IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                                         FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
CHARLES W. LYSTER,
                                         NOT  FINAL  UNTIL  TIME  EXPIRES TO
      Appellant,                         FILE  MOTION  FOR  REHEARING  AND
                                         DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v.

FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT                     CASE NO. 1D01-4411
APPEALS  COMMISSION  and
SOUTHERN  REFRIGERATED
TRANSPORTATION,

      Appellees.
___________________________/

Opinion filed September 20, 2002.

An appeal from an order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission.

David M. Noll, Esquire of Kievit, Kelly & Odom, Panama City, for Appellant.

Geri  Atkinson-Hazelton,  General  Counsel  and  John  D.  Maher,  Esquire,  Tallahassee,
for Appellee Unemployment Appeals Commission.





BENTON, J.

      Charles W. Lyster appeals an order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission
disqualifying him from receiving unemployment compensation benefits on the basis
of  "misconduct  connected  with  .  .  .  work."  § 443.101(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001).
Because the employer did not prove carelessness or negligence of the kind the statute
requires  (and  has  not  alleged  any  other  misconduct), we reverse.  Carelessness that
does not "manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design" does not constitute
"misconduct" within the meaning of section 443.036(29)(b), Florida Statutes (2001).

       Until he was fired, Mr. Lyster worked for Southern Refrigerated Transportation
(SRT) as a long haul truck driver.  The unemployment compensation appeals referee
denied unemployment compensation benefits on the ground that the

              record  reflects  the  claimant was discharged on March 26,
              2001, due to a number of accidents.  The claimant had five
              accidents[1]  within  a  ten-month  period  of time.  The
               employer attempted to rectify the situation by retraining the
               claimant on two separate instances.  The claimant's actions
               were careless and not in the employer's best interests.  It is
               concluded, he was discharged due to misconduct
               connected with work . . . .

The  Unemployment  Appeals  Commission  affirmed the appeals referee's decision,
finding  it  supported  by  competent  substantial  evidence,  and  describing  it  as  "a
reasonable application of the pertinent laws to the facts of the case."

         The  burden  to  prove  misconduct  rests  on  the  employer.  See  SKF  Mgmt.  v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 664 So. 2d 345, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) ("[T]he
employer has the burden of proving that the act or acts complained of constitute
`misconduct'  sufficient  to  disqualify  the  employee  from  receiving unemployment
compensation benefits.") citing Gunther v. Barnett Banks, Inc., 598 So. 2d 243, 245
(Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Sheriff of Monroe County v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n,
490 So. 2d 961, 962 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 500 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1986).  Accord
Pascarelli v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 664 So. 2d 1089, 1091 (Fla. 5th DCA
1995);  Paul  v.  Jabil  Circuit  Co.,  627  So.  2d  545,  546  (Fla.  2d  DCA  1993).  Under
section  443.036(29)(b),  Florida  Statutes  (2001),  carelessness or negligence may
constitute  misconduct rendering an applicant ineligible to receive unemployment
benefits, but only in certain, specified circumstances.  The statute requires

              [c]arelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence
              as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design or
              to  show  an  intentional  and  substantial  disregard of the
              employer's  interests  or  of  the  employee's  duties  and
              obligations to his or her employer.

At issue here is whether the Commission and the appeals referee erred in concluding
that SRT proved that  the accidents Mr. Lyster had were the product of  carelessness
or negligence of the kind the statute defines as disqualifying.  Absent disqualification,
"[e]ntitlement  to  unemployment  compensation benefits--designed to ameliorate `the
serious  social  consequences  of  unemployment,'  §  443.021,  Fla.Stat.  (1995)--is  a
matter of statutory right."  Gilbert v. Dep't of Corr., 696 So. 2d 416, 417 (Fla. 1st
DCA  1997).  "Courts should narrowly construe the disqualification provisions, and
should liberally construe the statute in favor of the claimant when determining whether
a  claimant's  actions  constitute  misconduct  in  accordance  with  its  remedial  nature."
Webb v. Rice, 693 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). 

       Despite  the  number of accidents, the record contains no evidence that
Mr.  Lyster's  carelessness  or  negligence­assuming inattention instead of
ineptitude­amounted to the kind required under section 443.036(29)(b).  See Maxfield
v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 716 So. 2d 859, 860 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Poole
v.  J.B.  Hunt  Transp., 703 So. 2d 1158, 1159-60 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997);  Williams  v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 484 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).  Multiple
accidents alone do not render a claimant ineligible for benefits.  See Frazier v. Home
Shopping  Club, L.P., 784 So. 2d 1190, 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).  The record
contains  no  evidence that the accidents were the result of driving recklessly or at
excessive  speeds.  Compare  Trinh  Trung  Do  v.  Amoco  Oil  Co.,  510  So.  2d  1063,
1065  (Fla.  4th  DCA  1987),  with  Poole,  703  So. 2d at 1159.  As far as the record
reveals, Mr. Lyster received a traffic citation for none of the accidents.  See Maxfield
716 So. 2d at 861; Poole, 703 So. 2d at 1159.

      The  negligence  SRT  established  does  not,  in  short,  "manifest  culpability,
wrongful intent, or evil design." § 443.036(29)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001).

             Whether  an  employee  works  in  a  factory,  a  restaurant,  or
             driving  a  truck,  the  employer  may  have  good  cause  to
             terminate  the  worker  for  inattention  or  clumsiness  that
             results  in  several  preventable  accidents.  Merely  having  a
             company rule requiring employees to be careful, however,
             does not transform several negligen[t] acts into misconduct.

Poole, 703 So. 2d at 1159.  Nor was Mr. Lyster's negligence shown to amount to an
intentional disregard of SRT's interests.  See Maxfield, 716 So. 2d at 860-61.  


       Although his negligence (or lack of driving skill) may well justify SRT's decision
to terminate him--nobody has argued otherwise--it does not justify forfeiture of  Mr.
Lyster's  unemployment  compensation  benefits.  See  Poole,  703 So. 2d at 1159-60;
Williams, 484 So. 2d at 90.  See generally Spink v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n,
798  So.  2d  899,  901-02  (Fla.  5th  DCA  2001).  In the present case, as in  Fisher  v.
Unemployment Appeals Commission, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D1221, D1222 (Fla. 5th DCA
May 24, 2002), "[w]e agree with the appellant [who argues in effect] that the instant
record reflects incompetence, not misconduct."

       Reversed.

VAN NORTWICK, J., CONCURS; BOOTH, J., DISSENTS.



NOTES:

       1Uncontroverted  testimony  established  that  none  of  the  accidents occurred at
high speed (backing up seemed to pose a challenge) and that three of the accidents (all
of which Mr. Lyster duly reported) occurred at night in areas that were ill lit, if at all.
The referee found: 
              The claimant was employed as an over-the-road truck driver
              for a transportation company from February 24, 2000, until
              March 26, 2001. On May 25, 2000, the claimant backed his
              vehicle into another vehicle.  The claimant received remedial
              training at that time.  On June 30, 2000, the claimant was
              making a left turn and hit another vehicle.  On August 20,
              2000, the claimant hit a concrete post with his trailer.  On
              February 2, 2001, the claimant was backing his trailer and
              hit another vehicle.  The claimant was retrained on February
              19, 2001.  On March 17, 2001, the claimant was driving his
              vehicle  and  hit  the  roof  of  a building.  The claimant was
              discharged on March 26, 2001, due to these accidents.
Mr.  Lyster  testified  that  the  accident  on  March  17,  2001,  which  precipitated his
discharge occurred because he was exhausted from job-related duties; and that the
damage  to  the  overhanging roof near the traffic island was minor, a fact he
documented (by taking photographs) to protect SRT against an inflated claim.  
         He testified further that the accident on February 2, 2001, resulted in nothing
more  than  a  dent  to  another truck's mirror; that the  accident on August 20, 2000,
caused  very  slight  damage to the trailer only; that the June 30, 2000, accident took
place at a truck stop where the traffic was tight; and that the May 25, 2000, accident
occurred in an area not well designed for long trailers like the one he was hauling at the
time.