THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY 

SANDRA L. VITELLI, 
Appellant, 
v.
E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS CO. and 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
APPEAL BOARD, 
Appellees. 

Submitted: April 25, 2007 
Decided: May 10, 2007 

ORDER 

Upon Appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board - AFFIRMED 
This is an Appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s denial 
of benefits to Sandra Vitelli, who was employed by DuPont for seventeen years. Bas ically, 
Vitelli failed to report for work in May 2006, bec ause she w as arrested. A fter DuP ont did 
not hear from her for eightee n days, it sent a warning notice requiring her to contact DuPont. 
When Vitelli did not respond, DuPont sent a termin ation letter. Then, almost a month after 
she went absent, Vite lli contacted D uPont. 

Claiming she was fired without cause, as she was incommunicado while
imprisoned, Vitelli filed for unemployment insurance benefits. When a referee and then the 
Board denied her claim, she filed this Appeal. Vitelli argues that the Board erred by deciding 
that she was to blame fo r failing to rep ort for wo rk or contact DuPont for at least eighteen 
days. In her letter supporting her Appeal, Vitelli explains why she was unable to contact 
DuPont sooner. Sh e conclud es that, under the circumstanc es, DuPont w as not entitled to fire 
her. Thus, she is entitled to benefits. 

On Appeal, the court’s role is limited.1 The court is only allowed to consider 
whether there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the B oard’s factual findings 
and whether the Board’s decision is supported by the law. The court is not entitled to 
reconsider and re-weigh the evidence in order to reach its own factual conclusions. Although 
there is room for Vitelli to disagree with its factual findings, the Board considered the 
arguments Vitelli raised in her Appeal. Actually, during the Board’s procee ding it heard 
addition al evide nce, including Vitelli’s testimony. 

The Board found that DuPont has a policy that after an employee is absent for 
sixteen consecutive days, without a leave of absence, the employee “will be dropped from 
the roll.” Similarly, DuPont has a policy against misconduct, including unauthorized absence 
from work, “unless the cau se of absence preve nts giving n otice.” It is beyond reasonable 
dispute that Vitelli was away for more than sixteen consecutive days. It also is beyond
dispute that Vitelli neither notified DuPont personally, nor did she obtain a leave of absence. 
The question for the Board, therefore, was whether the reason for Vitelli’s absence prevented 
her from notifying Du Pont. 

As to that, although it was disputed, the Board implicitly found that Vitelli 
could have notified DuPont, but she did not. That finding was supported by the fact that 
Vitelli attempted to notify DuPont indirectly, which means that she was not, in fact, 
incommunicado while in cu stody. For exa mple, she testified that she was able to contact her 
boyfriend and also write and send mail after one week. It also is unclea r as to whe n Vitelli, 
in fact, actually was released from prison. 

The court will assume without deciding that had she actually been held 
incommunicado, that would establish, as a matter of law, cause for her failure to contact 
DuPont. That assumption is debatable. In any event, as mentioned, there was evidence in 
the record from which the Board could reasonab ly conclude that Vitelli was to blame for not 
contacting DuPont until after she had be en term inated. At most, she indirectly asked DuPont 
for a couple of vacation days. She did not tell DuPont why she had stopped coming to work, 
and she did no t directly or indirectly request a leave of absence. 

The court is sensitive to the fact that Vitelli worked for seventeen years and, 
presumably, has contributed to the unemployment insurance program. Nevertheless, to keep
a job, typically, the first requirement is that the employee show up.2 Failing that, it is 
reasonable to expect the employee to explain her absence, especially if it is prolonged. 
DuPont’s forbearance for over sixteen days was reasonable, as a matter of law. 

Moreover, the Board was within its authority to consider the evidence and decide that, under 
the circumstances, Vitelli’s failure to notify DuPont and request a leave of absence was 
unreasonable. Thus, Vitelli’s failing to come to work and ask for leave amounted to willful 
misconduct and cause for termination. In other words, there is no basis upon which the court 
can reject the Board’s fact-find ing and legal conclusions. 

For the foregoing reasons, the September 13, 2006 decision of the Board 
affirming the Referee’s denial of benefits is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.