NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 
OF FLORIDA 
SECOND DISTRICT 
LYNNE E. ROCHUSSEN, ))
Appellant, ))
v. ) Case No. 2D00-3622 
) 
UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS ) 
COMMISSION and OPINION ) 
RESEARCH CORPORATION ))
Appellees. ) 
) 
Opinion filed September 21, 2001. 
Appeal from the Unemployment Appeals 
Commission. 
John P. Cunningham of Gulfcoast Legal 
Services, Inc., St. Petersburg, for 
Appellant. 
John D. Maher, Unemployment Appeals 
Commission, Tallahassee, for Appellee 
Unemployment Appeals Commission. 
No appearance for Appellee Opinion 
Research Corporation.
ALTENBERND, Acting Chief Judge. 

Lynn Rochussen appeals the order of the Unemployment Appeals 
Commission (UAC) affirming the appeals referee's decision to deny her claim for 
unemployment benefits. Although Ms. Rochussen worked full-time for Bank of America, 
formerly known as NationsBank, for more than fifteen years and was laid off for no cause 
attributable to her, she is being denied unemployment benefits by the State of Florida 
because she had the resourcefulness to work part-time for six weeks while seeking 
suitable, permanent employment. We are compelled to affirm the UAC's decision 
because the current statutes leave us no choice. We are inclined, however, to believe that 
the legislature was misinformed as to the nature of an amendment it passed in 1999 and 
that it never intended this harsh result. We tell Ms. Rochussen's story in hopes that the 
legislature will read it and consider an amendment to protect people like her in the future. 

Ms. Rochussen went to work for a bank on January 1, 1984, when she was 
27 years old. Ultimately, she became an investment associate at the bank earning more 
than $25,000 per year. Like many banks, her employer changed names and structures 
over the years and became known as NationsBank and thereafter Bank of America. She 
survived the various bank mergers until October 8, 1999. On that day, she was laid off 
because the bank had eliminated her position in the local office. The bank gave her a 
severance package that continued some of her salary until April 30, 2000. 

Between October and April 2000, Ms. Rochussen conducted a job search 
without success. She is a single mother with a college-age child. She decided to take a
part-time job to earn a little extra money while she was looking for a suitable job. 
Accordingly, she took a job as a telemarketer for Opinion Research Corporation. She 
started the job on January 25, 2000, and worked through March 10, 2000, a period of 
about six weeks. She worked from 4 to 7 p.m., Monday through Friday, making $8.05 per 
hour. In total, she earned $831.17 at this job. She quit the job because it interfered with 
her ability to interview for jobs in the afternoon. 

Ms. Rochussen applied for unemployment compensation in early May, 
immediately after her severance package expired. She applied for benefits listing 
NationsBank or Bank of America as her most recent employer, but disclosing the brief 
period of part-time employment with Opinion Research Corporation. The Division of 
Unemployment Compensation (the Division) sent Ms. Rochussen a denial of benefits in 
which it classified Opinion Research as the employer and denied her benefits because 
she voluntarily quit the part-time job. The denial of benefits informed Ms. Rochussen that 
she would be eligible for benefits only after she had earned $4,675, which is 560% of her 
total earnings at the part-time job. This rate was apparently based largely upon her 
earnings at the bank. 

Ms. Rochussen sent the Division a letter appealing its decision and 
explaining that she believed the Division was analyzing the claim using the wrong 
employer. She did not contest that she had quit the part-time job, but she did not regard 
that work as a suitable replacement for the job that she had held for fifteen years at the 
bank. The appeals referee reviewed the matter and conducted an evidentiary hearing. 

The referee concluded that, under current law, Opinion Research must be treated as the 
relevant employer and that Ms. Rochussen had voluntarily left that job. 
Ms. Rochussen appealed the referee's decision to the UAC. It affirmed with 
an opinion. We attach a copy of that opinion as an appendix to this opinion because it fully 
explains the UAC's position and reflects the long-standing disagreement between the UAC 
and the courts as to the best way to address this issue while remaining true to the public 
policies and rules of interpretation contained in sections 443.021 and 443.031, Florida 
Statutes. 

We affirm the UAC's decision in this case, as we affirmed a similar decision 
in Groudas v. Pinellas County School Board, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D412 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 
27, 2001). We are constrained to do so because of the amendments passed by the 
legislature in chapter 99-131, Laws of Florida, addressing the part-time job issue. It is 
important for the legislature to understand, however, that the part-time job issue involves 
two distinct situations: (1) people who quit part-time jobs that they held long before they 
lost their primary job, and (2) people who take on part-time jobs because they are 
unemployed or about to become unemployed and thereafter discover that the part-time job 
is incompatible with their primary obligation to search for suitable, full-time employment. 
The legislative history of chapter 99-131, which was filed as House Bill 1951,1 strongly 
suggests that legislators were only aware that they were addressing the first situation. It 
seems inconceivable that any legislator would actually have intended to forfeit Ms.
Rochussen's right to unemployment benefits relating to her job at the bank simply because 
she attempted to aid her family and maintain her own self-respect by taking a part-time job 
that just did not work out. 

The scenario the legislature clearly intended to address was that which first 
arose in Neese v. Sizzler Family Steak House, 404 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). In 
Neese, the employee was working two jobs. She was laid off from a full-time job for 
reasons that authorized her to receive unemployment benefits. A few weeks later, she quit 
her part-time job, which she apparently held before she was laid off. The UAC held that the 
employee's benefits should be terminated in total. From a practical perspective, the UAC 
announced a rule that an individual forfeits benefits attributable to the full-time job by 
quitting the part-time job. This court reversed the UAC, explaining its reasoning in detail. 
We held that the benefits should only be decreased by an amount related to the part-time 
earnings. 

The UAC disagreed with the rule announced in Neese. Six years later, in a 
comparable case, the UAC was chastised by Judge Pearson in the Third District for its 
failure to obey the rule in Neese. See Wright v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 512 
So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). In fairness to the UAC, the problem with the Neese 
opinion is that it mandated a remedy not specified in the statutes. The statutory methods 
for calculating benefits allowed an offset for other partial employment but made no 
provision for an offset for other partial employment that the individual voluntarily quit. See § 
443.111(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981). 

Although it would seem that the UAC could have easily arranged for a 
legislator to propose a statutory amendment to ease implementation of the rule announced 
in Neese, that did not occur. Instead, in 1994, someone submitted a bill attempting to 
overrule Neese. See H.B. 2447, 13th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1994). Prior to the 
amendment, section 443.101(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), stated: 
Disqualification for benefits.–An individual shall be disqualified 
for benefits: 

(1)(a) For the week in which he has voluntarily left his work 
without good cause attributable to his employing unit or in 
which he has been discharged by his employing unit for 
misconduct connected with his work, if so found by the 
division. 

The amendment added a final sentence: "The term 'work' as used in this paragraph, 
means any work, whether full-time, part-time, or temporary.'" Ch. 94-347, § 4, at 2481, 
Laws of Fla. 

Both before and after this amendment, section 443.101(1)(a)(1) stated: 
"Disqualification for voluntarily quitting shall continue for the full period of unemployment 
next ensuing after he has left his work voluntarily without good cause . . . ." As a result of 
this language, courts continued to follow Neese after the amendment because the partial 
benefit rule could still fit within the language of the statute, and the logic and fairness of the 
reasoning in Neese convinced the courts that the legislature did not intend a rule requiring 
forfeiture of the benefits arising from full-time employment. See Alderman v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 664 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). 

After the Alderman decision, House Bill 1951 was submitted during the 1999 
session. While this bill primarily reduced unemployment taxes, it also included a section to
overrule Neese. In relevant part, it added the following language to section 
443.101(1)(a)(1): "Disqualification for voluntarily quitting shall continue for the full period of 
unemployment next ensuing after he or she has left his or her full-time, part-time, or 
temporary work voluntarily without good cause . . . ." The Committee on Finance and 
Taxation's substantive analysis prepared for House Bill 1951 relating to this amendment 
states, in part: 

In 1981, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal held in Neese 
v. Sizzler Family Steak House, 404 So.2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), 
that an individual is not totally disqualified for benefits when he/she 
works a full-time and part time job simultaneously, qualifies for 
partial unemployment benefits based on being laid off by the fulltime 
employer, then subsequently quits the part-time job. The 
court ruled that, in such instances, the individual is entitled to 
partial benefits which is equal to the weekly benefit amount 
reduced by what the individual would have earned had he/she 
continued the part-time employment. The district courts have 
continued to follow the Neese decision, despite legislative 
amendment in 1994 aimed at overturning Neese. 

It further states: 

Disqualification 

The bill would overturn Neese and its progeny (Berger v. 
ASOLO Center for the Performing Arts, Inc., 686 So.2d 649 (Fla. 
2d DCA 1996); Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 
664 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Tierney v. Florida 
Unemployment Appeals Commission, 640 So.2d 154 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1994); Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So.2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1994); Coelho v. Balasky, 631 So.2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). 
This bill would require the total disqualification of individuals who 
work a full-time and part-time job simultaneously and qualify for 
partial benefits based on being separated from the full-time 
employer, if they subsequently quit the part-time job. 
Staff Analysis of Finance & Taxation Comm. for H.B. 1951, 16th Leg., Reg. Sess., Report 
on Unemployment Comp. (Fla. 1999) (emphasis added).


As can be seen in this analysis, the legislature was informed that the 
amendment addressed cases in which individuals worked "a full-time and part-time job 
simultaneously." Although this summary cited cases similar to Ms. Rochussen's case, no 
one informed the legislators that they were voting to forfeit benefits for unemployed people 
who unsuccessfully attempt part-time employment while looking for suitable full-time 
employment.2 

Thus, Ms. Rochussen fits within a different category of people than Ms. 
Neese. Ms. Rochussen is being penalized because she did not want to be a burden on 
society and because she tried a part-time job that was not compatible with her primary 
obligation to find suitable, full-time employment. She fits into a cluster of cases including: 
Barry v. Faulk Invs., Inc., 621 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 
So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1994); Coelho v. Balasky, 631 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 1994); Tierney v. Fla. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 640 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Berger v. Asolo 
Ctr., 686 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Bomar v. Rolling in Cookie Dough Co., 715 So. 
2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Milkolsky v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 721 So. 2d
738 (Fla. 1998); Rembert v. Interim Personnel, Inc,, 745 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); 
Groudas, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D412 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 7, 2001). 

As this court succinctly stated in Tierney: 

To deny benefits to an individual in appellant's position 
would not further the legislative purpose of the Unemployment 
Compensation Law–to ease the financial hardships caused by 
unemployment–but could discourage part time employment 
and give a windfall in the form of reduced contribution rates to 
the former full time employer. 
Tierney, 640 So. 2d at 155. 

Assuming the legislature intends to overrule Neese3 but does not wish to 
deprive people like Ms. Rochussen of their unemployment benefits, we believe that 
chapter 443 could be amended to achieve that result. Although someone with greater 
expertise in unemployment law might propose a more sophisticated solution, we would 
suggest that the last sentence in the first part of section 443.101(1)(a) could state: "The 
term 'work' as used in this paragraph means any work, whether full-time, part-time, or
temporary, but shall not include part-time work accepted by the individual after unemployed 
from full-time work or in anticipation of such unemployment." 

Unless and until the legislature amends the statute, people who are unemployed 
from full-time jobs should be warned that they should never accept a part-time 
job while searching for a full-time job unless they are completely certain that they will never 
quit the part-time job before finding suitable employment. Thus, with our regrets to Ms. 
Rochussen, we affirm the decision of the UAC. 

Affirmed. 
SALCINES and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.






APPENDIX 
STATE OF FLORIDA 
UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION 
In the matter of: 
Claimant/Appellant 
LYNNE E ROCHUSSEN 
SS No. 003-34-7246 
U.A.C. Order No. 00-03708 
VS. 
Referee Decision No. 00-17913U 
Employer/Appellee 
OPINION RESEARCH CORP 
Employer No. -None 
UCCO-3643-0 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_ORDER OF UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION NO. 00-03708 
This cause comes before the Commission for disposition of 
the claimant's appeal pursuant to Section 443.151(4)(c), Florida 
Statutes, of a referee's decision holding the claimant disqualified 
from receipt of benefits. 

The issue before the Commission is whether the claimant 
voluntarily left work without good cause within the meaning of 
Section 443.101(l), Florida Statutes. 

The claimant established her claim effective April 30, 
2000. Her base period employers were Nations Bank NA and Bank of 
America NT & SA. She was not held disqualified as a result of her 
separations from these employers. Prior to filing her claim, she 
accepted employment as a part-time telephone surveyor with the 
instant employer, Opinion Research Corp. The claimant resigned from 
that employment effective March 10, 2000. The referee held the 
claimant disqualified because she voluntarily left work without good 
cause attributable to the employing unit. The referee's decision is 
in accord with the law and will not be disturbed. 

On appeal, the claimant argues that she should not have 
been disqualified because she left a part-time job. In support of 
her argument, the claimant cites a number of court opinions. These 
opinions are not controlling; therefore, the claimant's argument is 
rejected.

In Neese v. Sizzler Family Steak House, 404 So. 2d 371 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1981), rev. den. 412 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1982), the 
claimant had both full-time and part-time employment. She was 
separated from her full-time employer under non-disqualifying 
circumstances and was awarded partial unemployment benefits. She 
then voluntarily left her 
part-time job. Although the applicable statutes were clear and 
unambiguous, the Court, based upon its interpretation of legislative 
intent, held that, a claimant who voluntarily left a part-time job 
under these circumstances should not entirely forfeit her right to 
benefits. The Court held that the appropriate penalty would be to 
reduce the claimant's benefits to the extent of her loss of part-time 
income. This "partial reduction" penalty was subsequently adopted by 
other district courts. See Wright v. Florida Unemployment Appeals 
Commission, 512 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), Campeanu v. Florida 
Unemployment Appeals Commission, 629 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), 
and Stewart v. Dollar Tree, 635 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). 

Prior to June 1994, Section 443.101(l)(a), Florida 
Statutes, provided that an individual "shall be disqualified for 
benefits for the week in which he has voluntarily left his work 
without good cause attributable to his employing unit" and that a 
disqualification for voluntarily quitting "shall continue for the 
full period of unemployment next ensuing after he has left his work 
voluntarily without good cause and until such individual has earned 
income equal to or in excess of 17 times his weekly benefit amount." 
On its face, the statute did not distinguish between full-time, parttime 
or temporary employment and did not provide for a "partial 
reduction" penalty. The disqualification imposed a severe penalty 
upon individuals who became unemployed voluntarily, but the 
Legislature provided an incentive for part-time workers to continue 
working. Section 443.111(4)(b), Florida Statutes, provides that 
"each eligible individual who is partially unemployed in any week 
shall be paid with respect to such week a benefit in an amount equal 
to her or his weekly benefit less that part of the earned income (if 
any) payable to her or him with respect to such week which is in 
excess of 8 times the federal hourly minimum wage. . . ." For 
example, a claimant whose weekly benefit amount is $250, established 
as a result of a layoff from a full-time job, who is employed parttime 
and earning $100 a week would be entitled to partial 
unemployment benefits in the amount of $191. The incentive for 
continuing work, therefore, is $41. The law also provides that 
employers who continue to provide part-time work to workers who are 
entitled to partial benefits will not be charged with any benefit 
payments made to such partially unemployed claimants. Clearly, the
Legislature intended to encourage work, whether full-time, part-time, 
or temporary, and discourage voluntary unemployment. 

The above-cited court opinions required the Commission 
to fashion and impose a penalty not found in the statute; 
therefore, the Florida Legislature was requested to clarify
its intent with respect to disqualification of claimants who quit 
part-time jobs. The Legislature responded by amending Section 
443.101(l)(a), Florida Statutes, to explicitly define the term "work" 
to mean "any work, whether full-time, part-time, or temporary." The 
amendment became law effective June 3, 1994. The Agency, thereafter, 
continued to apply a complete disqualification penalty when a 
claimant voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to the 
employing unit regardless of whether the separation was from fulltime, 
part-time or temporary employment. 

In Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 664 So. 2d 
1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), the claimant had both full-time and parttime 
employment. Like the claimant in Neese, she was separated from 
her full-time employer under non-disqualifying circumstances. She 
then quit her part-time job. The Commission upheld the denial of 
benefits because the claimant voluntarily left her part-time 
employment without good cause attributable to the employing unit. On 
appeal, the Court rejected the Commission's argument that the 
amendment to Section 443.101(l)(a), Florida Statutes, was intended by 
the Legislature to result in a total disqualification of a worker who 
left part-time employment under these circumstances. The Court held 
that the amendment was to be interpreted to hold that the Commission 
was required to "individually consider unemployment compensation 
claims based on the termination of employment for each job, whether 
it be full-time, part-time or temporary." The Court then held that, 
"to the extent a worker holding multiple jobs left any job 
voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer, 
there would be a reduction in benefits but not a total forfeiture of 
benefits," and applied the "partial reduction" penalty originally 
expounded in Neese. The Court ignored the statutory penalty enacted 
by the Legislature that provides for disqualification to continue 
from the week in which the individual quits and until the individual 
earns 17 times the weekly benefit amount. In effect, the Court 
fashioned a penalty to fit its view of public policy without regard 
to the express intent of the Legislature. Although the Court 
asserted that the Legislature had not expressly rejected Neese and 
the cases that followed it, the Legislative staff analysis clearly 
reflects otherwise. The Court, however, did not have the benefit of 
the staff report when it rendered its opinion. 

In direct response to the Alderman decision, the 1999 
Florida Legislature again amended the penalty provisions of 
Section 443.101(l)(a)l., Florida Statutes, to make it 
abundantly clear that a disqualification for voluntarily 
quitting "shall continue for the full period of unemployment 
next ensuing after he or she has left his or her full-time,
part-time, or temporary work voluntarily without good cause and until 
such individual has earned income equal to or in excess of 17 times 
his or her weekly benefit amount" and that "no other disqualification 
may be imposed." (emphasis added). The amendment became law 
effective July 1, 1999. 

The Legislature has now explicitly provided that the total 
disqualification penalty applies when a claimant has, left part-time 
or temporary work without good cause attributable to the employing 
unit. The "partial reduction" penalty crafted by the courts in Neese 
and its progeny has been rejected. As stated by the Court in 
Alderman, the Commission is required to consider the claimant's 
termination of employment from each job, whether it be full-time, 
part-time or temporary. The Commission, however, must impose the 
disqualification penalty enacted by the Legislature. Neither the 
Commission nor the Courts may fashion novel penalties upon a view of 
fairness that conflicts with the explicit language of the statute. 
The claimant in the instant case voluntarily left part-time 
employment without good cause attributable to the employing unit and 
she is subject to the total disqualification penalty imposed by the 
Legislature. The claimant is disqualified from the week ending March 
11, 2000, and until she earns $4,675. 

Upon review pursuant to Section 443.151(4)(c), Florida 
Statutes, it is found that the decision of the appeals referee is in 
accord with the essential requirements of law and is, therefore, 
affirmed. 

It is so ordered. 
UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION 
R. Carson Dyal, Chairman 
Charlie Harris, Member 
James A. Hammond, Member, Not Participating