IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
IN AND FOR KENT COUNTY 


HUMBERTO QUINONES, : 
Appellant, : 
v. : 
ACCESS LABOR, : 
Appellee. : 

Submitted: December 18, 2007 
Decided: March 18, 2008 

ORDER 

WITHAM, R.J. 

March 18, 2008 

On April 10, 2007, pro se Appellant Humberto R. Quinones ("Appellant") 
appealed to this Court to reverse the decision of the Division of Unemployment 
Insurance Appeal Board ("the UIAB" or "the Board") affirming the denial of 
unemployment insurance to Appellant by the Division of Unemployment Insurance 
("the Division"). After reviewing the record, the Court finds that the Board has failed 
to sufficiently inquire into the facts and provide the necessary rationale that would 
allow the Court to find for substantial evidence that supports the Board’s findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, the Court reverses and remands the case back 
to the UIAB for further inquiry and analysis. 

BACKGROUND 

Appellant is a resident of Dover, Delaware and began working for Wyoming 
Concrete via the job placement agency, Access Labor, on March 5, 2006. Wyoming 
Concrete was very pleased with his work, and in turn, Access Labor was pleased with 
him as well. Wyoming Concrete wanted to hire Appellant for a full time position, but 
instead had to lay off its entire work force. As a result, Appellant ended his 
employment there on July 21 where he was earning $7.50 an hour. Appellant filed 
a claim for unemployment benefits the next day. Three days later, Access Labor 
offered Appellant new employment that was for full time work at $8.00 an hour with 
IDS, for which he would be working garbage pick-up in Felton. The shift would start 
at 5 a.m. and complete at 5 p.m, Monday through Friday adding 10 hours more per 
week that he had worked previously. Appellant was excited, accepted the position 
and indicated that he would be there the following morning. The record is unclear as 
to whether Appellant conditioned his acceptance on whether his father being able to 
drive him to and from work. Appellant testified that he depends on his father for 
transportation since he does not hold a drivers license. He asserted that Access Labor 
knew this. 

The next morning, Access Labor’s agent, Edward Hawkins,1 learned that 
Appellant was not at work at 5 a.m. The events that led up to this time and soon 
thereafter are contested: who called whom and at what time; whether Mr. Hawkins 
hung up on Appellant; whether Appellant was informed that transportation could be 
provided to him; and whether the working conditions of trash pickup makes the 
position unfit due to Appellant’s illness. On August 18, the Division Claims Deputy 
found that Appellant refused suitable work and was consequently disqualified from 
benefits. 

Appellant appealed to the Division’s Referee, and then to the UIAB, both of 
whom denied benefits.2 Hearings were held before each. At the first hearing, Mr. 
Hawkins represented Access Labor. Mr. Hawkins testified that on the morning 
Appellant was to start the IDS job, he called to inform Access Labor that his father 
could not drive him as Felton was too far. He also testified that Appellant was a good 
worker and that if Appellant were to call him tomorrow, he would offer him work. 

The issue for Appellant is that he failed to go to work. When Appellant applied for 
work through Access Labor he did not indicate that he had any restrictions with 
working that would impact his ability to accept any job offers. 

Regarding transportation, Mr. Hawkins testified that Access Labor provides 
transportation service to everyone, but made an exception for Appellant whose father 
drove him instead, and it seemed to work out just fine that way. Access Labor’s 
transportation service is dependant upon getting to Access Labor’s office for pick up 
and drop off and a deduction is taken from the pay. The record reveals that the 
opportunity for transportation was raised at the start of Appellant’s relationship with 
Access Labor, back in March of 2006, but is silent as to whether the topic was ever 
raised again. 

Mr. Hawkins testified that Appellant never called back the afternoon of the 
offer to say that he did not have transportation. He asserts later in his testimony that 
it was he, not Appellant, who made the phone call to Appellant in the morning that 
Appellant was to begin his job with IDS and that is how he found out there was a 
transportation issue.3 Appellant testified that he called Access Labor at 4 a.m., did 
not get through, no answering machine picked up to allow for him to leave a message 
and that he called later in the morning and connected with Mr. Hawkins.4 He then 
informed Mr. Hawkins that his transportation plans fell through. Appellant testified 
that he wanted to ask Mr. Hawkins about other possible employment opportunities 
but that Mr. Hawkins hung up on him before he could do so. Appellant further 
testified that Mr. Hawkins would not work with him regarding transportation. 

Appellant testified that he wanted to do the job, but since he was not informed 
of the offer to work the IDS job until about 2 or 3 in the afternoon of the 25th, and the 
office closes at 4 p.m., he was not able to confirm his transportation until much later 
that evening when his father came home. Therefore, it was too late to inform his 
contact that day that he would be unable to get to his new job the next morning at 5 

a.m. He testified that in the conversation of the 25th, that he accepted the position but 
stated that he needed to talk to his father about transportation. It appears that without 
transportation, he had indicated that he would need to be picked up at his house. He 
asserts that Mr. Hawkins then indicated that none would be provided, but there was 
no further discussion along that line.5,6 Mr. Hawkins asserts that this portion of the 
conversation occurred on the 26th (the day Appellant was to begin the IDS job). 
Appellant also testified that the position was unfit for him because of his 
illness. Appellant testified that he has Crohn’s of the ileum (a type of Crohn’s 
Disease) which requires him to have ready access to bathroom facilities. In contrast 
to the Wyoming Concrete position, riding on a garbage truck did not permit him 
emergency access to bathrooms. He testified that he did not communicate this 
immediate concern to Mr. Hawkins because he wanted to try the job first, and see if 
he could handle it. He said that everyone knew about his illness but that he did not 
want to bring it up specifically because he believes it is private and personal. Upon 
learning that his father would be unable to provide his transportation, he realized that 
he should face the fact that the job was not a proper fit. 

Mr. Hawkins asked Appellant why he stopped coming to the office that 
morning or thereafter to learn of work opportunities, like he had previously. 
Appellant’s reply indicated that he believed he was no longer invited to come to the 
office in the mornings since he could not take the job in Felton, Mr. Hawkins hung 
up on him and did not pick up the phone again when Appellant called back. Finally, 
Appellant explained that he had found other work three weeks prior to this hearing 
and therefore sought only a few weeks of unemployment claims. 

The Referee cited Title 19 Delaware Code Section 3314(3) and found that 
Appellant had refused a suitable offer of employment. In the Referee’s rationale, he 
stated: 

The claimant argued that the offer was not suitable due to his illness and 
his lack of transportation. However, when he accepted the assignment 
the day prior, he never mentioned either of these reasons as a factor for 
not accepting the work. Instead, he informed the employer that he could 
perform the job. Further, since the claimant testified that he would have 
done the job if he had the transportation, this tribunal will not consider 
the claimant’s illness as a bona fide reason for the assignment not being 
suitable for him. Lack of transportation is personal to the claimant and 
is not a valid reason for refusing to accept a suitable offer of work. 
Therefore, this tribunal finds the claimant failed to accept a suitable 
offer of employment and is disqualified from the receipt of 
unemployment benefits. 

Thus, the Claims Deputy’s decision was affirmed, and the Appellant remained 
disqualified from the receipt of benefits for refusing a suitable offer of employment 
pursuant to Title 19 Delaware Code Section 3314(3). 

Appellant appealed to the UIAB who affirmed the decision.7 The Board 
reviewed the case on October 25, 2006 and found that, in addition to receiving an 
incomplete waiver form (it was not signed and dated),8 the Claims Deputy had been 
unclear as to whether there was "good cause" to disqualify Appellant from benefits.9 
They remanded the matter sua sponte for the Deputy to confirm this finding. The 
Deputy seems to have backdated the waiver to August 18, 2006 and confirmed that 
there was good cause at the time she prepared the waiver. 

At the second UIAB hearing, in addition to the evidence provided in the first 
one, Appellant testified that the 5 a.m. to 5 p.m. shift hours were substantially 
different from his previous job, which has been from 1 p.m. to 12 a.m. He was 
willing to switch shifts but asserted that he had told Access Labor that he had to 
check first on his transportation availability, and that Access Labor had suggested 
other alternatives on this issue. Appellant reasserted that when he called to 
communicate that he could not get to his new position and asked about other 
opportunities, the contact, Mr. Hawkins, hung up on him, and when Appellant tried 
to call back, no one picked up, and the answering machine did not pick up. This time 
he asserted that Mr. Hawkins also cursed him out and Appellant believed that he had 
been terminated. He asserted that on the day of the phone call, that he was feeling 
better (regarding his Crohn’s Disease) but was concerned that the change in shifts 
would disrupt that trend. 

Dino Uniaro,10 Access Labor’s representative, appeared at the UIAB hearing 
instead of Mr. Hawkins because Mr. Hawkins had now left Access Labor. At the 
Board hearing, he testified that he is disadvantaged in his representation of this case 
since he was absent for a two month period during which the events of this action 
occurred. As a consequence, he was standing on the previous record. He testified 
that he has no personal knowledge of the matter before the Board. He said that Mr. 
Hawkins had not said anything to him about cursing at Appellant. 

The Board found that "Chris"11 had provided a valid offer and Appellant a valid 
acceptance with all the terms required to form a contract. That lacking medical 
confirmation of Appellant’s Crohn’s Disease and failing in his responsibility to 
arrange his own transportation, Appellant failed to meet his burden of leaving his 
position for good cause. On this basis, the Board affirmed the Referee’s decision and 
denied Appellant benefits. Of note, the Board’s findings of fact included that the 
position for which Appellant was reasonably fit was driving the trash truck, rather 
than picking up garbage. 

In his opening brief, Appellant described further the difficulties of suffering 
from Crohn’s Disease, the pain, weakness, and the daily medication and its side 
effects. He provided his doctor’s name and telephone number. He also said that his 
employer did know about his illness and therefore provided false testimony during 
the hearing. Finally, he reiterated the fact that he does not have a driver’s license and 
does not have a commercial driver’s license, and therefore would be unable to driver 
a commercial vehicle such as a trash truck.12 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The scope of review for an appeal of an UIAB decision is limited to examining 
the record for errors of law and determining whether substantial evidence is present 
on the record to support the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.13 
Substantial evidence equates to "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."14 On appeal, this Court will not weigh 
the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings.15 
Instead, this Court reviews the case to determine if the evidence is legally sufficient 
to support the Board’s factual findings.16 

DISCUSSION 

The Board has cited to a different provision of the statute to support its 
decision than the one cited by the Claims Deputy and the Referee, requiring a 
different burden that Appellant must meet. The Board cites to Title 19 Delaware 
Code § 3314(1), whereas the other two decisions were based on Title 19 Delaware 
Code § 3314(3). Section 3314(1) provides that an individual will be disqualified 
from benefits: 

(1) For the week in which the individual left work voluntarily without 
good cause attributable to such work . . . However, if an individual has 
left work involuntarily because of illness, no disqualification shall 
prevail after the individual becomes able to work and available for work 
and meets all other requirements under this title, but the Department 
shall require a doctor’s certificate to establish such availability . . .17 
Thus, the issue is whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding 
that there was a valid contract between Access Labor and Appellant for the IDS job, 
and if so, whether Appellant left for good cause. 

To form a valid contract, there must be a "bargain in which there is 
manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and consideration," also known as the 
"meeting of the minds."18 Delaware has adopted the mirror-image rule, requiring that 
the "acceptance be identical to the offer."19 Additionally, to be enforceable, the 
contract must contain all material terms.20 Here, Appellant testified that his 
acceptance was conditioned on his need to consult with his father regarding 
transportation and therefore was not a mirror image of the offer. Mr. Hawkins 
testified that Appellant simply stated that he would be there, which would satisfy the 
mirror image rule. The Board does not appear to have weighed this testimony. 
Regardless, the Court finds the evidence insufficient to establish that there was a 
meeting of the minds. Even if the Appellant unconditionally accepted, without a 
single day of work and nothing but an oral contract between a company experienced 
in job placement and a contractually inexperienced individual, the argument that the 
consideration requirement is satisfied is a stretch. Without consideration, no contract 
was formed, and therefore Appellant did not leave his job voluntarily without good 
cause.21 Based on the record, the Court does not find substantial evidence to support 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Board. Of note, the Court has not 
found any precedence supporting the use of § 3314(1) when no day of work or 
portion of has been completed.22,23 

If Appellant did not voluntarily leave his job, then is he disqualified from 
benefits under Title 19 Delaware Code § 3314(3)?24 Section 3314(3), in relevant 
part, states that an individual will be disqualified from benefits: 

(3) If the individual has refused to accept an offer of work for which the 
individual is reasonably fitted . . . 
Section 3314(3) allows an illness to render a claimant unfit for the job and is silent 
as to whether claimant must provide a doctor’s certificate as proof of the illness, 
unlike § 3314(1).25 For example, he testified in both hearings about his Crohn’s 
Disease. Appellant’s previous position at Wyoming Concrete allowed him ready 
access to bathroom facilities, whereas the IDS job, for which he would be picking up 
trash, would not have the same immediate access, making him unfit for the new job. 
The statute is silent as to whether Appellant had a duty to disclose this information 
before claiming that he is unfit for a position. His previous position gave him no 
reason to broadcast his condition. Furthermore, Appellant testified that his employer 
knew about his illness, as well as everyone else. This area of the record is too sparse 
for the Court to find substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings of facts and 
conclusions of law. 

Appellant also testified that because the new job was located farther away and 
during different shift times (5 a.m. to 5 p.m. compared to 1 p.m. to 12 a.m.) that he 
was now unable to provide his own transportation. He testified that he brought this 
up with his employer and that his employer was unwilling to work with him on this 
issue. Section 3314(3)(c) provides that an individual may not be disqualified from 
benefits if 

The work is at an unreasonable distance from the individual’s residence, 
having regard to the character of the work the individual has been 
accustomed to do, and travel to the place of work involves expenses 
substantially greater than that required for the individual’s former 
work.26 

Mr. Hawkins testified that Access Labor provides transportation as a service, which 
is deducted from the employees’ paychecks. No evidence was presented as to the 
amount of the deduction and whether Access Labor had given notice to Appellant that 
this was an option. Felton is farther from Appellant’s residence of Dover than 
Wyoming, and Access Labor knew that Appellant was always dropped up and picked 
up by his father. The Court finds the facts on this issue insufficient. 

Finally, the Board found that Appellant had accepted an offer to drive the trash 
truck. Appellant does not have a driver’s license. The Court believes this finding of 
fact is in error as there is no testimony to support it. The Court finds that there is no 
substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings of fact as to the characterization 
of Appellant’s job offer. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court reverses and remands for a full and proper 
hearing, in conformity with this decision. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.