IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY SHAUNDRA L. SHAW-MALACHI, )) Appellant, )) v. ) C.A. No. 05A-09-008 WCC ) CITY OF WILMINGTON/FINANCE ) and the UNEMPLOYMENT ) INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD )) Appellees. ) Submitted: March 3, 2006 Decided: June 30, 2006 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. AFFIRMED. Shaundra L. Shaw-Malachi; 404 West 23rd St.; Wilmington, Delaware 19802. Pro Se Appellant. Brenda James-Roberts; First Assistant City Solicitor; Louis L. Redding City/County Building; 800 North French St. 9th Floor; Wilmington, Delaware 19801. Attorney for Appellee. CARPENTER, J. Introduction Before this Court is Shaundra L. Shaw-Malachi’s (“Claimant” or “Ms. Shaw- Malachi”) appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s (“Board”) decision, in which it found that Ms. Shaw-Malachi voluntarily resigned from her job, and therefore was not eligible for unemployment benefits. Upon review of briefs filed in this matter, this Court finds the Board’s decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Facts On July 28, 2000, Ms. Shaw-Malachi began her employment with the City of Wilmington (the “City”) as a Customer Service Representative (CSR). As a CSR, Ms. Shaw-Malachi’s responsibilities included making adjustments and calculations to customer accounts, a task with which Ms. Shaw-Malachi had difficulty performing throughout her employment with the City.1 In an attempt to correct this shortcoming, she was provided additional training by the City and was assisted by her coworkers and supervisors.2 However, the Claimant continued to struggle with these responsibilities, which eventually led to a decision to remove these tasks from her day-to-day responsibilities.3 Eventually the tasks were again assigned to her as part of the regular function of her job, but she continued to struggle and was again provided more training, to no avail.4 In addition to being a City employee, Ms. Shaw-Malachi, was also a member of the Local 1102, and was therefore bound by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with respect to her position. As such, she was required to take lunch breaks at a certain time and for a certain length.5 This led to an incident on February 9, 2004 when Ms. Shaw-Malachi told her supervisor she would work through lunch or go after she completed the task she was working on.6 However, because of the requirements of the CBA, the supervisor insisted Ms. Shaw-Malachi take her break. The Claimant became upset, admittedly throwing her work onto her desk, with some of the work falling into the trash can. Immediately following this incident, Ms. Shaw- Malachi requested medical leave and did not return to her position with the City for almost a month and half. Unbeknownst to the City at the time, Ms. Shaw-Malachi was suffering from a bipolar and anxiety disorder. Ms. Shaw-Malachi returned to her position with the City on April 13, 2004.7 Upon her return, she was disciplined for the February 9th incident, and was given a 3-day suspension.8 That same day, Ms. Shaw-Malachi was advised by her supervisor, Linda Hunter, that her performance required immediate improvement, and to ensure this occurred, her work would be reviewed weekly. Ms. Hunter further advised the Claimant if improvement in her work was not apparent, she would face disciplinary action.9 Approximately three months later, on July 14, 2004, Ms. Shaw-Malachi received an additional letter, this time from the Revenue Manager James O’Donnell, indicating the Claimant’s training had failed to improve her performance. As a result, the Claimant was given a deadline of August 13, 2004 for her work to improve to a satisfactory level, and failure to improve would result in disciplinary action.10 As of August 10, 2004, the improvement required was not evident as the same mistakes in the calculations were being made by the Claimant. At this point, Ms. Hunter placed Ms. Shaw-Malachi on a daily review schedule, and any incorrect work would be returned to Ms. Shaw-Malachi for correction.11 That same day, the Claimant submitted her resignation, stating September 30, 2004 would be her last day. The letter did not indicate a reason for her resignation.12 On September 16, 2004, Manager O’Donnell advised an assistant supervisor to take over a transaction Ms. Shaw-Malachi was handling with a customer.13 As a result, the Claimant became upset and went directly to Martha Gimbel, Labor Relations Manager within the Personnel Department, and left a note indicating her need to leave at two o’clock that afternoon. When it became apparent that Ms. Shaw- Malachi wished to move up her resignation date from September 30, 2004 to September 16, 2004, the Claimant was instructed to submit a second resignation letter with the new date.14 The second letter was again devoid of a medical reason for the Claimant’s termination of her employment, though it did indicate that stress at her job was the reason for her premature departure. Ms. Shaw-Malachi’s last day with the City was September 16, 2004. At this juncture, the City still had no notice of Ms. Shaw-Malachi’s medical condition. Subsequently, the Claimant filed a claim with the Delaware Department of Labor Division of Unemployment Insurance (DOL), and on October 12, 2004 the DOL determined Ms. Shaw-Malachi voluntarily quit her job with the City for good cause,15 and thus she was qualified to receive benefits pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314.16 This decision was appealed to an appeal referee which held a hearing on November 30, 2004. The Appeals Referee issued her decision on December 16, 2004, determining the Claimant voluntarily quit without good cause and was not available for work, and therefore was not eligible for unemployment benefits.17 The Claimant appealed this decision to the Delaware Department of Labor Appeal Board, and on August 9, 2005, the Board issued its opinion in which it determined Ms. Shaw-Malachi 1) did voluntarily terminate her employment with the City; 2) did not exhaust her administrative remedies prior to terminating her employment; 3) was available to work; and 4) was constructively discharged twoweeks prior to her original termination date.18 Subsequently, the Claimant filed this appeal currently before the Court. It is well-settled that the standard of review for this Court regarding an appeal from the Board is limited to a determination of whether the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error.19 Substantial evidence may be characterized as evidence that a reasonable mind accepts as adequate support for the conclusion.20 In this capacity, the Court does not weigh evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make findings of fact.21 When applying the substantial evidence standard, the Court must consider the record in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, “resolving all doubts in its favor.”22 Further, the Court is limited to considering the record that was before the Board, and if the Board adopts the findings of the Referee, this Court will also review that findings of fact and conclusion of law.23 If the record supports the Board’s findings, the Court should accept those findings even though, acting independently, the Court might reach a different conclusion. Discussion Both the Board24 and the Appeals Referee25 have determined the Claimant voluntarily quit without good cause. Ms. Shaw-Malachi argues that it was the hostile work environment coupled with her bipolar disorder which caused her treating doctor to tell her to quit her job, and she therefore quit involuntarily due to medical reasons.26 The Board disagreed, however, and concluded that the work environment was tolerable.27 Thus, this Court must determine if the Board had substantial evidence in making that finding, and that the Board’s decision was based on sound legal ground. In both respects, the Court finds that the Board did not err. In order to receive unemployment compensation, Ms. Shaw-Malachi must initially demonstrate 1) that she either voluntarily quit with good cause or involuntarily quit and 2) that she is eligible to work. This determination is a fact question for the Appeals Referee or the Board, and if a claimant is found to have involuntarily quit and available to work, she is generally eligible for unemployment benefits.28 However, if a claimant is found to have voluntarily quit, she must demonstrate she had good cause to do so in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits.29 “Good cause has been defined as ‘such cause as would justify one in voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed. . . .’”30 It requires more than the showing of an unsafe or undesirable work environment.31 And, even if the claimant left her employment because of a medical condition or because the stress of the workplace was too much for the claimant to bear, she still must make a good faith effort to resolve the situation prior to voluntarily quitting in order to be eligible for benefits, including providing the employer with proper notice of her adverse medical conditions.32 33Rizzitiello v. McDonald’s Corp., 868 A.2d 825, 832 (Del. 2005) (citing Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004)). 34Id. 35Kondzielawa v, 2003 WL 21350538, at *4; see also O’Neal’s Bus Serv., 269 A.2d at 249 (citing Zielenski v. Bd. of Review, 203 A.2d 635 (N.J. Super. 1964)) (“Good cause for quitting a job must be such cause as would justify one in voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.”). 36Rizzitiello, 868 A.2d at 832. The Board reviews cases of intolerable work environment under the reasonable person standard, and not under an emotionally fragile person standard.33 Thus, even if the Board believed Ms. Shaw-Malachi’s medical condition was the reason she could not tolerate her work environment, the environment itself would be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable person.34 Good cause to quit her employment cannot be established merely because the Claimant does not desire to work in a particular environment, or because her job was stressful, or because the Claimant thought it was an intolerable work environment.35 The environment must be one that justifies to a reasonable person that becoming unemployed is the only alternative.36 This standard has clearly not been met by the Claimant. In its decision, the Board relied on a number of facts submitted at the hearing to reach the conclusion that Ms. Shaw-Malachi voluntarily quit without good cause. Namely, with respect to the work conditions in August 2004 when the Claimant submitted her resignation, the Board determined that there were obvious concerns regarding the Claimant’s performance that were clearly and strongly communicated to her by her supervisor.37 There is also no dispute that the Claimant was unable to comprehend and perform a central function of her position, which added to her conflict with her supervisor and led to weekly and almost daily reviews of her work.38 In spite of this deficiency, the City provided her training and time to master these tasks, which the Claimant never satisfactorily accomplished. The Claimant may not have liked the intense supervision that she was under, but to argue this was an intolerable work condition is simply without merit. The Claimant was unable to effectively perform a central function of her job in spite of significant training and the Court finds the actions taken to ensure the public’s accounts were appropriately handled by the Claimant were reasonable and necessary. The Claimant has failed to demonstrate that her work environment was intolerable in order to establish good cause, as the situation does not meet the standard for an intolerable work environment for a reasonable person, as set forth by the Courts.39 Again, whether Ms. Shaw-Malachi terminated her employment voluntarily with the City is a question of fact, and therefore, not for this Court to decide. This Court is to merely determine if there was substantial evidence for the Board to reach its decision. The Board determined the Claimant failed to meet her burden of showing good cause to voluntarily quit. Since this decision rendered by the Board was based on the above facts, which taken as a whole, constitutes substantial evidence to reach the conclusion that Ms. Shaw-Malachi did in fact voluntarily quit without good cause, this Court affirms the Board’s decision in that respect. And, because the Claimant is not eligible for benefits without showing good cause existed, the Court need not delve into the other aspects of the Board’s decision. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED. IT IS SO ORDERED. _______________________ Judge William C. Carpenter, Jr. ______________________________________________________________________________ notes: 1Tr. Malachi, Dept. of Labor Appeal. Nos. 155756 & 155757, 5. 2Id. at 7. 3The Claimant was taken off adjustments for about a year in 2002 and 2003. 4Tr. Malachi, Dept. of Labor Appeal. Nos. 155756 & 155757, 9; Claimant Ex. 1. 5Tr. Hunter, Dept. of Labor Appeal. Nos. 155756 & 155757, 61-2. 6Id. 7Id. at 27. 8Id. at Employer Ex. 1. 9Id. at Claimant Ex. 4. 10Id. at Claimant Ex. 1. 11Id. at Claimant Ex. 4, 5. 12Tr. Malachi, Dept. of Labor Appeal. Nos. 155756 & 155757, 9; Claimant Ex. 7. 13Malachi v. City of Wilmington, UIAB Appeal No. 155756 (Aug. 9, 2005). 14Malachi v. City of Wilmington, Decision of Appeals Referee Nos. 155756, 155757 (Dec. 16, 2004). 15Malachi v. City of Wilmington, Determination of Department of Labor Claim Nos. 155756, 155757 (Oct. 12, 2004). 1619 Del. C. § 3314 states, in pertinent part: Disqualification for Benefits. An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (1) For the week in which the individual left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work . . . . However, if an individual has left work involuntarily because of illness, no disqualification shall prevail after the individual becomes able to work and available for work and meets all other requirements under this title, but the Department shall require a doctor’s certificate to establish such availability . . . 17Malachi, Decision of Appeals Referee Nos. 155756, 155757. 18Malachi, UIAB Appeal No. 155756. 19Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 689 (Del. 1960) (“The position of the Superior Court . . . on appeal is to determine only whether or not there was substantial evidence to support the findings of the Board. If there was, these findings must be affirmed.”); Fed. Street Fin. Serv. v. Davies, 2000 Del. Super. Ct. LEXIS .286, at *6 (“In reviewing the decisions of the UIAB, this Court must determine whether the findings and conclusions of the UIAB are free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence in the record.”). 20Majaya v. Sojourners’ Place, 2003 WL 21350542 (Del. Super. Ct.), at *4; Fed. Street Fin. Serv., 2000 Del. Super. Ct. LEXIS 286, at *7; see also Oceanport Indus. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994). 21Johnson, 213 A.2d at 66-67 (“On appeal from the Board, however, the Superior Court does not sit as a trier of fact with authority to weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, and make its own factual findings and conclusions.”). 22Gen. Motors Corp. v. Guy, 1991 WL 190491, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct.). Standard of Review 23Majaya v. Sojourners’ Place, 2003 WL 21350542, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct.). 24Malachi, UIAB Appeal No. 155756. 25Malachi, Determ. of Department of Labor Claim Nos. 155756, 155757 (Oct. 12, 2004). 26Tr. Malachi, Dept. of Labor Appeal. Nos. 155756 & 155757, 47. 27Malachi, UIAB Appeal No. 155756. 28Kondzielawa v. Perry, Joseph & Pearce, P.A., 2003 WL 21350538, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct.). 29O’Neal’s Bus Serv. v. Employ. Sec. Comm’n, 269 A.2d 247, 248 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970). 30Kondzielawa, 2003 WL 21350538, at *3. 31Id. at *4. 32Id. at *2-4 (“[G]ood faith is an essential element of good cause,” and thus a claimant must make a good faith effort to resolve the situation prior to voluntarily quitting in order to be eligible for benefits, meaning he must exhaust all administrative remedies before quitting.). 37Malachi, UIAB Appeal No. 155756. 38Id. 39See Kondzielawa, 2003 WL 21350538, at *4; O’Neal’s Bus Serv., 269 A.2d at 249; Rizzitiello, 868 A.2d at 832.