Supreme Court of Iowa Decision
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Case Title: R. CLAIR SHARP, Appellant, vs. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF JOB SERVICE, Appellee.
Date: 11/25/92
Bound Citation:
Summary: No. 348 / 91-1988
Decision: Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County,
Kristin L. Hibbs, Judge.

Appeal from district court order denying petitioner's
motion for enlargement of time to file a petition for
judicial review in district court. AFFIRMED.

Amanda Potterfield of Johnson, Larson, Potterfield,
Zimmermann & Nathanson, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

William C. Whitten for appellee.
William J. Sueppel of Meardon, Sueppel, Downer & Hayes,
Iowa City, for City of North Liberty on behalf of appellee.

Considered by Larson, P.J., and Schultz, Carter,
Lavorato, and Neuman, JJ.

PER CURIAM.
R. Clair Sharp appeals from a district court order
denying his motion for enlargement of time to file a
petition for judicial review from final agency action
denying him unemployment benefits. The district court
denied Sharp's right to seek judicial review of the agency
decision because Sharp failed to timely file his petition
for judicial review in district court pursuant to Iowa Code
section 17A.19(3) (1991). Sharp contends that Iowa Rule of
Civil Procedure 82(d) applies to extend the time for filing
a timely petition if service of the petition on opposing
parties is made within thirty days of final agency action.
We find Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 82(d) inapplicable to
toll timely filing of a petition for judicial review under
Iowa Code section 17A.19 and therefore affirm.
The facts in this case are not disputed. R. Clair
Sharp lost his job with the City of North Liberty, and he
applied for unemployment benefits. On May 31, 1991, the
administrative law judge (ALJ) reversed the decision of the
job service representative and denied Sharp unemployment
benefits. On July 31, 1991, the Employment Appeal Board
affirmed the decision of the ALJ and denied benefits.
Sharp filed a timely application for rehearing with the
Board. On August 14, 1991, the Employment Appeal Board
filed its decision denying Sharp's application for
rehearing. On September 13, 1991, Sharp mailed a copy of
his petition for judicial review to the Iowa Department of
Job Service, the City of North Liberty, and William
Sueppel, the city's attorney. On September 23, 1991, Sharp
filed his petition for judicial review in district court.
Sharp also filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 83(a)(2) to enlarge time to file the petition for
judicial review. The district court denied Sharp's motion
to enlarge time thereby preventing consideration of his
petition for judicial review on the merits. Sharp has filed this appeal.
A timely petition for judicial review to the district
court is a jurisdictional prerequisite for review of final
agency action. Sioux City Brick & Tile v. Employment
Appeal Bd., 449 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Iowa 1989). Pursuant to
Iowa Code section 10A.601(7), a petition for judicial
review from an Employment Appeal Board decision shall be
filed pursuant to section 17A.19. Under section 17A.19, a
petition for judicial review must be filed in district
court within thirty days after the agency's final
decision. Iowa Code Sections 17A.19(2) and (3). Therefore,
unless some other statute or rule applies, Sharp's failure
to timely file his petition for judicial review in district
court within thirty days of the appeal board's final
decision deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear his petition.
Sharp contends, however, that the rules of civil
procedure apply to extend the time for his filing a timely
petition for judicial review in district court. Sharp
relies on Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 82(d), which
provides in part that:

Whenever these rules or the rules of appellate
procedure require a filing with the district court
. . . within a certain time, the time requirement
shall be tolled when service is made, provided the
actual filing is done within a reasonable time thereafter.

Since Sharp mailed a copy of his petition to the opposing
parties in this case within thirty days of final agency
action, Sharp concludes that Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure
82(d) applies to permit his filing of a petition for
judicial review in district court ten days later.
We have stated that, "The courts of our state cannot
expand their judicial review jurisdiction by allowing
appeal of agency action in contested cases beyond the time
limit specified for that purpose by the legislature."
Sioux City Brick & Tile, 449 N.W.2d at 638. We concluded
that the broad discretion given courts to grant a motion
for leave to amend under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 88
could not be applied to cure a party's failure to timely
appeal agency action. Id. If such a motion would be
permitted, we concluded that the jurisdictional time limits
prescribed by the legislature would be rendered
meaningless. Id. at 639.
We have also held that the provisions of Iowa Rule of
Civil Procedure 82(b) did not apply to cure a litigant's
failure to comply with the requirements to appeal a civil
service commission ruling to district court under Iowa Code
section 400.27. In re Elliott, 319 N.W.2d 244 (Iowa
1982). We held that the mailing of a notice of appeal to
the secretary of the civil service commission was
insufficient to vest appellate jurisdiction in district
court when section 400.27 required actual service of the
notice on the secretary. Id. We noted that Iowa Rule of
Civil Procedure 82(b) applied with respect to papers
required to be filed and served pursuant to the rules of
civil procedure but that the section 400.27 appeal
procedure was not controlled by these rules. Id. at 247.
We concluded that under section 400.27, a district court
acquired appellate jurisdiction only when the appellant
substantially complied with its provisions. Id. at 247.
We also noted that, if the legislature had intended to
incorporate the rules of civil procedure into the procedure
for appealing a civil service commission ruling, it could
have done so. Id. at 246. See also Fryer v. Hamilton, 278
N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1979) (the rules of civil procedure made
applicable to postconviction proceedings by specific statutory provision).
Iowa Code section 17A.19 provides that "the judicial
review provisions of this chapter shall be the exclusive
means by which a person or party who is aggrieved or
adversely affected by agency action may seek judicial
review of such agency action." Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 82(d) provides that the time requirements for
filing shall be tolled when service is made "[w]henever
these rules . . . require a filing with the district court
. . . ." (Emphasis added.) However, the procedure for
timely filing a petition for judicial review from an
Employment Appeal Board decision is not governed by the
rules of civil procedure but is instead governed by Iowa
Code section 17A.19. Iowa Code section 10A.601(7). Under
section 17A.19, and not the rules of civil procedure, Sharp
was required to file his petition for judicial review in
district court within thirty days of final agency action in
order to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court.
Sharp failed to timely file his petition in district court.
We hold that Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 82(d) is
inapplicable to expand the district court's judicial review
jurisdiction by permitting an appeal of an Employment
Appeal Board decision beyond the time limit specified for
that purpose by the legislature. We affirm the district
court's order denying Sharp's motion for enlargement of
time to permit consideration of his late-filed petition.
AFFIRMED.
This opinion shall be published.