IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
WILLIAM G. REEVES,
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
Appellant, FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v.
F L O R I D A U N E M P L O Y M E N T CASE NO. 1D00-2392
APPEALS COMMISSION and
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed April 12, 2001.
An appeal from Unemployment Appeals Commission.
R. Carson Dyal, Chairman.
William G. Reeves, Pro Se, for Appellant.
Steven S. Godwin, Assistant General Counsel, Department of
Business and Professional Regulation, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
The claimant below appeals from an order of the Unemployment
Appeals Commission (Commission) and raises three issues.
Because we reverse on the first issue, we need not address the
others.
Immediately following his discharge from the Department of
Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR), appellant initiated
the process of filing a claim for benefits with the Division of
Unemployment Compensation (Division). Over the next several
months, appellant and the Division were engaged in resolving the
question of appellant's eligibility for such benefits because
the position he had held was part of the Senior Management
Service under section 110.205(2), Florida Statutes. The
Division then issued a determination awarding appellant
unemployment benefits, which it mailed on June 4, 1999. On July
30, DBPR sent a letter to the Division, "to protest the payment
of unemployment compensation" to appellant and asserted as
grounds that appellant had occupied a position in the Senior
Management Service and therefore was not eligible for benefits.
Subsequently, on August 19, 1999, the Division sent appellant a
"Reconsideration Determination" stating that the Division had
reexamined his claim and determined that the position he held
was excluded from unemployment compensation coverage. At the
same time, the Division informed appellant that he must repay
the benefits already paid him. Appellant appealed the
redetermination, arguing that DBPR's appeal to the Division was
untimely and that the Division's redetermination was
unauthorized under applicable law. The appeals referee upheld
the Division's redetermination, and the Commission affirmed.
Section 443.151(3)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that an
employer or claimant must file an appeal of a benefits
determination within 20 days after the Division mails such
determination. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 38E-5.003(1),.005.
Clearly, DBPR's letter to the Division was untimely as an appeal
of the determination that appellant was entitled to benefits.
The question before us then is whether the Division's August
1999 redetermination was authorized by section 443.151(3)(c)1.,
Florida Statutes, which provides that within specified time
limits, the Division "may reconsider a determination whenever it
finds that an error has occurred in connection therewith or
whenever new evidence or information pertinent to such
determination has been discovered subsequent to any previous
determination or redetermination." See, e.g., Blaser v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 687 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
We reject DBPR's contention that its July 1999 letter
questioning appellant's eligibility for unemployment
compensation because he worked in a Senior Management position
constituted "new information" to the Division under section
443.151(3)(c)1. The record clearly demonstrates that this was
the very issue under consideration by the Division from the
beginning of the claims process. Accordingly, the Division's
redetermination was not authorized by the statute and the
determination that granted appellant benefits became final 20
days after it was mailed. See Guido v. Vincam Human Res., Inc.,
729 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
We reverse the Commission's order and remand with directions
to reinstate the June 4, 1999, determination awarding appellant
benefits.
MINER, KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ., CONCUR.
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