IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STAT E OF D ELAWARE
IN AND FOR KENT COUNTY
ROGER O. SCHNEID ER, :
: C.A. No. 03A-09-004 WLW
Appellant, :
:
v. :
:
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE :
APPEAL BOARD, :
:
Appellee. :
Submitted: January 9, 2004
Decided: April 30, 2004
ORDER
Upon Appeal of Decision of the Unemployment
Insurance Appeal Board. Reversed and Remanded.
Roger O. Schneider, pro se.
Ray E. Calloway Bus Service, pro se.
WITHAM, J.
Schneider v. Calloway Bus Service
C.A. No. 03A-09-004 WLW
April 30, 2004
Introduction
Before this Court is Roger Schneider’ s appeal of a decision of the
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (" UIAB") finding that Mr. Schneider was
not eligible to receive unemployment benefits because he was not unemployed. Ray
Calloway Bus Service, Inc. (" REC" ) answered the appeal.
Background
Roger Schneider has been employed by REC since September 2, 2002 as a
school bus driver. Originally he was hired as a substitute bus driver ear ning $68.00
per day, but due to budget cuts within the state, his pay was reduced to $60.00 per
day for the same work. When he began working for REC, he was receiving
unemployment benefits due to the loss of a previous job in the construction business.
In April 2003, he was offered a position as a permanent bus driver for a route in
Clayton, Delaware. Although his pay would be reduced to $39.00 per day, it was
an easier route than his pr evious assignments and he was told that he would be able
to make up the difference by driving on extra trips, earning $10.00 per hour. He
had the option of continuing as a substitute bus driver at a pay rate of $60.00 per
day, but instead chose to accept the permanent driver position at the lower pay rate.
At the time of the UIAB hearing, Mr. Schneider was still employed by REC as a
driver on the Clayton bus route.
On December 1, 2002, while employed with REC, Mr. Schneider filed for
unemployment benefits. According to his opening brief, he was told he was eligible
for 26 weeks of benefits at $314.00 per week. However, on April 29, 2003, a
claims deputy concluded that he was ineligible for benefits because he was not
" unemployed" as defined in 19 Del. C. § 3302(17).1 The claims deputy concluded
that Mr. Schneider was ineligible for benefits beginning with the week ending
December 14, 2002, because he was employed as a bus driver for 30 hours per
week. However, the claims deputy did award benefits for the weeks during which
school was closed.
Mr. Schneider appealed the denial of benefits and the matter was then heard
by Joseph Julian, Jr ., an Appeals Referee, on May 28, 2003. The Appeals Referee
concluded, after hearing from Mr. Schneider and Phyllis Poore, a representative of
REC, that Mr. Schneider was employed as a full-time driver with REC when he
applied for benefits and thus was not eligible for unemployment benefits. In
addition, the Appeals Referee found that Mr. Schneider voluntarily accepted the
lower paying position as a permanent driver. Therefore, the Appeals Referee
affirmed the decision of the claims deputy.
19 Del. C. § 3302(17) (2004) provides:
"Unemployment" exists and an individual is "unemployed" in any
week during which the individual performs no services and with
respect to which no wages are payable to the individual, or in any
week of less than full-time work if the wages payable to the
individual with respect to such week are less than the individual's
weekly benefit amount plus whichever is the greater of $10 or 50%
of the individual's weekly benefit amount
Mr. Schneider appealed this decision as well as a decision by the Appeals
Referee that he repay benefits improperly received, and a hearing was conducted on
July 16, 2003 before the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board. The Board heard
testimony from Mr. and Mrs. Schneider regarding the two decisions from which Mr.
Schneider was appealing: (1) the requirement that he pay back improperly paid
unemployment benefits from September 2002, and (2) the denial of unemployment
benefits for which Mr. Schneider filed in December 2002. Mr. Schneider contended
that he was eligible for unemployment benefits because his weekly pay was less than
his unemployment benefits. The Board, however, concluded that because Mr.
Schneider was working full-time and receiving wages, he was not unemployed as
defined in 19 Del. C. § 3302(17). In addition, the Board agreed with the Appeals
Referee in finding that Mr. Schneider voluntarily accepted the lower paying job.
Therefore, the Board affirmed the decision of the Appeals Referee finding the Mr.
Schneider was ineligible for benefits. While the Board heard testimony regarding
Mr. Schneider’ s allegedly improper receipt of benefits in September 2002, this
issue was not specifically addressed in their decision.
Mr. Schneider appealed the Board’ s decision to this Court contending that
he is eligible for unemployment benefits because he earns less than his weekly
benefit amount and was employed only part-time until April 2003. In addition, Mr.
Schneider contends that he should not be required to refund the benefits he received
in September 2002, because he did not obtain them through fraud. 2 REC mailed a
letter to the Court indicating that it did not oppose Mr. Schneider’ s appeal.3
Discussion
On appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,
the Court must determine whether the Board’ s conclusions are free from legal err or
and supported by substantial evidence.4 " Substantial evidence is evidence which
affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably
inferred. "5 The factual findings of the Board, " if supported by evidence and in the
absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the Court shall be
confined to questions of law."
While Mr. Schneider pursued this appeal through the Division of Unemployment
Insurance, he did not include the appeal docket number 427649 on his notice of appeal to this
Court. In his opening brief, Mr. Schneider states that it was an oversight on his part due to his
inexperience filing an appeal in the Superior Court. Although this was not raised in his notice of
appeal, the Cour t will still consider this issue.
The issue before this Court is whether the Board properly concluded that Mr.
Schneider was employed full-time with REC.7 Although the term " full-time work"
has not been defined in the Delaware Code, the Courts have interpreted this to mean
not only full-time hours, but also full-time pay.8 In Weeraratne v. Unemployment
Insurance Appeal Board, the Court concluded that although the claimant was
working 40 hours per week on a commission basis, the fact that he earned only
$1,000 in one year of work was overriding in determining that he was not a full-time
employee. In Weathersby,10 the Court affirmed the Board’ s decision that the
claimant was employed full-time when he was working a total of 37.75 to 38.5 hours
per week between two part-time employers. The Board in that case made reference
to the merit rules for the State of Delaware, which provide that state employees are
considered full-time if they work at least 37.5 hours per week.11 However, the
Court noted that this was not dispositive of what constitutes full-time work.
The testimony before the Board indicated that Mr. Schneider was working 30
hours per week for REC, initially earning $340.00 per week. After state budget
cuts, Mr. Schneider’ s pay was reduced to $300.00 per week. Originally Mr.
Schneider was hired as a substitute bus driver, but then became a permanent driver
in April 2003. However, even when he was a substitute driver, he worked five days
a week, according to the testimony of the REC representative. Curr ently, he works
five days a week, making bus runs in the morning and in the afternoon. He also has
an opportunity to drive on extra trips, earning additional money, but the opportunity
for trips has not ar isen often.
The Board’ s decision does not clearly set forth its reasons for concluding that
Mr. Schneider was employed full-time. After reviewing the record there does not
appear to be substantial evidence establishing that Mr. Schneider was performing
full-time work for REC at the time he applied for unemployment benefits. Full-time
work means full-time pay and full-time hours. This Court finds that working 30
hours per week does not qualify as full-time work. Therefor e, Mr. Schneider is not
working full-time and the Board erred in r eaching this conclusion.
Because Mr. Schneider is not working full-time, whether he is " unemployed"
must be determined by using the formulation set forth in 19 Del. C . § 3302(17),
which states that one is unemployed if he or she is working less than full-time and
the wages payable are less than the weekly benefit plus the greater of $10 or 50%
of the weekly benefit. Here, Mr. Schneider’ s weekly benefit amount is $314.00
and his weekly wages were $300. 00. His weekly benefit plus 50% of the weekly
benefit totals $471.00. In sum, because $300.00 is less than $471. 00, Mr.
Schneider meets the test of unemployment. Based upon the record before this
Court, the Board erred as a matter of law in finding that Mr. Schneider was not
unemployed.
However, pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314, an unemployed individual still must
meet additional requirements in order to be eligible for benefits. The Board did not
receive evidence nor hear testimony regarding the other eligibility requirements or
the factors which would result in disqualification from benefits set forth in 19 Del.
C. § 3315. Therefor e, this case must be remanded to the Board for a determination
regarding Mr. Schneider’ s eligibility to receive unemployment benefits.
Mr. Schneider also appeals the Board’ s decision that he must repay benefits
he received improper ly during the weeks of September 7, 14, and 21, 2002,
pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3325. Mr. Schneider contends that because he did not
receive the benefits as the result of fraud, but rather mistake, he should not be
required to refund the payments. The Board’ s decision does not specifically
address this issue, although the Board heard testimony regarding Mr. Schneider’ s
repayment of benefits received. 12 Presumably, the Board intended to address the
issue in its decision when it affirmed the decision of the Appeals Referee. However,
the record provided to the Court by the Board contains a transcr ipt of a proceeding
before the Appeals Referee in which Mr. Schneider attempted to address the issue
but was told by the Referee, " I don’ t want to hear about that one now."13 The
decision of the Referee dated June 12, 2003, also does not address this issue.
According to 19 Del. C. § 3325, if unemployment benefits are received
improperly, whether as the result of mistake or fraud, the person who received those
benefits must repay them. It appears from the testimony before the Board that Mr.
Schneider acknowledged that he failed to disclose income he was receiving in
September 2002 when he filed for unemployment benefits. Therefore, he would
have received an amount in excess of what he was supposed to receive. Based upon
§ 3325, Mr. Schneider is responsible for repaying any amounts he received
improperly, even if he simply made a mistake completing the forms. However,
because the record does not have a transcript of the proceeding before the Appeals
Referee addressing this issue, and the Board apparently did not hear testimony
regarding the amount Mr. Schneider must refund, the matter must be remanded to
the Board to make a determination of the amount of improper benefits Mr. Schneider
received in September 2002 and the amount he is required to r epay.
Conclusion
Based upon a review of the transcr ipt of the proceeding below, this Court
finds that Mr. Schneider did meet the test for unemployment. Therefor e, the
Board’ s decision finding that Mr. Schneider was not unemployed is reversed and
the matter is remanded to the Board to make a determination with respect to the
additional requirements for eligibility. In addition, the Board’ s decision requiring
Mr. Schneider to repay the improper benefits he received in September 2002 is
affirmed, but the matter is remanded to the Board to make findings regarding the
amount Mr. Schneider must repay.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ William L. Witham, Jr.
J.
WLW/ dmh
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xc: Order D istribution
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