BRIAN E. WILLIS, 
Appellant, 
v. 
FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT 
APPEALS COMMISSION and 
COMMANDER DEPARTMENT 
OF THE ARMY, 
Appellee. 
_________________________/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED 
CASE NO. 1D03-5434 
Opinion filed January 7, 2005. 
An appeal from an order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission. 
Appellant, pro se. 
John D. Maher, Deputy General Counsel, Unemployment Appeals Commission, 
Tallahassee, for Appellee. 
PER CURIAM. 

Claimant Brian Willis appeals the November 26, 2003 order of the 
Unemployment Appeals Commission (UAC), arguing that the UAC improperly 
reconsidered its June 25, 2003 order upon motion for redetermination of the Agency 
for Workforce Innovation (the Agency). We agree. Section 443.151(3)(c)1., Florida
Statutes (2003), does not contemplate reconsideration where, as here, the Agency 
contends that the UAC made an error in law. 

Section 443.151 provides that the Agency may reconsider its original 
determination, or may apply to the appeals referee, UAC, or court that rendered a final 
determination to issue a revised decision, within one year of the last day of the benefit 
year where “an error has occurred in connection therewith or whenever new evidence 
or information pertinent to such determination has been discovered subsequent to any 
previous determination or redetermination.” In the instant case, the Agency did not 
allege or present new evidence or information.1 Instead, the Agency alleged that the 
UAC erred in interpreting federal regulations concerning unemployment 
compensation for ex-servicemembers. Such an error does not authorize the UAC to 
reconsider its previous decision. 

Section 443.151 does not define what type of “error” can be the basis of a 
redetermination. Read in isolation, the term “error” could be read to encompass error 
of any type, legal, factual, typographical, etc. Statutory words and phrases should not 
be read in isolation, however. See Thompson v. State, 695 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 
1997). Rather, “‘[i]t is axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in
order to achieve a consistent whole. Where possible, courts must give effect to all 
statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one 
another.’” Young v. Progressive S.E. Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000) (quoting 
Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 
(Fla.1992)). 

In reading the statute as a whole, it is apparent that the term“error” should not 
include errors in law. Section 443.151 not only provides for reconsideration, it also 
provides for an appeals process and the finality of orders of the appeals referee and 
the UAC. See § 443.151(4)(b), (c) & (e), Fla. Stat. (providing for an appeal first to 
the appeals referee within twenty days, then to the UAC within twenty days, and 
finally to a district court, within the thirty-day period provided in Fla. R. App. P. 
9.110(b)); see also §§ 120.68(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (requiring appeals from a 
commission to a district court to be taken from final orders unless final review would 
not provide an adequate remedy); Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(a)(3)&(m) (stating that the 
district courts have jurisdiction to judicially review administrative action as general 
law provides). 

To read the term “errors” to encompass an error in the law would allow a party 
to completely ignore the appeals process and repeatedly apply for reconsideration until 
a determination of his or her liking prevailed. Such a reading of the term “errors”
cannot stand because it would render the appeals procedure in the statute superfluous.2 
See Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 2003) (stating that 
“[i]t is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect 
must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and 
words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage”). Therefore, the 
Agency’s request for and the UAC’s grant of reconsideration due to an error in law 
was not authorized. 

Accordingly, we REVERSE the UAC’s November 26, 2003 order and 
REMAND to the UAC for it to reinstate its June 25, 2003 order. 
BROWNING, LEWIS and POLSTON, JJ. CONCUR.