IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
IN AND FOR KENT COUNTY 
MARIANA ROBLEDO, ) 
) 
Appellant, ) 
) C.A. No. 00A-09-001 HDR 
v. ) 
) 
STRATUS and UNEMPLOYMENT ) 
INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD, ) 
) 
Appellees. ) 
Submitted: January 25, 2001 
Decided: March 27, 2001 
Mariana Robledo, Milford, Delaware, pro se. 
James J. Hanley, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. 
Upon Appeal from a Decision of the 
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board 
AFFIRMED 
RIDGELY, President Judge 

O R D E R 

This 27th day of March, 2001, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and 
the record below, it appears that: 

(1) Mariana Robledo ("Claimant") appeals from the decision of the 
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board ("Board") which held that her appeal 
before the Board was untimely and therefore the Board did not have jurisdiction 
to hear the merits of her case. 

(2) On April 1, 2000, the Claimant left her employment with Stratus 
because she thought she had another job. She then filed a claim for 
unemployment compensation benefits. Following a fact finding interview, the 
Claims Deputy denied the Claimant’s application because she voluntarily quit 
her employment without good cause. The Claimant filed a timely appeal from 
this decision to the Appeals Referee ("Referee"). On July 18, 2000, the Referee 
affirmed the Claims Deputy’s disqualification. On July 31, 2000, the Claimant 
filed her appeal with the Board. The Board held a hearing and concluded that 
the Claimant’s appeal should be dismissed for failure to comply with the 10-day 
filing deadline contained in 19 Del. C. § 3318(c). The Claimant now appeals from 
that decision. 

(3) The Court’s review of the Board’s decision is twofold. First, the 
Court must determine if there are facts to support the finding that the appeal 
was untimely. Second, the Court must determine whether the Board abused its 
discretion by not exercising, sua sponte, its power to review the record for an 
injustice despite the untimely appeal.1 

(4) In reviewing the factual findings of the Board, the Court must 
determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and free 
from legal error.2 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.3 

(5) 19 Del. C. § 3318(c) states that a Referee’s decision "shall be deemed 
to be final unless within 10 days after the date of notification or mailing of such 
decision further appeal is initiated pursuant to § 3320 of this title."4 The ten-day 
period referred to in § 3318(c) begins to run on the date of the mailing unless the 
mail fails to reach a party due to the Department of Labor’s error. 

The Claimant asserts that she was justified in filing her appeal three days 
past due because she had traveled to Texas, did not return until July 27, 2000, 
and did not pick up her mail until the appeal deadline of July 28, 2000. Also, the 
Claimant admits that she failed to pick up her mail at the Texas address which 
she had provided to the Referee for notice purposes. 

(6) Properly addressed mail is presumed to be received by the 
addressee.6 The addressee’s mere denial of receipt of the notice is insufficient to 
rebut this presumption.7 Further, it is "reasonable to expect that a claimant 
awaiting an important decision from an appeal tribunal would regularly check 
the locations at which [s]he receives mail."8 

Here, the decision was properly mailed both to the Claimant’s home 
address and the Texas address she provided. Neither was returned as 
"undeliverable." Moreover, there is no evidence of error by an employee of the 
Department of Labor. 

Based on the above findings, the Board’s determination that the notice was 
properly mailed to the Claimant and that the subsequent appeal was untimely 
filed was based on substantial evidence. Therefore, the Board properly held that 
19 Del. C. § 3318(c) created a jurisdictional bar to its consideration of the 
Claimant’s untimely appeal. 

(7) The Board does have authority under 19 Del. C. § 3320 to "act sua 
sponte beyond the ten day appeal period to consider a case where no valid appeal 
has been filed by the parties."9 However, this authority is used only "where there 
has been some administrative error on the part of the Department of Labor 
which deprived the claimant of the opportunity to file a timely appeal, or in those 
cases where the interest of justice would not be served by inaction."10 Absent an 
abuse of discretion, this Court must uphold the Board’s decision.11 
Here the Board found that "the facts in this case do not involve 
circumstances so severe as to require that it assume jurisdiction in this case."12 

The Claimant has admitted that she received the notice on the last day 
designated for appeal, and further has admitted that she failed to check her mail 
at the Texas address she provided to the Referee or to notify the Department of 
any other address in Texas. The Claimant cannot show any error on the part of 
the Department of Labor that might have delayed the Claimant’s receipt of the 
decision or delayed her filing of the appeal. On these facts there was no abuse of 
discretion by the Board. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the 
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is AFFIRMED. 

/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
President Judge 
cmh