Roark

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
RANDY ROARK, )
)
Appellant, )
) C.A. No. 00A-08-001 WCC
)
v. )
)
COMPUTER AID, INC., )
and UNEMPLOYMENT )
INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD, )
)
Appellees. )
Submitted: August 18, 2001
Decided: November 29, 2001
O R D E R
Upon Claimant’s Appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
Denied.
Randy Roark, 209 Bates Avenue, Apartment A, Indian Rocks Beach, FL
33785. Pro Se Plaintiff.
Jeffrey K. Martin, 1509 Gilpin Avenue, Wilmington, DE 19806. Attorney for
Appellee Computer Aid, Inc.
James J. Hanley, Deputy Attorney General, 820 N. French Street, 6th Floor,
Wilmington, DE 19801. Attorney for Unemployment Insurance Appeal
Board.

CARPENTER, J.

On this 29th day of November, 2001, upon consideration of Randy Roark’s
appeal from the July 10, 2000 decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal
Board, it appears to this Court that:

1. Randy Roark, (hereinafter "the claimant") was employed by Computer
Aid, Inc., (hereinafter "CAI") from June 7, 1999 until January 31, 2000 as a Help
Desk Analyst. In January of 2000, CAI assigned the claimant to work at the Merck
facility in Lansdale, Pennsylvania. The claimant worked in Lansdale for four days,
but expressed concerns with his assignment through an e-mail he sent to his
supervisor. This e-mail notified his supervisor that claimant’s assignment was not
working, and that he preferred to work at another assignment in Newark, Delaware.
This e-mail was disregarded by CAI, and thereafter, the claimant did not report to
work.

On January 17, 2000, the claimant called CAI before he attended a scheduled
computer training class, and his manager instructed him not to attend the computer
training class that day (January 17, 2000) as well as the January 19, 2000 class. In
anticipation that he was about to be terminated and disappointed with the corporate
culture surrounding CAI, the claimant resigned from CAI.1 Before resigning
Claimant was allegedly threatened with termination earlier on October 13, 1999 if he
did not sign an "Associate Improvement Form," which indicated that the claimant was not doing
his job. He signed this form on October 16, 1999, only after he was permitted to place his own
however, the claimant voluntarily signed an amendment to a previous "Associate’s
Agreement,"2 which effectively voided a promissory note signed by the claimant in
favor of CAI and voided a liquidation clause whereby the claimant could have been
responsible for paying CAI $5,000.

however, the claimant voluntarily signed an amendment to a previous "Associate’s
Agreement,"2 which effectively voided a promissory note signed by the claimant in
favor of CAI and voided a liquidation clause whereby the claimant could have been
responsible for paying CAI $5,000.

2. The claimant first filed a petition to receive unemployment insurance on
March 13, 2000. In its March 30, 2000 decision, the Claims Deputy determined that
the claimant voluntarily left his employment with CAI because "he was placed at a job
site, which was too far for him to travel" and that "the employer states the claimant
voluntarily left to pursue other employment."3 The Claims Deputy then made a
determination that the claimant voluntarily quit without good cause and was therefore
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.4 The claimant then appealed that
decision on April 11, 2000 to an Appeals Referee. In its decision the Referee stated
input into the matter.

that:

[a]n employee who voluntarily terminates his employment will be
disqualified from the receipt of unemployment benefits unless he can
show that he had good cause for leaving, and that his reason or reasons
for doing so were directly related to his work or to his employer. Good
cause can be found where there has been a substantial reduction in hours,
wages or a substantial deviation in the working conditions from the
original agreement of hire to the detriment of the employee.5

After a thorough review of the facts surrounding the claimant’s termination, the

Appeals Referee determined that:

[q]uitting one’s job in anticipation of being fired, constitutes a quit for
personal reasons. It is accordingly concluded that the claimant
voluntarily quit his job without good cause attributable to the same
within the meaning of the above-cited section of the law.6

Thereafter, the Referee affirmed the Claims Deputy decision, noting that the claimant
"quit without good cause attributable to his work."7 After this decision, the claimant
appealed to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (hereinafter "Board"). The
Board notified the claimant that his appeal was scheduled for July 5, 2000, to which
the claimant responded with a letter stating he would not attend the hearing due to the
fact he lives in Florida. The Board thereafter held the hearing on July 5, 2000, and the
claimant failed to appear. As a result of his absence, the Board dismissed the appeal
for failure of the claimant to appear and prosecute. The claimant has now filed an
appeal of the Board’s decision with this Court.

3. The claimant’s contentions on appeal merely reiterate his previous
assertions made to the Claims Deputy and the Appeals Referee and he again states he
was unable to attend the Board hearing because he relocated to Florida. Because his
administrative remedies were not exhausted, the Board claims that this Court is
jurisdictionally barred from hearing the appeal. The only jurisdiction this Court does
have, according to the Board, is to determine whether the Board abused its discretion
in dismissing the claimant’s appeal.

4. The function of this Court on review of an Unemployment Insurance
Appeal Board decision is to determine whether the decision is supported by
substantial evidence9 and is free from legal error. Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. This Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of
credibility, or make factual findings in the first instance. Rather, this Court’s role
is to determine whether the evidence is legally adequate to support the Board’s
findings.

5. The Court finds that there was substantial evidence to support the
Board’s decision to dismiss the claimant’s appeal, and that there was no abuse of
discretion, in making that decision. Delaware law provides that "the manner in which
disputed claims shall be presented and the conduct of hearings and appeals shall be
in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal
Board...." The Board’s Rules and Regulations state that all parties must be present
for their hearing at the scheduled time and "any party who is not present within 10
minutes after the scheduled time for hearing shall be deemed to waive his right to
participate in said hearing."

In this case, the claimant sent a letter to the Board dated June 23, 2000
informing them that he would not appear at the July 5, 2000 hearing because he had
moved to Florida, but he requested that the appeal go forward. The claimant did not
attempt to reschedule the hearing date, nor did he offer the Board an excuse, which
would constitute good cause. The claimant did not request a different hearing date,
nor did he set forth other dates that he could travel to Delaware to attend a Board
hearing.

As noted in the Board’s Regulations, no continuance or rescheduling of any
hearing shall be granted, unless an application is made to the Board six days before
the scheduled hearing date, and in such a case, a postponement for rescheduling shall
be granted only for emergency circumstances, such as death in the family or serious
illness. Here, the claimant’s only justification for not attending the hearing was due
to the fact he now lives in Florida.

6. The Board’s decision to enforce procedural rules is discretionary, and
this Court will not set aside the Board’s decision unless its decision was unreasonable
or capricious. The claimant was notified of the hearing date, and did not proffer an
excuse for his absence, which would qualify as good cause, to justify a postponement
of the hearing. Here the claimant simply wanted the benefit of the Board’s decision
without the inconvenience of complying with the rules. Under such circumstances,
the Board is free to dismiss the appeal and such conduct is not unreasonable or
capricious. In essence, by his own conduct, the claimant forfeited his right to appeal
to this Court. The appeal is dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________
Judge William C. Carpenter, Jr.