NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES 
TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 
OF FLORIDA 
THIRD DISTRICT 
JANUARY TERM, 2005 
MARGIA R. FORTE, ** 
Appellant, ** 
vs. ** CASE NO. 3D04-1595 
FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT ** LOWER 
APPEALS, etc., et al., TRIBUNAL NO. 04-04894 
** 
Appellees. 
** 
Opinion filed April 6, 2005. 
An Appeal from the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission. 
Margia R. Forte, in proper person. 
John D. Maher, for appellees. 
Before COPE, CORTIÑAS, and ROTHENBERG, JJ. 
ROTHENBERG, Judge. 

The claimant, Margia R. Forte, appeals an order of the 
Unemployment Appeals Commission disqualifying her from receiving 
benefits. We reverse. 

Ms. Forte was employed as a security guard by Vanguard 
Security, Inc. (Vanguard). She was terminated after she refused 
to work on Christmas or the following day. Ms. Forte applied 
for unemployment benefits, but her application was denied. She 
challenged this decision before an appeals referee, who affirmed 
the denial. Ms. Forte then appealed to the Unemployment Appeals 
Commission (UAC). The UAC affirmed the decision to deny 
benefits, determining that “the evidence deemed credible by the 
appeals referee supports the conclusion that the claimant was 
discharged for misconduct connected with work.” 

On appeal, Ms. Forte argues that she was unjustly fired and 
should not be denied benefits. The UAC argues that the denial 
of benefits is appropriate because competent substantial 
evidence supports the conclusion that Ms. Forte was discharged 
from her employment based on misconduct related to her 
employment. The standard of review of a decision by the UAC is 
whether the decision is supported by substantial competent 
evidence. See Ritter v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 
875 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Kelly v. Dade County School 
Bd., 872 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). 

Under section 443.101(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), a 
claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits if he has been 
discharged by his employer for misconduct connected with his 
work. Misconduct is defined in section 443.036(29), Florida 
Statutes (2004), as follows: 
	”Misconduct” includes, but is not limited to, the 
	following, which may not be construed in pari materia 
	with each other: 
	(a) Conduct demonstrating willful or wanton 
	disregard of an employer’s interests and found to be a 
	deliberate violation or disregard of the standards of 
	behavior which the employer has a right to expect of 
	his or her employee; or 
	b) Carelessness or negligence to a degree or 
	recurrence that manifests culpability, wrongful 
	intent, or evil design or shows an intentional and 
	substantial disregard of the employer’s interests or 
	of the employee’s duties and obligations to his or her 
	employer. 

When determining whether a claimant should be denied 
unemployment benefits, the statute defining misconduct should be 
construed liberally in favor of the claimant. Mason v. Load 
King Mfg. Co., 758 So. 2d 649, 654 (Fla. 2000); Riveras v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 884 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2004). An isolated incident of poor judgment should usually not 
constitute misconduct under the unemployment compensation 
statute, even if the incident is a valid ground for termination. 
Vilar v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 889 So. 2d 993, 935 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2004); Riveras, 884 So. 2d at 1145. Although “excessive 
unauthorized absenteeism” justifies the denial of benefits, a 
single absence does not. Mason, 758 So. 2d at 654 (holding that 
misconduct under the statute is shown when the record presents 
substantial competent evidence of excessive unauthorized 
absenteeism, but to prove excessive unauthorized absenteeism, an 
employer must prove more than one act). 

Because the record contains evidence of only one 
unauthorized absence by Ms. Forte, the UAC’s determination that 
she was discharged for misconduct is not supported by 
substantial competent evidence. See Riveras, 884 So. 2d at 
1146. Her unauthorized absence was an isolated incident of poor 
judgment which did not rise to the level of misconduct within 
the meaning of the statute. See LaCharte v. Unemployment 
Appeals Comm’n, 890 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); McCarty v. 
Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 878 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 2004).1 While Vanguard was justified in terminating Ms. 
1 The cases cited by the UAC to support its argument that Ms. 
Forte’s termination was based on misconduct under the statute 
each involve more than a single unauthorized absence or other 
incident of insubordination. See Mason, 758 So. 2d at 655 
(noting that, in a four-month period, claimant was absent four 
times, late four times, and left early one time); Barragan v. 
Williams Island, 568 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)(noting that, 
on one or two previous occasions, claimant had previously failed 
to notify his supervisor of an absence and on these occasions 
received verbal warnings); Washington v. Burdines, 422 So. 2d 
932 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)(noting a “clear, consistent pattern of 
insubordination”); City of Riviera Beach v. Florida Dep’t of 
Commerce, Div. of Employment Sec., 372 So. 2d 1007, 1008 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1979)(noting that, out of forty-seven working days, 
Forte’s employment when she refused to work on the days she was 
scheduled to work, termination of employment is a separate issue 
from the disqualification criteria set out in the unemployment 
compensation statute. Anderson v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 
822 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Pascarelli v. Unemployment 
Appeals Comm’n, 664 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Mendez v. 
River Orchids Inv. Corp., 653 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). 

We, therefore, reverse the UAC’s order disqualifying Ms. Forte 
from receiving unemployment benefits. 

Reversed.