IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
BREIGH D. STRAZZELLA, )
Appellant, )
v. )
JOE TEJAS, INC., and )
UNEMPLOYMENT )
INSURANCE APPEAL )
BOARD, )
Appellee. )
ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD
AFFIRMED
Submitted: February 1, 2008
Decided: February 12, 2008
This 12th day of February, 2008, upon consideration of the appeal of
Breigh D. Strazzella ("Strazzella") from the decision of the Unemployment
Insurance Appeal Board (the "Board") denying her request for a rehearing, it
appears to the Court that:
1. On December 24, 2006, Strazzella filed a petition with the
Board seeking unemployment benefits. She had been employed at a
restaurant operated by Joe Tejas, Inc. Although not entirely clear from her
brief, Strazzella appears to admit that she missed a substantial amount of
work from burns on her left arm from a faulty ice machine, as well as from
three deaths in her family in August and September 2006. Strazzella claims
that the absences due to the burns were excused and that she submitted
obituaries to support her absences related to the deaths in her family. After
these absences, her employer placed her on notice on December 19, 2006
that she would be terminated, regardless of the reason, if she did not report
to work.
2. Strazzella reacted to the warning by giving her two weeks’
notice to quit on December 23, 2006. She claims that her manager, Martin,
told her that she was not needed for the two-week period. After she filed for
unemployment benefits, according to Strazzella, Martin claimed instead that
she had refused to work for those two weeks.
3. On January 17, 2007, the Claims Deputy found that Strazzella
was disqualified from receiving benefits. Strazzella appealed that
determination, and the Appeals Referee affirmed the Deputy’s ruling but
modified it to award her benefits for two weeks’ pay. Strazzella then
appealed to the Board, claiming this time that Joe Tejas, Inc. put her on
notice of termination for no legitimate reason.
4. A hearing before the Board was scheduled for March 14, 2007.
Proper notice was sent to Strazzella and to Joe Tejas, Inc. that a hearing was
scheduled for that date at 1:20 p.m. The notice also informed Strazzella that
"[f]ailure to appear for your hearing in a timely manner can result in your
appeal being dismissed." Strazzella failed to appear at the hearing. As a
result, the Board dismissed her appeal.
5. After receipt of the dismissal notice, Strazzella filed a request
for a rehearing with the Board on March 23, 2007, claiming she failed to
attend the hearing because she was "very ill." On March 28, 2007, the
Board denied her request because she provided no medical documentation,
nor did she identify any such documentation. The Board also found that her
failure to appear was not the fault of the Department, nor the result of
extraordinary circumstances. The decision was mailed to Strazzella on April
13, 2007.
6. Strazzella filed a pro se appeal of the Board’s decision to this
Court on April 23, 2007.1 In her brief, Strazzella argues that she was too
sick to attend the hearing. She claims that she called the Board and left a
message indicating that she could not attend and that she would submit a
doctor’s note. She also argues that Joe Tejas, Inc. improperly gave her
notice that they would terminate her without a legitimate reason.
7. In response, the Board submits that Board regulations permit
the Board to dismiss the appeal when the appellant fails to appear. Since
Strazzella was given proper notice and did not timely request a continuance,
the Board appropriately dismissed her appeal. The Board also points to
Strazzella’s failure to include any documentation supporting her claim of
being "very ill." Although she submitted a doctor’s note to this Court
indicating that she had a severe bacteria infection on March 15, 2007, the
Board maintains that this Court cannot review evidence which was not
submitted to the Board in the first instance. Finally, the Board contends that
this Court should not decide the merits of Strazzella’s appeal because she
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
8. This Court’s appellate review of a Board decision is limited.
"In reviewing the decisions of the UIAB [Unemployment Insurance Appeal
Board], this Court must determine whether the findings and conclusions of
the UIAB are free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence in
the record."2 Substantial evidence means "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."3 The
"substantial evidence" standard means "more than a scintilla but less than a
preponderance of the evidence."4 The Court "does not weigh the evidence,
determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings."5 A
discretionary decision of the Board will be upheld absent an abuse of
discretion.6 An abuse of discretion occurs when the Board "exceeds the
bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has ignored recognized
rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice."7 The Court reviews
questions of law de novo to determine "whether the Board erred in
formulating or applying legal precepts."8
9. 19 Del. C. § 3322(a) only permits judicial review of a Board
decision "after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted all
administrative remedies as provided by this chapter."9 To the extent that
Strazzella seeks to have this Court decide the merits of her claim for
unemployment benefits, her failure to appear before the Board and present
her case there precludes consideration of any evidence she offers to this
Court.10 As a result, the Court will not consider the doctor’s note that
should in the first instance have been presented to the Board.
10. The only issue remaining is whether the Board abused its
discretion when it denied Strazzella’s request for a rehearing. This same
issue was addressed by the Superior Court in Archambault v. McDonald's
Restaurant.11 In that case, the Superior Court determined that the Board’s
decision to dismiss appellant’s case for failing to appear was not an abuse of
discretion:
The Board maintains statutory authority to promulgate
regulations designed to ensure the prompt and orderly
determination of the parties’ rights. In that regard, the Board
has adopted Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board Rule B
which provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll parties are required
to be present for a hearing at the scheduled time. Any party
who is not present within 10 minutes after the scheduled time
for hearing shall be deemed to waive his right to participate in
said hearing." The Court cannot conclude that the Board
abused its discretion by dismissing Claimant’s appeal. This
Court has previously recognized "the importance of adhering to
a hearing schedule to efficiently manage and dispose of cases
and the need to enforce rules such as Rule B to engender
cooperation from the interested parties." Thus, the Court
concludes that the Board did not act arbitrarily by dismissing
Claimant’s appeal for failure to appear.12
11. Just as in Archambault, the Board in this case did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Strazzella’s request for a rehearing. Pursuant to its
authority,13 the Board followed its regulations, provided due notice to all
parties involved, waited ten minutes after the scheduled hearing for
Strazzella to appear, and then dismissed her appeal.14 Because the notice to
Strazzella expressly informed her that "[f]ailure to appear for your hearing
can result in your appeal being dismissed[,]" Strazzella was aware of the
consequences if she chose not to appear. Strazzella also failed to seek a
continuance.15 Although she claims that she called "the Court" on the date
of her hearing and indicated that she would provide a doctor’s note, there is
no evidence in the record to substantiate that any such documentation was
ever submitted. Strazzella did not speak with anyone on the date of the
hearing, nor did she deliver a note from a physician or any other
documentary evidence supporting her claim of illness. Considering these
circumstances, the Board did not exceed "the bounds of reason in view of
the circumstances . . . so as to produce injustice."16 Accordingly, the Board
did not abuse its discretion.
12. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is hereby
AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Peggy L. Ableman, Judge