Re: Evon R. Robertson v. Easter Seals 

C.A. No. 07A-07-002 
Date Submitted: October 24, 2007 

Dear Ms. Robertson: 

Ms. Evon R. Robertson ("Ms. Robertson") appeals the decision of the Unemployment 
Insurance Appeals Board ("the Board") that denied Ms. Robertson’s request for unemployment 
insurance benefits after she was terminated from her position of employment with Easter Seal 
Society ("Employer"). The Board denied Ms. Robertson’s request for benefits after concluding 
Employer had good cause to discharge Ms. Robertson. For the reasons set forth herein, the Board’s 
decision is affirmed. 

Procedural & Factual Background 

At the time of her termination on March 7, 2007, Ms. Robertson was employed as an 
employment specialist supervisor with Employer. Ms. Robertson had been with Employer for 
approximately fourteen years prior to her termination. Employer discharged Ms. Robertson from 
her position with the company because Ms. Robertson was in violation of the company’s "travel 
policy". That policy requires all employees who drive an Easter Seals vehicle as their primary job 
responsibility to meet certain criteria. Among these criteria is the condition that the employee have 
a motor vehicle report showing no more than four points or two moving violations within the 
previous three year period. After Employer pulled Ms. Robertson’s driving record and discovered 
she had nine points on her license, Employer fired Ms. Robertson. 

Ms. Robertson’s request for unemployment benefits was denied by the reviewing Claims 
Deputy on March 26, 2007. Ms. Robertson appealed the Claims Deputy’s decision and a hearing 
was held before an Appeals Referee on May 2, 2007. After taking testimony from Employer’s 
representative and Ms. Robertson, the Appeals Referee upheld the Claims Deputy’s determination 
by way of a written decision mailed May 4, 2007. Ms. Robertson appealed this decision to the 
Board. The Board heard testimony on June 13, 2007, from Employer’s representative, Ms. 
Robertson, and another one of Employer’s former employees. By way of written decision mailed 
June 29, 2007, the Board affirmed the Appeals Referee’s decision. Ms. Robertson filed a timely 
appeal with this Court. Employer has elected not to take a position on Ms. Robertson’s appeal and 
has not filed an Answering Brief. 

Discussion 

Standard of Review 

When reviewing the decisions of the Board, this Court must determine whether the Board’s 
findings and conclusions of law are free from legal error and are supported by substantial evidence 
in the record. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Martin, 431 A.2d 1265 (Del. 1981); Pochvatilla v. 
U.S. Postal Serv., 1997 WL 524062 (Del. Super. Jun. 9, 1997); 19 Del. C. § 3323(a) ("In any 
judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the [Board] as to the facts, if supported by 
evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the Court shall be 
confined to questions of law."). "Substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion". Gorrell v. Div. of Vocational Rehab., 1996 
WL 453356, at *2 (Del. Super. July 31, 1996). The Court’s review is limited: "It is not the appellate 
court’s role to weigh the evidence, determine credibility questions or make its own factual findings, 
but merely to decide if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency’s factual findings." 
McManus v. Christiana Serv. Co., 1197 WL 127953, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 31, 1997). 

Merits 

Section 3314 of Title 19 of the Delaware Code provides, in pertinent part, that one shall be 
disqualified for unemployment benefits if she has been "discharged from [her] work for just cause 
in connection with [her] work." 19 Del. C. § 3314(2). "Generally, the term ‘just cause’ refers to a 
wilful or wanton act in violation of either the employer’s interest, or of the employee’s duties, or of 
the employee’s expected standard of conduct." Abex Corp. v. Todd, 235 A.2d 271, 272 (Del. Super. 
1967). Just cause may arise from an employee’s violation of a company policy of which she is 
aware. Smoot v. Comcast Cablevision, 2004 WL 2914287, at * 4 (Del. Super. Nov. 16, 2004). 

In this case, Ms. Robertson testified she knew of Employer’s travel policy. Moreover, Ms. 
Robertson was aware that she had nine points on her license and that this point accumulation was 
a violation of Employer’s travel policy. Ms. Robertson’s sole argument on appeal is that she should 
be awarded unemployment benefits because another employee, whom Employer fired on the same 
day and for the same reason, was awarded unemployment benefits. That former employee, Robin 
Parker, testified at the Board hearing on June 13, 2007. Unfortunately, Ms. Parker’s case was not 
properly before the Board for review, nor is it before this Court. Employer terminated both women 
because their driving records were in violation of the travel policy. For reasons that are not before 
the Court for review, the Claims Deputy awarded benefits to Ms. Parker and Employer chose not to 
appeal that decision. The Court can imagine a myriad of valid reasons that would explain why the 
Claims Deputy awarded benefits to Ms. Parker and Employer chose not to appeal the decision. 
Those reasons are irrelevant to the outcome of Ms. Robertson’s request for benefits. 

To the extent Ms. Robertson complains other employees were permitted to retain their 
positions of employment despite appearing to violate the travel policy, the Appeals Referee elicited 
testimony from Employer’s representative that distinguished those employees’ cases from Ms. 
Robertson’s. Specifically, Employer’s representative testified that Employer placed the other 
employees on probation, pending the removal of some of the points on the employees’ driving 
records. In sum, Ms. Robertson has failed to present any evidence supporting her contention that 
Employer has unfairly held her to a higher standard than other employees. 

Ms. Robertson violated a company policy of which she was aware. This policy -- the travel 
policy -- established a standard of conduct to which Ms. Robertson was expected to conform. Ms. 
Robertson’s knowing violation of this policy constituted just cause for her termination and the denial 
of her request for unemployment benefits is supported by the record. 

Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth herein, the Board’s decision denying unemployment insurance 
benefits to Ms. Robertson is affirmed. 

Very truly yours, 

T. Henley Graves