IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
JOHN B. SULLIVAN, III, ) 
) 
Employee-Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) C.A. No. 02A-09-005 JRS 
) 
ESQUIRE PLUMBING & HEATING, ) 
)
Employer-Appellee, ) 
)
and ) 
)
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE )
APPEAL BOARD, ) 
)
Appellee. )
Submitted: January 30, 2003 
Decided: April 7, 2003 
Upon Appeal from an Order of the Unemployment 
Insurance Appeal Board. 
AFFIRMED. 
O R D E R 

This 7th day of April 2003, upon consideration of the appeal of John B. 
Sullivan, III from the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the 
"Board"), dated September 6, 2002, denying Mr. Sullivan’s application for benefits, 
it appears to the Court that: 

1. Mr. Sullivan began his employment as a HVAC technician for Esquire 
Heating and Plumbing ("Esquire") on January 15, 2001. The Vice President of 
Esquire, Rob Briccotto, hired Mr. Sullivan with a hourly wage of $17.90, which was 
the full journeyman wage negotiated by Local Union 74 of the United Association of 
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United 
States and Canada ("the Union"). At that time, Mr. Sullivan was a probationary 
journeyman with the Union. A month later, Mr. Briccotto conducted an evaluation 
of Mr. Sullivan’s work and determined that his knowledge and skills in oil burner 
service, gas service, and heat pump service were below the standard of a full 
journeyman HVAC technician. Rather than terminate Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Briccotto 
contacted the Business Manager of the Union, John Czerwinski, to request permission 
to lower Mr. Sullivan’s wages to $15.00 per hour, which was the "installer" rate. At 
the Referee and Board hearings, there was some dispute about whether Mr. 
Czerwinski acceded to the lower wage, but the Board determined that he did agree. 

2. Mr. Sullivan signed a contract with Mr. Briccotto ("the Esquire contract") 
in which he agreed that his wages would be reduced to $15.00 per hour (to be 
increased every six months) with the understanding that Mr. Sullivan would receive 
full pay after he completed further training. On March 12, 2001, Mr. Sullivan became 
a full member of the Union, but he continued to receive reduced pay in accordance 
with the Esquire contract. Mr. Sullivan never attended additional training courses. 

3. In April 2002, Mr. Sullivan discovered that the Union bylaws prohibited 
a member of the union from working for less than the contractual rate of $17.90; he 
then requested an increase in pay and back wages. Mr. Briccotto refused. On April 
19, 2002, Mr. Sullivan voluntarily terminated his employment with Esquire. 
4. Mr. Sullivan filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits on April 
14, 2002. He asserted that he quit for "good cause" because the Esquire contract 
violated the Union rules. The Claims Deputy denied his request, stating that Mr. 
Sullivan quit based on his "dissatisfaction with agreed upon terms" of his 
employment, which is not "good cause." The Appeals Referee agreed, finding that 
Mr. Sullivan did not meet his burden of showing "good cause" for the voluntary 
termination of his employment. 

5. The Board held two hearings for Sullivan’s claim. At the first hearing, 
Mr. Sullivan claimed that Mr. Czerwinski did not approve the Esquire contract, but 
Mr. Czerwinski was not present to testify. The Board postponed the hearing to 
subpoena the testimony of Mr. Czerwinski. At the second hearing, Mr. Czerwinski 
testified that he agreed to the Esquire contract. The Board concluded that the Esquire 
contract did not violate Union bylaws for several reasons: 1) the Union agreed to 
Esquire’s new wage agreement; 2) Mr. Sullivan was only a probationary journeyman 
at the time of the agreement; 3) Mr. Sullivan provided insufficient evidence that the 
terms of the Esquire contract actually violated Union rules; and 4) Mr. Sullivan had 
worked under this agreement for 14 months prior to his voluntary termination. The 
Board then rendered a decision denying Mr. Sullivan’s benefits. 

6. The Court’s standard of review of the Board’s decision is limited. The 
Court must evaluate whether the Board’s factual findings are supported by substantial 
evidence and whether the Board made any legal error in reaching its conclusions. 
Substantial evidence is "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion." The Court cannot decide facts or assess the 
credibility of witnesses. 

7. On appeal, Mr. Sullivan no longer contends that Mr. Czerwinski did not 
agree to the Esquire contract. Instead, he argues that the Board erroneously failed to 
address Mr. Czerwinski’s authority to approve the Esquire contract before 
determining whether Mr. Czerwinski agreed to the contract. Esquire counters by 
arguing that the record supports the finding that Mr. Czerwinski had the authority to 
bind the Union to the Esquire contract. Alternatively, Esquire asserts that Mr. 
Sullivan did not have "good cause" to quit because he failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies through the Union before his voluntary termination. The Board also 
submitted an answering brief, arguing that Mr. Sullivan never raised the issue of Mr. 
Czerwinski’s authority at any stage of the proceedings, thus precluding the Court’s 
consideration of this issue on appeal. 

8. To be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits, Mr. Sullivan must 
meet the requirements of Section 3315(1), Title 19 of the Delaware Code. Section 
3315(1) provides that a claimant will not be disqualified from benefits if the claimant 
demonstrates that he voluntarily terminated his employment with "good cause." The 
claimant carries the burden of proof.8 "Good cause may exist where there is a 
substantial reduction in wages or hours of employment, or a substantial deviation 
from the original employment agreement."

9. Mr. Sullivan asserts that the Board failed to address the threshold issue of 
whether the Union authorized Mr. Czerwinski to approve the Esquire contract. He 
maintains that he attempted to raise this issue to the Board, pointing to an 
incomprehensible question in the transcript from him to Mr. Czerwinski. The Court 
cannot conclude on this record that Mr. Sullivan fairly raised this issue before the 
Board. The Court is compelled to observe that it seems unlikely that Mr. Sullivan 
intended to or actually raised this issue in view of the fact that his position at the first 
Board hearing and at the outset of the second Board hearing was that Mr. Czerwinski, 
as a representative of the Union, did not approve the Esquire contract. In fact, based 
on Mr. Sullivan’s position in this regard, the Board postponed the first hearing to 
subpoena Mr. Czerwinski to appear before the Board so that he could explain the 
Union’s role in the creation of the Esquire contract. Mr. Sullivan initially took the 
position in the proceedings below that Mr. Czerwinski possessed the authority to 
approve the Esquire contract, and it is disingenuous for Mr. Sullivan to contend on 
appeal that the Board ignored this issue. 

10. In any event, the Court finds that there is substantial evidence in the 
record to support the Board’s implicit determination that Mr. Czerwinski had the 
authority to bind the Union. Mr. Czerwinski held the position of "Business 
Manager" in the Union, and Mr. Briccotto testified that Mr. Czerwinski regularly 
interacted with the employers on behalf of the Union. Additionally, Mr. Sullivan 
named Mr. Czerwinski as his union representative at the first Board hearing.15 This 
testimony provides substantial evidence to support the Board’s implicit finding of Mr. 
Czerwinski’s authority to represent the Union. 

11. Even if Mr. Czerwinski did not have the authority to accede to the 
Esquire contract, as Mr. Sullivan contends, the Board decided that Mr. Sullivan did 
not carry his burden of proving "good cause" for other reasons. Most significantly, 
the Board found insufficient evidence to support Mr. Sullivan’s claim that the terms 
of the Esquire contract actually conflicted with Union bylaws. This conclusion 
likewise is supported by substantial evidence and provides a viable basis to support 
the Board’s ultimate finding that Mr. Sullivan did not demonstrate "good cause." At 
the hearings before the Referee and the Board, Mr. Sullivan merely presented a copy 
of the Union bylaws and offered his own conclusory opinion that the Esquire contract 
breached them. Article XV of the Union bylaws states the general rule that "[n]o 
member of this Local Union shall work for less than the regular rate of wages decided 
upon by this Local Union." This language does not shed light on Mr. Sullivan’s 
circumstances, however, because it does not address the situation where a 
probationary member enters a separate contract for lower wages pending completion 
of requisite training. In addition, Mr. Briccotto testified at the Referee’s hearing that 
the Union never informed him that he was in violation of Union bylaws. The Board 
reasonably concluded that Mr. Sullivan produced insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the terms of the Esquire contract actually conflicted with or violated 
the Union rules. 

12. Based on the foregoing, the Board’s denial of Mr. Sullivan’s 
unemployment insurance benefits is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Judge Joseph R. Slights, III 
Original to the Prothonotary 
16Id. at 60. 
17Id. at 53.