Supreme Court of Iowa Decision
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Case Title: HENRY PAUL COBB, Appellant, vs. EMPLOYMENT APPEAL BOARD and KOR-BERT, INC., Appellees.
Date: 10/20/93
Bound Citation:
Summary: No. 319 / 92-1417
Decision: Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hancock County,
Jon Stuart Scoles, Judge.

Appeal from district court decision affirming denial of
unemployment compensation benefits. MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.

Mark S. Soldat, Algona, for appellant.

Thomas F. Pronk, Garner, for appellee Kor-Bert, Inc.
William C. Whitten, Des Moines, for appellee Employment
Appeal Board.

Considered by Harris, P.J., and Carter, Lavorato,
Neuman, and Andreasen, JJ.

HARRIS, J.
This is a dispute over the denial of unemployment
benefits after a voluntary quit by the employee. The
district court, sitting in review of agency action,
affirmed the denial and so do we.
While working as a carpenter for a prior employer, the
claimant, Henry Cobb, developed overuse syndrome in his
upper extremities and shoulders. As a result a doctor took
him off work at that company. Cobb was treated at an
occupational medicine clinic that recommended a change in
Cobb's line of employment and outlined certain restrictions
in any future work. Although the former employer offered
him a job within the restrictions, Cobb instead undertook
employment at Kor-Bert, Inc., the respondent in this
proceeding.
In applying for employment with Kor-Bert, Cobb
presented a list of his restrictions and was assured
Kor-Bert would comply with them. Notwithstanding these
assurances, many of the restrictions were in fact violated
or exceeded, but Cobb did not complain. Cobb did not
inform Kor-Bert of the problem until after he stopped
working there.
Cobb last performed work for Kor-Bert on or about
November 8, 1991. Cobb failed to report to work on the
following day and was called by a Kor-Bert representative.
Cobb said he would be late because he was having problems
with one of his children. He also said he intended to take
a week off because his "arm hurt." A few days later Cobb's
wife advised Kor-Bert that her husband was quitting. At no
time during these conversations did Cobb notify Kor-Bert
that his quit was due to intolerable or detrimental working
conditions, work-related health problems, or change in
contract for hire.
Cobb then applied for unemployment benefits. The job
service representative found that Cobb was disqualified for
benefits because his quit was due to injury and he did not
comply with the notice requirements of Iowa Code section
96.5(1)(d) (1991). Cobb then requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge.
That judge determined Cobb failed in his duty to inform
his "employer of a contemplation of quitting in order to
give the employer an opportunity to correct the need to
quit." The administrative law judge concluded that Cobb
voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to his
employer. Cobb then appealed the matter to the employment
appeal board. The board affirmed the conclusion of the
administrative law judge. The district court affirmed on
judicial review and the matter is before us on appeal from
that decision.
I. Our review of job service cases is governed by the
administrative procedures Act, chapter 17A of the Iowa
Code. Suluki v. Employment Appeal Bd., 503 N.W.2d 402, 404
(Iowa 1993). In reviewing a district court decision on the
validity of agency action, we ask only whether the district
court correctly applied the law. Id. The district court
is itself acting in an appellate capacity to correct errors
of law on the part of the agency. Id. On appeal to us, we
apply the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) to the
agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the
same as those of the district court. Id.
Two such standards are implicated here: whether the
agency action is in violation of statutory provisions; and
whether the agency action is supported by substantial
evidence. See Iowa Code Sec. 17A.19(8)(b), (f) (1991). As to
the first standard--violation of statutory provisions--we
accord an agency only limited deference on matters of law,
including statutory interpretation. The final decision is
ours. Suluki, 503 N.W.2d at 404. As to the second
standard--substantial evidence--an agency's findings of
fact are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence
in the record, when the record is viewed as a whole. Id.;
Iowa Code Sec. 17A.19(8)(f). Evidence is substantial if a
reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the
same findings. Suluki, 503 N.W.2d at 404.
II. Most unemployment compensation disputes begin with
the general rule that an individual who leaves work
voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer
is disqualified for unemployment benefits. Iowa Code
Sec. 96.5 (1993). Our task, most often, is to apply the facts
to one of the definitions of "good cause" found in Iowa
Code sections 96.5(1)(a)-(i), or in Iowa administrative
code sections 345-4.26(1)-(28). Our task in the present
case is different. The parties here do not question the
applicability of any of the code definitions. The fighting
issue here is whether, as a prerequisite to benefits, an
employee has a duty to inform his or her employer of the
motivation for quitting, prior to doing so.
The administrative law judge, the employment appeal
board and the district court all found such a duty to
exist. They relied on Larson v. Department of Economic
Security, 281 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 1979). Their reliance was
well founded. In Suluki, an opinion filed after this case
was appealed to us, we agreed there is a duty to give
notice. We said:

We think it is logical, reasonable, fair, and
practical to require--as a condition of
entitlement to unemployment benefits--an employee
to give an employer notice of work-related health
problems before quitting. Such a requirement
would enable an employer to correct the working
conditions causing the problem or provide the
employee with different job duties.

503 N.W.2d at 405.
We have no inclination to retreat from our Suluki
holding, and see no reason not to apply it here. Suluki
dealt with Iowa Administrative Code 345-4.26(6) (quitting
based on work-related health problems). At issue in the
present case are Iowa Administrative Code sections
345-4.26(1) (change in contract for hire) and (4) (where
claimant left due to intolerable or detrimental working
conditions).
We think the rationale that prompted our Suluki holding
applies as well here. The evidence indicates Cobb's
silence may well have been the sole cause of his continued
assignment to the tasks of which he later complained.
III. Cobb argues in the alternative that, if he had a
duty to notify, it was satisfied for the following reasons:

1. Kor-Bert was aware of Cobb's working
restrictions and preexisting health problems but
still allowed him to do work which exceeded the
restrictions.
2. That by virtue of Cobb telling Kor-Bert
representatives at the time he quit that his "arm
hurt," they were put on notice.
3. Because Kor-Bert reprimanded Cobb for
working too many hours, they were aware that his
job was exceeding his restrictions.

By virtue of these facts, Cobb thinks Kor-Bert had actual
notice of his problems and the notice requirement was
thereby satisfied.
We think not. The Suluki notice requirement is not
waived by reason of preliminary understandings about work
restrictions reached at the time employment is undertaken.
The persons assigning the myriad of tasks to a work force
should not be expected to check employment applications, or
to bear in mind the conversations that took place during a
job interview. Surely it is more fair to require the
employee to remind the employer at the time a task is
assigned that some agreed restriction would thereby be
violated. Cobb's failure to advise his employer of the
problem before quitting distinguishes this case from Ellis
v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 285 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa
1979) (employee, suffering from allergy, quit after
complaining because of continued presence of Christmas tree
at place of employment, benefits allowed).
Notification at the time of the quit comes too late to
allow the employer to remedy the problem. Notice then is
after the fact, and serves no more good than it would after
unemployment benefits are sought. We also reject Cobb's
suggestion that a reprimand he received for working too
many hours amounted to actual knowledge. Knowledge of
Cobb's job performance would not amount to knowledge of
some special understanding about working restrictions.
IV. Cobb asserts, and neither Kor-Bert nor the
Employment Appeal Board contests, that the district court
improperly assessed court costs against Cobb. Under Iowa
Code section 96.15(2), "an individual claiming benefits
shall not be charged fees of any kind in any proceeding
under this chapter by the division of job service or its
representatives or by a court or an officer of the court."
"Fees" include court costs. Geiken v. Lutheran Home for
the Aged, 468 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Iowa 1991).
The district court order is modified by removing the
requirement that Cobb pay court costs. We likewise do not
assess court costs on appeal to Cobb.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Andreasen, J., who concurs
specially.
#319, Cobb v. Employment Appeal Board

ANDREASEN, J. (concurring specially).
I believe the employer was legally aware of Cobb's
working restrictions, even though his supervisor was not.
However, I concur in the result because prior to quitting,
Cobb repeatedly accepted additional hours without
complaint. The employer, under these circumstances, could
reasonably believe that Cobb voluntarily accepted a
modification of the work agreement.