IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 
FIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2003 
SHARON R. LEICHERING, 
Appellant, 
v. CASE NO. 5D03-113 
UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, 
Appellee. 
/ 
Opinion Filed September 26, 2003 
Administrative Appeal from the 
Unemployment Appeals Commission. 
Sharon R. Leichering, Orlando, pro se. 
John D. Maher, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 
PER CURIAM. 

Appellant, Sharon R. Leichering, proceeding pro se, appeals a decision of the 
Unemployment Appeals Commission ["UAC”] affirming a referee's determination that she had 
not timely appealed a redetermination of the award of her unemployment benefits. 

The City of Orlando had employed appellant prior to her termination. She was 
awarded unemployment benefits of $275 per week with an effective date of June 23, 2002. 
Subsequently, however, she was notified that she was not entitled to unemployment benefits 
because the City had terminated her employment for discharging a weapon on the job. The 
notice contained the following: "[t]he determination will become final unless you request a
hearing within 20 days from the mailing date of this notice explaining the basis of the protest." 
The twenty-day period expired on September 3, 2002. 

Appellant sent the Office of Appeals a letter dated September 7, 2002, asserting that 
she had never received the August 14 notice of determination. She wrote that she had found 
out about the notice in a letter informing her that she was required to repay $825 in benefits 
already received. 

A referee held a hearing on October 7, 2002, and initially took up the issue of whether 
the appeal was timely. Appellant testified that she had never received the notice of 
determination. The referee found that the agency had mailed the notice of determination to 
appellant on August 14, 2002, the date that appeared on the form, and that appellant's mailing 
address was correctly printed on the notice, and dismissed the appeal due to a lack of 
jurisdiction. Appellant unsuccessfully appealed the referee's decision to the UAC. 
Here, the UAC urges that the referee was legally bound under section 443.151(3)(a), 
Florida Statutes (2000) to dismiss appellant's appeal because she filed it more than 20 days 
after the decision was mailed to the parties. The UAC notes that section 443.151(3)(a), 
Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60BB-5.007 do not permit any “good 
cause” exceptions to the dismissal rule. The Commission, however, acknowledges that 
Florida appellate courts have directed appeals referees to accept late filed appeals on due 
process grounds where the determination appealed from was not received by appellants 
within the time for filing an appeal.1 See, e.g., Koppelman v. Unemployment Appeals
against him.” UAC’s brief at 5-6. 

The facts of this case are similar to this court’s Carrigan decision. Carrigan had 
applied for unemployment benefits and received a Wage and Transcript document stating that 
he would receive $72/week in benefits. 615 So. 2d at 217. Subsequently, the Agency denied 
Carrigan all benefits and mailed him a determination, dated February 11, 1992, advising him 
of the denial. Id. On March 9, 1992, Carrigan filed a notice of appeal on which he wrote: "We 
just received this determination on March 4, 1992." Id. The referee found Carrigan's notice 
of appeal to be untimely because the time between the mailing date of February 11, 1992, 
and Carrigan's filing of a notice of appeal exceeded the 20-day period. Id. At the hearing, 
Carrigan testified that he did not receive the determination until March 4, 1992. Id. 
This court reversed, concluding that Carrigan's testimony was the only competent 
evidence of when the notice of determination was received. Id. This court noted that section 
443.031 specifies that Chapter 443 is to be liberally construed and cited to Florida’s 
numerous cases holding that, although the appeal was not timely filed, an appeal was
possible. Id. This court also reasoned: 
	To establish the mailing date, courts require competent factual 
	evidence of the date of the mailing. Mere testimony of customary 
	procedures is insufficient. Without such evidence, the date of 
	mailing is subject to mere guesswork, and creates such 
	uncertainty that the ends of justice are best served by allowing 
	the appeal. We do not think that a typed notation of the 
	"mailing date" on top of the determination is sufficient evidence 
	to establish the mailing date. (citations omitted)(emphasis 
	added). 
Id. at 218. 

This case is indistinguishable from Carrigan. The notice of determination included a 
typed entry identifying: “date mailed 08/14/02." This was the only evidence in the record to 
support the appeals referee's conclusion. On the authority of Carrigan, we reverse and 
remand with instructions to allow appellant's appeal to go forward on the merits. 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 
THOMPSON and MONACO, JJ., concur. 


GRIFFIN, J., concurring and concurring specially, with opinion.

GRIFFIN, J., concurring and concurring specially. 5D03-113 

If I were writing on a clean slate, I wouldn’t go quite as far as Carrigan does. In my 
view, the typed notation is some evidence of the mailing date. If the fact-finder had this 
evidence and also concluded that the claimant’s testimony that he or she did not receive the 
decision in time to seek an appeal was not credible, the appeal could be dismissed for lack 
of jurisdiction. I think the fact-finder in this case could (and did) conclude that this claimant had 
not been deprived of due process and that the untimely filed appeal could not, therefore, 
proceed. But for Carrigan, I would affirm.