IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY 

KEVIN L. WRIGHT, SR., ) 
Appellant, ) 
v.
CLAYMONT STEEL and ) 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ) 
APPEAL BOARD, ) 
Appellees. ) 

Submitted: May 12, 2008 
 Decided: August 4, 2008 

On Appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. 

AFFIRMED. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

BRADY, J. 

 This is an appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance 
Appeal Board ("Board") which denied unemployment benefits to Kevin L. 
Wright, Sr. ("Wright"). Wright was terminated from his employment with 
Claymont Steel ("Claymont") due to a violation of Claymont’s substance 
abuse policy. After a hearing that took place on September 11, 2007, a 
Division of Unemployment Insurance Appeals Referee determined that 
Wright was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because he 
was terminated for just cause. The Board affirmed the Referee’s decision on 
December 10, 2007, and the instant appeal followed. After considering the 
parties’ briefs and the record in this matter, the Board’s decision is 
AFFIRMED. 

Facts 

Wright worked as a shipper/checker/loader for Claymont from 
September 18, 2006 to June 14, 2007. On his date of hire, Wright executed 
a form whereby he acknowledged receipt of Claymont’s Substance Abuse 
Policy ("Policy").1 Pursuant to the Policy, any employee who tests positive 
for any level of an illegal drug is subject to immediate termination. 
However, if an employee voluntarily discloses a substance abuse problem, 
Claymont will select and pay for an appropriate treatment program. The 
employee’s continued employment is contingent upon successful completion 
of the selected treatment program. The Policy also sets forth a procedure for 
testing for illegal drugs. If an employee’s urine sample tests positive for an 
illegal substance, the test is not considered positive until a laboratory test 
confirms the initial result. 

On January 22, 2007, Wright approached Patty Stevens2 ("Stevens") 
and voluntarily disclosed a substance abuse problem with alcohol and 
cocaine.3 After disclosing his problem, Wright signed a Continued 
Employment Agreement ("Agreement") which set forth, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 

I understand that Claymont Steel has agreed to continue 
my employment provided I meet and satisfy each of the 
following conditions: 

1. I must immediately enroll and successfully complete a 
rehabilitation program approved by Claymont Steel
...
3. During the 12 months following my return to work, I 
agree to allow and will promptly comply with Claymont 
Steel’s requests to conduct drug screening and searches 
on a random, unannounced basis. 

4. I agree to participate in and complete any follow-up 
programs and/or treatment which are deemed necessary 
by the rehabilitation counselors approved by Claymont 
Steel... 
I understand that if I fail to satisfy any of the conditions 
listed above, I will be terminated. I further understand 
that in addition to the conditions set forth above, I must 
abide by all other Claymont Steel regulations and 
policies.

After Wright entered into the above agreement, Claymont referred 
him to an intensive outpatient substance abuse program at PACE, Inc. On 
May 15, 2007, PACE’s executive director sent correspondence informing 
Stevens that Wright "has not completed the substance abuse program at 
PACE and has been given a negative discharge status."5 

Upon Wright’s discharge from PACE, he was referred to Dr. Alvin 
Turner to receive individual substance abuse counseling. Stevens testified 
that Claymont agreed to give Wright the opportunity to undergo treatment 
with Dr. Turner, despite his negative discharge from PACE. She testified 
that he missed two out of his first three scheduled appointments prior to his 
termination.6 

On April 26, 2007, Stevens obtained a urine sample from Wright. She 
tested the sample and it came back positive for cocaine. Pursuant to 
Claymont’s policy, Stevens sent the sample to an outside lab. The lab 
results indicated a negative result for cocaine.7 

However, Stevens testified that the lab uses a different standard for a 
positive test result than Claymont. Specifically, the lab has a minimum 
threshold that a sample must exceed before it is considered positive, whereas 
Claymont does not permit any level of illegal drugs.8 Accordingly, on June 
4, 2007, Stevens obtained a second urine sample, which also tested positive 
for cocaine. She sent the sample to the lab with the following instruction: 
"If test is negative, please test for presence."9 

As before, the lab results came back negative for cocaine. However, 
the requested "presence" test came back as "reconfirmed."10 According to 
Stevens, the "reconfirmed" test result indicated that the test that she used --
which apparently tests for trace amounts -- was accurate. Therefore, 
according to Stevens’ interpretation of the lab results, the lab confirmed 
Wright’s positive test.11 

Wright testified on his own behalf in front of the Appeals Referee. He 
stated that, despite the letter from PACE stating otherwise, he received a 
neutral discharge from PACE.12 He stated that PACE was going to give him 
a successful discharge upon his successful completion of treatment with Dr. 
Turner. However, he did not submit any documentary evidence or provide 
any witnesses to support that assertion. Wright testified that he missed two 
out of his first three appointments with Dr. Turner. He stated that he missed 
the first appointment because of a work-related emergency, and he missed 
the second appointment because of a power-outage in Dr. Turner’s office.13 
Wright provided no witnesses or independent documentary evidence to 
support these assertions.14 

Wright stated that he was taking medications, vitamins, and 
supplements and that, in his belief, these items caused him to test positive 
for cocaine.15 However, he did not submit any evidence documenting that 
he was on any medication at the time, and he did not provide any evidence 
that the medications, vitamins and supplements could cause a false positive 
drug test. 

Based on the above, the Claims Referee determined that Wright 
violated the Continued Employment Agreement by failing to successfully 
complete a treatment program and twice testing positive to the employer-
administered drug tests. The Referee did not accept the results of the two 
lab tests since the individuals who performed the tests were not present to 
testify regarding the tests’ methods and reliability. However, the Referee 
found that Claymont’s in-house drug tests were sufficiently reliable. 
Accordingly, the Referee determined that Wright was fired for just cause. 

Wright appealed the Referee’s decision to the Board. Wright did not 
present any additional documentary or testimonial evidence to the Board 
regarding his contention that he received a neutral discharge from PACE. 
He also did not submit any additional evidence supporting his position that 
he had valid reasons for missing his first two appointments with Dr. Turner. 

Wright did present a witness in support of his claim that he received a 
false-positive drug screening. Wright presented the testimony of Mariano 
Spittili, a former Claymont employee who was terminated for testing 
positive for cocaine.16 According to Mr. Spittili, he was taking the same 
sports supplement as Wright, and Mr. Spittili claims the supplement caused 
him to test positive for cocaine.17 

Wright also provided additional testimony regarding the reason why, 
in his opinion, he was fired. Wright testified that on April 28, 2007 he was 
injured when he was hit by a train at work.18 He stated that his attorney 
contacted Claymont regarding the accident, but Claymont did not document 
the accident.19 Wright suggested that Claymont disingenuously terminated 
his employment for violating its Substance Abuse Policy, while, in actuality, 
Claymont chose to fire him because they did not want to "deal with this 
issue with him and the train."20 Wright provided no evidence to corroborate 
this allegation or to corroborate the alleged work injury. 

The Board determined that Claymont terminated Wright for just 
cause. The Board did not accept Wright’s testimony regarding his neutral 
discharge from PACE. In particular, the Board stated that at "both the 
hearing below and before the Board, the claimant testified that he had been 
given a neutral discharge by PACE, in clear contradiction of the 
documentary record."21 Accordingly, the Board found that Wright failed to 
successfully complete the PACE program in direct violation of the 
Agreement with Claymont, and, as such, Claymont had just cause to 
terminate Wright as of May 15, 2007. The Board did not find Wright to be a 
particularly credible witness, and Wright’s lack of evidence corroborating 
his version of events further damaged his credibility with the Board.22 

The Board did not determine whether or not Wright’s two failed drug 
tests provided a separate, independent basis for terminating his employment 
for just cause. Rather, the Board stated the following: 

Because the claimant failed to abide by the agreement 
memorialized in the Continued Employment Agreement 
of January 2007 by being negatively discharged from the 
PACE program, the employer had just cause to terminate 
the claimant at any time following May 15, 2007. While 
the claimant’s failure of a second drug test in June may 
have precipitated the employer’s action, just cause for 
that action had been established on May 15th.23 

Accordingly, the Board affirmed the decision of the Claims Referee, 
and the instant appeal followed. 

Standard of Review 

This Court’s review of the Board’s decision is limited to determining 
whether the decision is free from legal error and supported by substantial, 
competent evidence.24 "The Board is to solve any questions as to credibility 
and conflicts."25 On appeal, Wright is bound by the record of the 
administrative hearing and cannot seek to enlarge the record by offering 
additional evidence.26 "Where a party with the burden of proof fails to 
convince the Board below, the resulting finding of fact can be overturned by 
this Court only for errors of law, inconsistencies, or a capricious disregard 
for competent evidence."27 

Analysis 

Pursuant to the Delaware Code, an individual who is discharged from 
work for just cause is not eligible to receive unemployment compensation.28 
Previous decisions of this Court have held that an employee’s failure to 
abide by the terms of a substance abuse rehabilitation agreement constitutes 
just cause for terminating employment.29 

 Wright does not allege any legal error in the Board’s decision. 
Rather, Wright claims that Claymont did not have requisite just cause, 
because "[n]one of the stipulations of my work agreement were ever 
violated..."30 Specifically, Wright claims that the Board erred in finding 
that Wright failed to successfully complete his substance abuse treatment. 
He further argues that the he never tested positive for any illegal drugs 
because his two positive tests were not properly confirmed by the lab. As he 
suggested in the proceedings below, Wright claims that he was dismissed 
because Claymont employees failed to properly report a work accident and 
are now attempting to "sweep [the accident] under the rug by getting rid of 
the employee and defaming his character."31 

 After reviewing the evidence in record, the Court finds that the 
Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, must 
be AFFIRMED. 

The record demonstrates that the Agreement between Wright and 
Claymont required Wright to "immediately enroll and successfully complete 
a rehabilitation program approved by Claymont Steel."32 Substantial 
evidence indicates that Wright never successfully completed the 
rehabilitation program selected by Claymont. Rather, the evidence in the 
record indicates that Wright was negatively discharged from PACE. Wright 
claims that he was given a neutral discharge from PACE. Even assuming 
that this is the case, a neutral discharge is not a successful completion. 

Although Claymont had just cause to discharge Wright when he failed 
to successfully complete the PACE program, Stevens testified that Wright’s 
superiors agreed to give Wright a final chance with Dr. Turner, but Wright 
missed two of his first three appointments and twice tested positive for 
cocaine, thus forcing Claymont to terminate Wright’s employment. As 
Stevens testified, the second drug test was the final proverbial straw, but the 
record supports the Board’s finding that Wright failed to satisfy his 
obligations under the Agreement prior to the disputed positive drug screens. 

Although Wright transferred from PACE to Dr. Turner (with the 
apparent blessing of Claymont), the Board was not satisfied that Wright 
followed through with his treatment with Dr. Turner. Wright proffered 
reasons for missing his first two appointments that, if true, might be 
legitimate, but the Board did not find Wright to be a particularly credible 
witness and was not inclined to accept his version of events. It is the role of 
the Board, not this Court, to weigh the evidence and "solve any questions as 
to credibility and conflicts."33 Therefore, this Court must accept the Board’s 
determination regarding the credibility of Wright’s proffered reasons for 
missing his scheduled appointments with Dr. Turner. 

 Wright attached to his Opening Brief a letter from PACE which 
supports Wright’s contention that he was given a neutral, rather than an 
unsuccessful, discharge from the program. This letter is not part of the 
record and, in fact, is dated February 25, 2008, more than two months after 
the Board issued its decision in this matter. Similarly, Wright attached a 
letter from Dr. Turner, confirming Wright’s attendance at two therapy 
sessions. The letter is dated December 14, 2007, four days after the Board 
issued its decision. The Court is bound by the record of the proceedings 
below, and Wright cannot seek to enlarge the record by offering additional 
evidence.34 

 It is regrettable if the facts upon which the Board based the decision 
are incomplete or, perhaps, even inaccurate. However, both parties were 
given an opportunity to establish the record regarding their position. If 
Claymont had failed, until following a hearing at which they were 
unsuccessful, to present documentation of Wright’s unsuccessful completion 
of the PACE program, Wright would, legitimately, object to giving that new 
information any consideration. So, equally, should this Court not consider 
an expansion of the record offered by Wright. 

Further, assuming the Court were to consider the letter from PACE, 
the Court notes that the letter indicates that Wright was given a neutral 
discharge. Nothing in the letter suggests that he successfully completed the 
program, as he was required to do under the terms of the Agreement with 
Claymont. Therefore, the Court will not consider the letters attached to 
Wright’s opening brief. 

Wright’s Positive Drug Screens and Alleged Work Injury 

 Wright devotes a substantial portion of his opening brief to the issue 
of whether or not his two positive drug screens satisfied the requirement for 
a positive drug test under Claymont’s Policy. However, the Board did not 
base its decision on this issue. The Board explicitly refrained from ruling on 
this issue and, instead, rested its decision on Wright’s failure to successfully 
complete the PACE program pursuant to Wright’s Agreement with 
Claymont. Therefore, this Court need not address whether or not Wright’s 
positive drug screens provided an independent basis to terminate his 
employment for just cause. 

 The Board’s decision did not specifically address Wright’s claims 
regarding his alleged work injury. However, given the Board’s 
determination that Wright was terminated for just cause, the Board implicitly 
rejected Wright’s claim that he was discharged in furtherance of some type 
of conspiracy to cover-up his alleged injury. Nothing in the record leads this 
Court to an alternative conclusion. 

Conclusion 

 For the forgoing reasons, the decision of the Unemployment Insurance 
Appeal Board is hereby AFFIRMED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.