IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY 
PARTHENIA UPSHUR, ) 
) 
Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
THE CHILDREN’S PLACE, INC., ) C.A. No: 03A-06-005 RSG 
) 
and ) 
) 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ) 
APPEAL BOARD ) 
) 
Appellees. ) 
Submitted: November 3, 2003 
Decided: January 13, 2004 
Upon Appeal from a Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board. 
AFFIRMED. 
Parthenia Upshur, Wilmington, Delaware, Appellant, pro se.
Daniel R. Losco, Esquire, Losco & Marconi, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
Margaret F. England, Esquire, Losco & Marconi, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Gebelein, J. 

Parthenia Upshur ("Claimant") is appealing a decision of the Unemployment Insurance 
Appeal Board ("UIAB" or "Board") in which the Board affirmed the decision of the Appeals 
Referee denying Claimant benefits. Upon review of the parties submissions and the record 
below, the Court concludes that the Board’s decision must be affirmed. 

STATEMENT O F FACTS 

Claimant was employed by the Children’s Place ("Employer") from May 200 2 through 
October 25, 2002. It is undisputed that Claimant failed to report to work after October 25, 2002. 
The parties disagree as to factual nature of the circumstances leading to Claimant’s 
unemployment. According to Claimant, she was terminated from her position because Employer 
informed her that she was being replaced because they wanted someone with 60 hours of training 
since they were getting ready to be re-licensed by the State. Employer contends that Claimant’s 
position did not require 60 hours of training because she was an assistant to a fully licensed 
teacher. Employer claims that Claimant’s hours were going to be changed from 8:00 a.m. until 
1:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. and that she was also offered a morning shift working with 
older children. Employer testified that Claimant indicated that she would rather "quit first." 
Subsequently, Employer indicates that Claimant failed to report for work after October 25, 2002. 

After hearing additional testimony, the Board adopted the pertinent findings of fact and 
conclusions of law made by the Appeals Referee ("Referee"). The Referee relied upon title 19, 
section 3315(1) ("section 3315") of the Delaware Code. He concluded that based upon the 
undisputed testimony of Employer, Claimant was terminated for job abandonment after she 
failed to report to work after October 25, 2002. Therefore, Claimant left her work without good 
cause attributable to her work within the meaning of section 3315. The Board found 
Employer’s witnesses to be more credible than Claimant and found that she was not fired, but 
walked off the job because she did not like the new shift alternatives that she was presented. 
Furthermore, the Board stated that: "[e]ven if claimant was unhappy with the proposed changes,
she made no attempt to resolve her issues administratively before quitting." Ultimately the 
Board held that Claimant voluntarily terminated her work for personal reasons, without good 
cause in connection with the work, thereby disqualifying her from unemployment benefits.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE 

The record reflects that Claimant filed for unemployment benefits on January 26, 2003. 
Several attempts that were made to obtain additional information from Employer were 
unsuccessful. As a result, on March 13, 2003, the Claims Deputy found that Claimant was 
terminated without just cause and was eligible for receipt of benefits. Employer filed a timely 
appeal on March 19, 2003, and a hearing with was scheduled for April 9, 2003. Claimant failed 
to personally appear for the hearing. The Referee reversed and modified the decision of the 
Claims Deputy and found that appellant left her job voluntarily without good cause. In so 
finding, Claimant was disqualified from receipt of unemployment benefits and an overpayment 
was ordered to be established for the unemployment benefits Claimant received during the period 
of her disqualification.

Claimant filed a timely appeal of the Referee’s decision with the UIAB on April 14, 
2003, and a hearing was scheduled. On May 29, 2003, the Board held a hearing and issued a 
decision affirming the decision of the Referee. The Board found that Claimant voluntarily 
terminated her work for personal reasons, without good cause in connection with the work and 
affirmed the decision of the Referee. The Board’s decision became final on June 22, 2003. 
Claimant filed a tim ely notice of appeal on June 30, 2003 from the decision of the UIAB. 

ISSUES ON APPEAL 

Claimant filed an appeal of the Board’s decision raising the following four issues for 
review: (1) Claimant did not quit, she was fired; (2) she was informed by Employer that she had 
been replaced; (3) Claimant disputes Employer’s claim that they were short staffed in light of 
Claimant’s failure to report to work; and, (4) that her hours were anytime her boss asked her to 
work. In support of her claims, Claimant argues that the Board’s decision should be reversed 
because it is "the only right thing to do." 

In response, Employer argues that there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s 
decision that Claimant voluntarily terminated her employment for personal reasons without good 
cause. Employer also argues that Claimant’s issues on appeal are arguments of fact, not 
questions of law, that have already been decided by the by the UIAB. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The function of the reviewing Court is to determine whether the agency’s decision is 
supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Substantial evidence 
requires "more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance" to support the finding. The 
appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own 
factual findings. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the 
agency’s factual findings. If the record below contains substantial evidence to support the 
findings of the Board, then that decision will not be disturbed.

DISCUSSION 

Under Delaware law, the employer must show that the claimant was discharged for "just 
cause" in connection with her work. "Just cause" is defined as "a wilful or wanton act in 
violation of either the employer’s interest or of the employee’s duties or of the employee’s 
expected standard of conduct." The Board concluded that Claimant’s failure to return to work 
after October 25, 2002 amounted to voluntary termination of her employment. In adopting the 
Referee’s decision, the Board properly recognized that an employee who voluntarily terminates 
her employment will be disqualified from the receipt of unemployment benefits unless she can 
show that good cause existed to justify her separation, and that the reason for doing so was 
directly related to her work or to her employer. The Board ruled that good cause can be found 
where there had been a substantial reduction in hours, wages or a substantial deviation in the 
working conditions from the original agreement of hire to the detriment of the employee. 
However, an employee has an obligation to make a good faith effort to resolve problems with the 
employer throu gh administ rative remedies before quitting.
 
The Board’s finding that Claimant voluntarily terminated her employment without good 
cause attributable to her work is supported by substantial evidence. The Board found 
Employer’s witnesses more credible than Claimant. Claimant has not meet her burden of 
showing good cause to "justify one in voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining 
the ranks of the unemployed." Claimant was not informed that she would have to accept a 
substantial reduction in hours or wages and Employer did not propose a substantial deviation in 
the working conditions from the original agreement of hire. Claimant was asked if she could 
change her hours from morning to afternoon, without changing the total amount of hours. She 
was also asked to watch older children which was the age group that she had originally been 
hired to supervise. Claimant’s fourth argument, that her hours were determined by the needs of 
her employer, clearly demonstrates that Employer was not proposing a substantial deviation in 
the conditions agreed upon when Claimant was hired. In the alternative, if Claimant believed 
that Employer was proposing a substantial change in the terms of her employment, she failed to 
fulfill her obligation to address her concerns through administrative remedies. After the 
proposed change, Claimant simply stopped reporting for work. 

Claimant’s argument that Employer replaced her with another employee because of the 
upcoming State re-licensing proceedings is without merit. Claimant contends that she was 
replaced with an employee who has 60 hours of training. As an assistant to a fully licensed 
teacher, Claimant’s position did not require 60 hours of training to be compliant with the State 
licensing regulations. The record reflects that Claimant’s "replacement" also did not have 60 
hours of training. As a result, the number of training hours completed is not a viable argument to 
support Claimant’s position. 

Lastly, Claimant disputes Employer’s claim that they were short staffed as a result of 
Claimant’s failure to report to work after October 25, 2002. Employer offered into evidence 
payroll forms that were completed for the two weeks following October 25, 2002. Claimant’s 
name appears on the form through November 8, 2002 which supports Employer’s position that: 
Claimant was expected to report for work on October 28, 2002. Claimant has not set forth any 
legal argument for the Court to consider. Accordingly, the court finds that there is substantial 
evidence to support the factual findings of the Board and the ruling that Claimant voluntarily 
terminated her employment, as opposed to being fired. 

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Board’s decision awarding Claimant benefits is 
AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

The Honorable Richard S. Gebelein 
Orig: Prothonotary 
cc: Parthenia Upshur, Wilmington, Delaware. 
Daniel R. Losco, Esquire, Losco & Marconi, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware. 
Margaret F. England, Esquire, Losco & Marconi, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware.