IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
CRYSTAL PINKNEY,
Appellant,
v.
DEL. DEPT. OF LABOR, DIVISION
OF UNEMPLOYMENT INS. and
ARAMARK CORPORATION
Appellees.
Submitted: January 9, 2007
Decided: January 23, 2007
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD
AFFIRMED.
This 23rd day of January, 2007, upon consideration of the appeal of
Crystal Pinkney from the decision of the Unemployment Insurance
Appeal Board, it appears to the Court that:
1. Crystal Pinkney ("Pinkney" ) was employed by Aramark Corporation
("Aramark"). Aramark, among other things, provides food and support
services to colleges and uni versities, and contracts with the
University of Delaware ("University") to provide such services.
Aramark placed Pinkney at the Perkins Student Center at the University.
2. In June 2005, Pinkney was laid off by Aramark for the University's
summer break. She subsequently filed for unemployment benefits with
the Delaware Department of Labor ("Department"). At the time she filed
her claim, the Department provided her with a handbook entitled "Guide
to Unemployment Benefits," which provides information about when a
claimant must file or reopen a claim. The Department ultimately awarded
Pinkney benefits for the summer break and she was to return to work on
September 5, 2005, which she did.2
3. On March 13, 2006, Pinkney was again laid off due to the University's
spring break. Pinkney filed another claim with the Department to receive
benefits. However, she did not file the claim until April 3, 2006
(a Monday), and requested that the claim be backdated to March 26, 2006.
A Claim s Deputy from the Departme nt determ ined that Pinkney was
disqualified for the receipt of benefits for that period because, under
the Department's regulations, the effective date of the filing of any
claim can backdate only to the Sunday immediately preceding the date of
filing.3 Therefore, Pinkney was not permitted to backdate her claim
to March 26 and, hence, could not receive benefits.4
4. Pinkney appealed the Claims Deputy's decision to the Department's
Division of Unemployment Insurance Appeals. A hearing was held in which
Pinkney and a Department representative testified. The Appeals Referee,
who presided over the hearing, affirmed the Claims Deputy's decision by
also finding that, under the Department's regulations,5 Pinkney was not
permitted to backdate her claim to March 26.
5. Pinkney then appealed the Appeals Referee's decision to the Unemployment
Insurance Appeal Board (" Board"). The Board did not have another hearing,
but rather based its decision upon consideration of the evidence presented
to the Appeals Referee. The Board ultimately affirmed the Appeals Referee's
decision. It found that, under REGULATION 9, Pinkney was not permitted to
backdate her claim and was, therefore, disqualified from receiving benefits
for that period. The Board also determined that, under D EL. C ODE ANN. tit.
19, $ 3315(3) ("S ECTION 3315(3)"),7 Pinkney was ineligible for benefits
because she testified that she would have been unable to work during the
week she was seeking benefits due to an illness and a death in the family.
Lastly, pursuant to D EL. C ODE ANN. tit. 19, $ 3320 ("S ECTION 3320"),
the Board denied Pinkney the right to any further appeal.
6. Pinkney now proceeds pro se in appealing the Board's decision to this
Court. In her two-paragraph brief to the Court, she makes only one claim.
She contends that the "Guide to Unemployment Benefits" handbook she was
provided "states nothing about filing for benefits after [a] week or more."
Pinkney, therefore, maintains that she is entitled to benefits for the period
in which she was laid off. Neither Aramark nor the Department have filed an
answering brief and, as a result, this Court previously issued an order
explaining that it will make a determination on the papers which have been
filed.
7. Appellate review of a Board decision is limited. The Court's function is
confined to determining whether the Board's decisions are free from legal
error, whether substantial evidence supports the Board's findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and whether the Board abused its discretion when
deciding "discretionary" issues. Questions of law, which arise in ascertaining
if there was legal error, are subject to de novo review requiring the Court
to determine whether the Board erred in formulating or applying legal precepts.
"Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is ... "more than a scintilla
but less than a preponderance of the evidence." Abuse of discretion "occurs
when the Board exceeds the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances
and has ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice.'"
Stated differently, the Board abuses its discretion when it makes a ruling
"based on `clearly unreasonable or capricious grounds.'"15
8. In applying those standards to this case, the Court is satisfied that the
Board did not abuse its discretion and that its decision is free from legal
error and supported by substantial evidence. First, REGULATION 9 clearly
does not permit a claimant to backdate his or her claim prior to the previous
Sunday before the claim was filed. Here, the record indicates that Pinkney
did not file her claim until April 3 (a Monday). She is, thus, not permitted
to backdate her claim to March 26. Pinkney is only permitted to backdate her
claim to April 2 - the Sunday immediately preceding her filing date. Next,
Pinkney testified at the hearing before the Appeals Referee that she was
unable and unavailable to work during the week in which she is seeking benefits
due to an illness and a death in the family. Therefore, because SECTION
3315(3) requires that an individual be able to work and be available to work
before that individua l can receive benefits, Pinkney is ineligible to
receive benefits during the period in which she was ill and there was a
death in her family. Lastly, the Board's decision to not permit Pinkney
any further appeal was not an abuse of its discretion as there is nothing
t o indicate that its decision was based on clearly unreasonable or
capricious grounds.16
9. Based on the foregoing, the Board's decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.