.
The ALJ made only three findings in this case. First,
the ALJ found "[t]he claimant is an epileptic and has
suffered several seizures weekly." However, we find no
evidence supporting the agency's finding regarding the
frequency of Sierra's seizures. Eagle itself documented
only six seizures over a period of eighteen weeks. There is
no evidence in the record that Sierra suffered several
seizures each week. To the contrary, we believe the record
at most indicates Sierra suffered seizures on the average of
once every three weeks.
The ALJ further found Sierra "did not take her
medication on a regular basis, which resulted in seizures."
We find no substantial evidence in the record to support
these findings either. The only evidence supporting the
finding that Sierra regularly did not take her medicine is
found in Dr. Milas's report. Dr. Milas stated, "I feel the
patient does have a considerable problem with compliance and
this is a major factor in controlling her seizure
disorder." There is no explanation regarding what
"compliance" means. There is no documentation of the
frequency with which Sierra failed to take her medicine.
There is no evidence demonstrating that the frequency of
Sierra's seizures increased prior to her placement on forced
medical leave by Eagle. Dr. Milas's conclusory medical
opinion appears to have no evidentiary foundation. Based on
the record as a whole, we find no substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ's finding that Sierra regularly failed to
take her medicine and that this failure resulted in
seizures.
Finally, the ALJ found "[t]here are no employment
opportunities for this claimant because of her illness and
because of her noncompliance with her requirement to take
medication." This conclusion necessarily rests on the ALJ's
prior two findings. Moreover, we find no evidence in the
record demonstrating Sierra's inability to work despite her
"illness." Even Dr. Milas would not "categorically" state
Sierra was unable to work. To the contrary, the evidence
shows Sierra satisfactorily performed her duties at Eagle as
well as in her prior occupations. Viewing the record as a
whole, we find the ALJ's decision is unsupported by
substantial evidence.
Moreover, an employer is under a legal duty to
reasonably accommodate disabled workers. Foods, Inc., 318
N.W.2d at 167. We believe the district court properly
considered this factor in determining Sierra's ability to
work. An evaluation of an individual's ability to work for
the purposes of determining that individual's eligibility
for unemployment benefits must necessarily take into
consideration the economic and legal forces at work in the
general labor market in which the individual resides. See
Geiken, 468 N.W.2d at 225-26. The record shows Sierra
successfully performed her job if she could be briefly
relieved by a fellow employee when she felt the onset of a
seizure. Her seizure always passed within five minutes and
she would then return to her duties. Accommodating Sierra
in this manner in no way interfered with her job
performance. In addition, there is no evidence in the
record that accommodating Sierra in such a manner caused
Eagle unreasonable hardship.
We also find Eagle's claim of a factual distinction with
the Foods, Inc. case unsupported. Eagle fails to describe
for the court how the factual distinctions they raise
translate into legal error on the part of the district
court. We hold that our decision in Foods, Inc. applies to
issues concerning unemployment compensation under chapter 96
of the Code and is controlling in this case.
We recognize the claimant bears the burden of proving
her ability to work for the purposes of receiving
unemployment compensation. See Davoren v. Iowa Employment
Sec. Comm'n, 277 N.W.2d 602, 603 (Iowa 1979). We believe
Sierra met her burden of proof. She satisfactorily
performed her duties at Eagle. She never injured herself or
injured others. Her history of epilepsy never interfered in
any other occupation Sierra undertook. Sierra's own doctor
places several restrictions on Sierra's employment
opportunities. However, there is no evidence in the record
that any of these restrictions applied to her work at
Eagle. The record clearly indicates that with reasonable
accommodation Sierra is qualified and presently able to
perform work.
The decision of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.