NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
DANIEL C. COSTARELL, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D03-3858
)
UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS )
COMMISSION, )
)
Appellee. )
)
Opinion filed May 7, 2004.
Appeal from the Unemployment Appeals
Commission.
Daniel C. Costarell, pro se.
Geri Atkinson-Hazelton, General Counsel,
and John D. Maher, Deputy General
Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
VILLANTI, Judge.
Costarell challenges the decision of the Unemployment Appeals
Commission (UAC) affirming the appeals referee's decision that he was not entitled to
benefits for a portion of the time he was unemployed. The sole basis for the UAC's
affirmance is that Costarell failed to continue claiming unemployment benefits as
required by section 443.091(a), Florida Statutes (2002), during the pendency of his
appeal from the appeals referee's determination that he was ineligible for benefits. We
affirm.
In compliance with its professional obligation to disclose adverse authority
to the court, the UAC directed this court to Dines v. Florida Unemployment Appeals
Commission, 730 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). In Dines, the UAC denied a claimant
benefits on the sole basis that he failed to file claims during the pendency of his appeal.
The Third District determined that requiring the claimant to file claims during the
pendency of his appeal would be tantamount to requiring the claimant to "perform[] a
series of useless acts." Id. at 379 (quoting Savage v. Macy's E., Inc., 719 So. 2d 1208,
1209 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)). Additionally, it determined the statutory filing requirement of
section 443.091 to be "advisory or directory only." Id. We find Dines's reasoning unpersuasive
and decline to follow it in this case. In our view, the statutory requirement to file
for benefits is clear and hence the referee's determination was legally correct. See
Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000) (noting that the first step
a court must take in interpreting a statute is to look at its actual language and then proceed
to rules of statutory construction only when the language is unclear). Moreover,
the legislature's recent amendment to sections 443.091 and 443.111 reinforces our
conclusion that its original intent was to require claimants to continue to file for benefits
during the pendency of any appeal. See ch. 2003-36, §§ 23, 25, Laws of Fla. ("Each
claimant must continue to report regardless of any appeal or pending appeal relating to
her or his eligibility or disqualification for benefits.").1
We affirm the denial of benefits to Costarell for the period of time during
which he failed to file claims while his appeal was pending. In so doing, we certify
conflict with Dines, 730 So. 2d 378.
Affirmed; conflict certified.
CANADY and WALLACE, JJ., Concur.