IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 
FIFTH DISTRICT JANUARY TERM 2004 
WILLIAM A. BROWNING, 
Appellant, 
v. 
Case No. 5D03-3468 
UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, 
Appellee. 
/ 
Opinion filed May 14, 2004 
Administrative Appeal from the 
Unemployment Appeals Commission. 
William A. Browning, Worthville, KY, 
Pro Se. 
No Appearance for Appellee. 
ORFINGER, J. 

William J. Browning appeals the denial of unemployment compensation benefits based 
on a finding that he voluntarily left his job without good cause. Because competent substantial 
evidence supports that finding, we affirm. 

Browning was employed by QIS, Inc. as a construction inspector. He was assigned 
to a project in Georgia and received daily pay and travel expenses. After that job was 
completed, Browning was offered a similar position on a project in Pennsylvania. As the 
Pennsylvania project was coming to an end, QIS offered Browning employment at a project 
in Maryland. The hearing officer found, based on conflicting evidence, that the terms of 
Browning’s employment in Maryland differed from his previous jobs in Georgia and
Pennsylvania in that he would be paid and receive travel expenses only for those days actually 
worked. Consequently, Browning would receive no pay or expenses for days no construction 
was performed due to weather or other circumstances. Because Browning averaged only 
three days of work per week in Pennsylvania, his earnings and travel reimbursement were low, 
and as a result, he resigned. 

A claimant who voluntarily leaves work without good cause is disqualified from 
receiving unemployment benefits. Good cause “includes only such cause as is attributable 
to the employing unit or which consists of illness or disability of the individual requiring 
separation from his or her work.” § 443.101(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). The hearing officer 
found that Browning voluntarily resigned his position because of his dissatisfaction with the 
compensation and reimbursement package he had agreed to. Because that finding is based 
on competent, substantial evidence, we affirm. While we recognize that the evidence was 
disputed, the determination of credibility falls solely within the purview of the hearing officer’s 
discretion as the finder of fact. Glover v. Sanford Child Care, Inc., 429 So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 1983). 

AFFIRMED. 
THOMPSON and TORPY, JJ., concur.