IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 1-296 / 00-1434
Filed September 12, 2001
DANA DELAIR,
                        Appellant,
vs.
EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INSPECTION 
AND APPEALS,
                        Appellee,
and
GERKIN WINDOWS AND DOOR,
                        Respondent.
            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for 
Woodbury County, Robert C. Clem, Judge.
The petitioner appeals the district court’s ruling
 on judicial review that affirmed the respondent bs 
oard’denial of his claim for unemployment benefits
.  AFFIRMED.  
            Roger L. Carter of Carter Law Firm, Sioux 
City, for appellant.
            Richard R. Ramsey, Des Moines, for app
ellee.
            Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel
 and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
VOGEL, J.
Danne Delair appeals the district court judgment upholding 
the Employment Appeal Board’s denial of his claim for 
unemployment benefits.  Because the agency decision 
was supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the 
district court.
Background Facts and Proceedings.   Danne Delair was 
hired by Gerkin Windows and Doors to perform a job
 known as “boxing up doors.”  The job required Delair 
to lift the doors off the assembly line and then carry 
and stack them.  Delair contended that prior to being 
hired, he informed Gerkin he had been in an accideand 
nt, as a result had a weight restriction that prohibited 
constant lifting in excess of forty to sixty pounds 
s.[1]  Gerkin’employees testified they were told of 
the accident, but did not recall Delair ever mentioning 
a weight restriction.  Although he had not weighed
 the doors, Delair believed many exceeded sixty poand 
unds, stated he “was told” that some doors weighed
 up to one hundred pounds.  Gerkin asserted that most 
of its doors were in the thirty-seven to forty pound 
range, with a small number weighing sixty pounds. 
 It denied producing heavier doors.  
Less than two weeks after being hired, while performing 
his job duties, Delair felt something snap in his He 
neck.  reported the injury to a supervisor, then left 
to seek medical attention.  Delair was seen by a nurse 
practitioner, who gave Delair an excuse for missing 
two days of work, but did not place any restrictions 
on the work he could perform once he returned to GIn 
erkin.   her progress notes the nurse practitioner
 recorded the following: “Note given to be off work 
today and tomorrow.  Talked with him perhaps needing 
to consider finding other work with the physical demands 
of his current position.  While he acknowledges thhe 
is, is unsure of what he might do.” 
After Delair returned to work, following the two excused 
days, he informed Gerkin he would have to quit his
 job if he was required to continue lifting heavy There 
doors.  is conflicting evidence as to whether Gerkin 
was informed of the contents of the nurse practitis 
oner’notes.  Delair was then placed in a different
 position where no heavy lifting would be required
.  Delair put in a full day at the new position, but 
early in his shift on the second day, the absence of 
other employees prompted Gerkin to return Delair to 
his former duties.  Delair did not object to being
 returned to a heavy-lifting task, and performed his 
old job, without complaint, for about an hour.  He
 then informed his supervisors he was physically unable 
to execute the current job tasks, and quit.  
Delair filed a claim for unemployment compensation
, but was found to be ineligible for benefits by a
 representative of Iowa Workforce Development.  He
 appealed this decision to Iowa Workforce Developms 
ent’Unemployment Insurance Appeals Section, which affirmed 
the ineligibility determination on the basis Delair 
had voluntarily quit his employment without good cause 
attributable to the employer.  After the Employment 
Appeal Board also affirmed the benefits denial, Delair 
filed a petition for judicial review with the district 
court.  When the district court found substantial evidence 
in the record to support the agency finding, Delair 
filed this appeal.   
Scope of Review.  When a district court renders a decision 
pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.19, review is limited 
to correcting errors at law. See Aluminum Co. of America 
v. Musal, 622 N.W.2d 476, 478 (Iowa 2001).A party challenging 
agency action bears the burden of demonstrating the 
action’s invalidity and resulting prejudice.  Iowa
 Code § 17A.19(8)(a) (West Supp. 1999).  This can be 
shown in a number of ways, including proof that the 
action was ultra vires, unconstitutional, legally arbitrary 
erroneous, or capricious.  See generally Iowa Code
 § 17A.19(10) (West Supp. 1999).  A party can also
 successfully challenge an agency action by demonstrating 
the action was unsupported by substantial evidence
 in the record, when that record is viewed as a whIowa 
ole. Code § 17A.19(10)(f) (West Supp. 1999).  See also 
Koehler Elec. v. Wills, 608 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2000
).  Substantial evidence is that which would allow
 a reasonable mind to reach the same conclusion as
 the decision maker. See Koehler, 608 N.W.2d at 3.
   
Good Cause.  A worker is not eligible for unemployment 
benefits if he or she voluntarily quits without good 
cause attributable to the employer.  Iowa Code § 9When 
6.5(1) (1999).  a worker quits due to illness, that 
quit is attributable to the employer if the illness 
is aggravated by work conditions. See White v. Employment 
Appeal Bd., 487 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Iowa 1992).  Howethe 
ver, worker must 
present competent evidence showing adequate health
 reasons to justify termination; before quitting have 
informed the employer of the work-related health problem 
and inform the employer that the individual intends 
to quit unless the problem is corrected or the individual 
is reasonably accommodated. 
Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.26(6)(b).  
As noted by the Iowa Supreme Court in Suluki v. Employment 
Appeal Bd.:
We think it is logical, reasonable, fair, and practical 
to require – as a condition of entitlement to unemployment 
benefits – an employee to give an employer notice of 
work-related health problems before quitting.  Such 
a requirement would enable an employer to correct the 
working conditions causing the problem or provide the 
employee with different job duties.  Then if the employer 
does not correct the problem or otherwise reasonably 
accommodate the employee, the employee would have good 
cause to quit.  Such a requirement could result in
 eliminating the need for the employee to seek unemployment 
compensation benefits in the first place.  
Suluki v. Employment Appeal Bd., 503 N.W.2d 402, 405 
(Iowa 1993).  
            This notice requirement is not satisfied 
by “preliminary understandings” about a work restriction 
discussed at the time the worker is hired.  See Cobb 
v. Employment Appeal Bd., 506 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Iowa 
1993).  Rather, it is incumbent upon the employee to 
remind the employer, at the time a task is assignethat 
d, a restriction is being violated. See id.  Notice 
given at the time of the quit is notice “after the
 fact,” because it does not allow the employer an opportunity 
to resolve the problem. Id.   
            When applying these standards to the agency 
record, there is substantial evidence to support a
 finding Delair voluntarily quit without good cause 
attributable to his employer.  While the record indicates 
his job duties did aggravate his preexisting neck and 
back problem, nothing outside of Delair’s own testimony 
affirmatively demonstrated that this problem compelled 
or required him to quit his job.  The nurse practis 
tioner’notes stated only that she told him he should 
consider finding a less demanding job.  The agency
 was free to interpret these notes as amounting to
 something less than a medical direction to quit eparticularly 
mployment, in light of the fact the nurse practitioner 
did not find it necessary to place any medical restriction 
on Delair’s return to work.   
            Similarly, the record sufficiently indicates 
that Delair failed to provide Gerkin with adequate
 notice of his intent to quit.  Even if the agency
 believed Delair’s testimony that Gerkin was on notice 
of his weight restrictions at the time of hire, and 
that his position did require him to lift amounts in 
excess of the restriction, under Cobb such information 
does not satisfy the notice requirement.  Cobb, 506 
N.W.2d at 448.  Although Delair did tell his emploupon 
yer, his return to work, that he would quit if he was 
required to do heavy lifting, he did not protest when 
the employer returned him to his old duties.  Nor did 
he, after discovering that his old job was now physically 
difficult, remind the employer of his prior statement 
and allow Gerkin an opportunity to provide a light
-duty accommodation.  
An employer must be allowed an opportunity to provide 
reasonable accommodations, after receiving notice.
  See Suluki, 503 N.W.2d at 405.   If an employee chooses 
to silently endure an inappropriate or physically aggravating 
job assignment, he cannot rely on prior notifications 
to satisfy his notice obligation.  See Cobb, 506 N
.W.2d at 448.  Here, the time between Delair’s first 
notice of intent to quit and his actual resignation 
was punctuated by a heavy-lifting assignment to which 
he raised neither protest nor complaint.   His second 
notice of intent to quit, occurring contemporaneously 
with his resignation, did not allow Gerkin an opportunity 
to make a reasonable accommodation.  See id.    
Given all the foregoing, the evidence substantially 
supports the agency determination of voluntary quit 
without good cause attributable to the employer.  The 
agency decision was not in any other manner arbitrthe 
ary, capricious, result of a misapplication of law
, or violative of agency rule or procedure.  We therefore 
affirm the decision of the district court.  
AFFIRMED.  
[1]   The accident referred to by Delair was a car
 accident occurring in the 1980s, which resulted in 
a broken neck.