IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 
FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2004 
SHIRLEY BELCHER, 
Appellant, 
v. CASE NO. 5D03-3666 
UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, 
Appellee. 
/ 
Opinion Filed September 17, 2004 
Administrative Appeal from the 
Unemployment Appeals Commission 
Shirley Belcher, Titusville, pro se. 
John D. Maher, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 
GRIFFIN, J. 

Shirley B. Belcher ["Belcher"] appeals a final order of the Unemployment Appeals 
Commission ["UAC"] reversing the appeals referee's determination that Belcher was entitled 
to unemployment benefits. Belcher contends that the appeals referee's determination was 
correct because she voluntarily left the workplace for good cause attributable to her employer 
pursuant to section 443.101(1), Florida Statutes (2002), and that the UAC erred in reversing 
the referee's decision. We agree and reverse. 

From March 5, 2003, until March 21, 2003, Belcher worked full-time in the stockroom 
and receiving department of Astec, a contract manufacturing company. After several weeks,
Belcher – who is five feet two inches tall, weighs 110 pounds and is fifty-two years old – found 
that she was physically unable to perform the work, which required her to lift heavy boxes. She 
quit her job and sought unemployment. She was awarded benefits on the basis that she quit 
the job with "good cause" attributable to the employer. 

Belcher's employer, Spherion Atlantic Resources, LLC ["Spherion"],1 appealed the 
award. At a hearing before the appeals referee, Belcher testified that when she was hired she 
was told she would be in charge of the stockroom and receiving, and was unaware that she 
would be the only employee in the stockroom. She thought she was being hired as a 
supervisor because, in her previous employment, she had fourteen years experience in 
management. She was unaware the job required her to perform manual labor. She testified 
that the job involved physically handling bulk supplies and was beyond her physical 
capabilities. She testified to backaches and bruising caused by her efforts to perform the job. 
In his final order, the appeals referee affirmed the initial award. He found as a factual 
matter that Belcher was physically unable to do the heavy lifting required by her job and that 
she faced serious physical harm if she continued in her employment. He noted that the 
employer had not only failed to provide her assistance in performing her duties, but had 
prohibited male employees from assisting her, which he found "demonstrated a lack of 
concern for the claimant's working conditions and safety" and gave her "good cause"
attributable to her employer for voluntarily leaving her employment. 

Spherion appealed to the UAC, which reversed the award. The UAC apparently found 
no evidence to support the conclusion that the employer lacked concern for Belcher's safety, 
emphasizing that there was no testimony that male employees had been prohibited from 
assisting Belcher or that a physician advised her to find other, less physically demanding 
employment. The UAC also found that Belcher had never "asked her supervisor for 
assistance" and concluded that benefits should be denied because Belcher had failed to 
expend reasonable efforts to preserve her employment. 

Section 443.101(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that individuals seeking 
unemployment compensation benefits shall be disqualified when they leave employment 
voluntarily, without "good cause" attributable to the employer. Good cause has been defined 
as "those circumstances which would compel the average able-bodied, qualified worker to 
give up his or her employment." Brown v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 633 So. 2d 36 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Whether an individual voluntarily left employment for "good cause" is 
a question of fact to be determined by an appeals referee. See Gfrorer v. Unemployment 
Appeals Comm'n, 864 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); see also San Roman v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 711 So. 2d 93, 95 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ("good cause" is 
mixed question of law and fact or ultimate fact best left to factfinder). The decision made by 
the appeals referee concerning the existence of "good cause" must be affirmed by the UAC 
if it is based on competent, substantial evidence and the proceedings complied with the 
essential requirements of the law. Kloepper v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 871 So.
2d 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). 

In this case, the appeals referee found as a factual matter that Belcher was physically 
unable to do the heavy lifting required by her job and that she faced serious physical harm if 
she continued in her employment. These findings are supported by competent substantial 
evidence in the record, in the form of Belcher's uncontroverted testimony that she was unable 
to perform her job and suffered bruises and backaches. They also support the referee's 
determination that "good cause" attributable to the employer existed for Belcher to terminate 
her employment. The physical inability to perform a job constitutes good cause for separation 
from employment which is attributable to the employer. See Krulla v. Barnett Bank, 629 So. 
2d 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Gottardi v. Joaquin General Distributors, Inc., 618 So. 2d 363 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1993). Florida courts also recognize that a reasonable fear for one's personal 
safety or health is good cause for leaving employment. Spangler v. Unemployment Appeals 
Comm'n, 632 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Tannariello v. Federation of Public 
Employees, 437 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). 

In reaching his holding, the appeals referee admittedly did make a factual finding that 
was not supported by any evidence – that Belcher's "physician had advised her to find other, 
less physically demanding employment." The UAC was entitled to reject this finding, as it was 
not supported by any evidence. However, the remaining findings made by the referee – 
including findings that the job was beyond Belcher's physical capacity and posed a risk of 
physical harm to Belcher – were supported by the evidence and, as in Gottardi, support the 
award of benefits to Belcher.

In reversing the referee's decision, the UAC relied in part on its conclusion that Belcher 
failed to make "reasonable efforts to preserve" her employment. The UAC found that the 
claimant had not asked her supervisor for assistance in lifting packages and that she had not 
gone to Spherion or anyone at Astec above the level of her supervisor to complain about her 
working conditions. This was not a requirement. Although a “reasonable effort to preserve 
employment” has been required in some cases in which the employee had been accused of 
some misconduct and failed to exhaust available grievance procedures, it logically does not 
control a case such as this. See Kralj v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 537 So. 
2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Board of County Commissioners v. Florida Dep’t of Commerce, 
370 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). REVERSED AND REMANDED with directions to 
reinstate the decision of the appeals referee. 

THOMPSON and ORFINGER, JJ., concur.