IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 3-408 / 02-1583
Filed August 27, 2003
PATRICIA A. PORAZIL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
IOWA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
DIVISION, and JACKMAN CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for
Iowa County, William L. Thomas, Judge.
Jackman Corporation appeals from the district
court ruling on judicial review reversing the Employment
Appeal Board’s decision determining a claimant was
disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation
benefits. AFFIRMED.
Kevin Visser and Brenda Wallrichs of Moyer
& Bergman, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant Jackman
Corporation.
Robert F. Wilson, Cedar Rapids, for ap
pellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht and
Eisenhauer, JJ.
ZIMMER, P.J.
The Jackman Corporation (Jackman) appeals
from a district court's ruling on judicial review reversing
an agency decision denying unemployment benefits to
former Jackman employee, Patricia Porazil. Jackman
contends the Employment Appeal Board’s (Board) decision
finding that Porazil voluntarily quit is supported
by substantial evidence. We affirm the district
court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Jackman owns a truck stop and restaurant
known as the Quarter Post Truck Stop. Porazil began
working at the truck stop as a food attendant in April
1999. In June 2001, she requested time off to have
surgery on a non-employment related thumb injury.
Jackman informed Porazil she had six weeks and two
days of leave available under the Family Medical Leave
Act (FMLA). Porazil had surgery. Jackman approved
FMLA leave and informed Porazil her leave would begin
on July 13, 2001, and expire on August 28, 2001.
On August 16, 2001, Porazil’s treating
physician released her to work, with restrictions
, effective September 26, 2001. On August 18, 200Porazil
1, requested Jackman to extend her leave to September
26, 2001, in accordance with the work release form
signed by her physician. Jackman’s office manager
responded by letter on August 20, 2001, stating:
We have received your request for an extended leave
due to surgery. This request is denied. The Quarter
Post is very understaffed at this time and we are running
ads in the surrounding papers for immediate employment
to fill the positions. Due to the fact that you have
requested another month off and would then only be
able to return with limitations we can no longer hold
your position for you.
Because Porazil believed she had already been termshe
inated, did not contact Jackman following the expiration
of her FMLA leave or when her physician released her
for work.
Porazil filed a claim for unemployment
benefits with Iowa Workforce Development – Unemployment
Insurance Division. The agency granted benefits.
Jackman appealed and an administrative law judge reversed
the agency’s decision. The administrative law judge
concluded Porazil was unavailable for employment while
in her physician’s care and, after being released from
her physician’s care, voluntarily quit by not returning
to work. Porazil sought further review before the
Board. Two members of the Board reviewed the recBecause
ord. those members were not in agreement, the decision
of the administrative law judge was affirmed by operation
of law. Porazil then sought judicial review and the
district court reversed, granting her benefits. Jackman
appeals.
II. Scope of Review.
Our review of unemployment benefits cases
is governed by the Iowa Administrative Procedure AIowa
ct, Code chapter 17A. Lee v. Employment Appeal Bd
., 616 N.W.2d 661, 664 (Iowa 2000). The district court
acts in an appellate capacity to correct errors at
law on the part of the agency when engaging in judicial
review under Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) (2001).
Holland Bros. Constr. v. Bd. of Tax Review, 611 N
.W.2d 495, 499 (Iowa 2000).
When we review a district court's judicial
review decision, we apply the standards of section
17A.19(10) to determine whether our conclusions are
identical to those of the district court. Id. A party
challenging agency action bears the burden of demonstrating
the action's invalidity and resulting prejudice. Iowa
Code § 17A.19(8)(a). This can be shown in a number
of ways, including proof that the action was ultra
vires, unconstitutional, legally erroneous, arbitrary
or capricious. See generally Iowa Code § 17A.19(1We
0). are bound by agency fact findings that are supported
by substantial evidence. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(1Norland
0)(f); v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 412 N.W.2d 904,
913 (Iowa 1987). Evidence is substantial when reasonable
minds could accept it as adequate to reach the same
finding. Id.
III. Discussion.
Jackman contends the district court exceeded
its scope of review and substituted its own judgment
in place of the Board’s. Jackman argues the Board
’s decision to affirm the denial of benefits is supported
by substantial evidence. Specifically, Jackman asserts
Porazil voluntarily quit without good cause by not
returning to work on September 20, 2000.[1]
Under Iowa Code section 96.5(1), a claimant
is disqualified from collecting unemployment compensation
benefits if that person has left work without good
cause attributable to the individual’s employer.
However, a person is not disqualified if:
The individual left employment because of illness,
injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed
and practicing physician, and upon knowledge of the
necessity for absence immediately notified the empor
loyer, the employer consented to the absence, and after
recovering from the illness, injury, or pregnancy,
when recovery was certified by a licensed and practicing
physician, the individual returned to the employer
and offered to perform services and the individuas
l’regular work or comparable suitable work was not
available, if so found by the department, provided
the individual is otherwise eligible.
Iowa Code § 96.5(1)(d).
The administrative law judge concluded
Porazil voluntarily quit her position by failing to
inform Jackman she was available for work after her
physician released her to return to work effective
September 20, 2001. On judicial review, the district
court concluded the administrative law judge’s decision
was “without basis in the facts of this case.” The
district court concluded Porazil was entitled to benefits
because Jackman had terminated her employment prior
to the expiration of her original request for leav
e.
We conclude the decision of the administrative
law judge is not supported by substantial evidence
. Porazil notified Jackman of her impending surgeShe
ry. requested and was granted a leave of absence,
which was scheduled to expire August 28, 2001. On
August 16, Porazil’s physician released her to work
effective September 26, 2001, with lifting restricPorazil
tions. asked Jackman to extend her leave to September
26. On August 20, 2001, Jackman responded with a letter
terminating Porazil’s employment. It would be an erroneous
and unreasonable application of the law to require
Porazil to report to work on September 20, 2001, the
actual date of her release to return to work, when
her employer had already terminated the employment
relationship. We affirm the district court’s ruling
remanding the case to the Board for purposes of determining
the amount of unemployment compensation owed Poraz
il.
AFFIRMED.
[1] On September 19, 2001, Porazil’s doctor changed
her release to work date and released her to employment
without restrictions effective the next day, September
20, 2001.