IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
CHARLES G. STANICK, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED 
v. 
CASE NO. 1D03-380 
T & B METAL WORKS INC., and 
FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT 
APPEALS COMMISSION, 
Appellees. 
_____________________________/ 
Opinion filed February 26, 2004.
An appeal from an order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission. 
Charles G. Stanick, pro se, Lake City.
John D. Maher, General Counsel, Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM. 

In this unemployment compensation case, the appeals referee and the Florida 
Unemployment Appeals Commission erred by failing to properly consider and apply 
section 443.101(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2002). The law provides that an unemployed 
worker may qualify for unemployment compensation benefits unless "he or she has 
voluntarily left his or her work without good cause attributable to his or her employing 
unit " § 443.101(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). Although the referee purported to 
consider the question of good cause, the order fails to apply the relevant definition: 

   [T]he term "good cause" as used in this subsection 
   includes only such cause as is attributable to the employing 
   unit or which consists of illness or disability of the 
   individual requiring separation from his or her work. 
   § 443.101(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2002). 

Here, the referee acknowledged evidence establishing that appellant quit his job 
as the result of work-related injuries that left him unable to perform his previous duties. 
Unfortunately, the referee analyzed the good cause requirement without acknowledging 
that good cause statutorily includes illness or disability requiring separation from work. 
See Vajda v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 610 So. 2d 645, 646 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1992) (explaining that "[u]nder the Unemployment Compensation Law, ‘good 
cause’ for leaving a job includes ‘illness or disability of the individual requiring 
separation from his work’"). Under a proper application of the statute here, "[t]he 
inquiry is whether there is an illness or disability which makes the employee physically 
unable to perform the duties of the job." Id.; see Krulla v. Barnett Bank, 629 So. 2d 
1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Here, the referee denied benefits based upon a finding that 
appellant "made no attempt to secure another position with the employing company." 

Acknowledging this finding, we are nonetheless compelled to reverse because the 
proper inquiry is whether the employee, because of illness or disability, is no longer 
able to physically perform the job. Our reading of the order convinces us that the 
referee resolved this particular issue in favor of appellant. 

REVERSED. 
ALLEN, KAHN and POLSTON, JJ., CONCUR.