SUPERIOR COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF DELAWARE 

Re: Diane K. Parsons v. Atlantis Industries, Inc. 

Dear Counsel and M s. Parsons: 

Diane K. Parsons (“Ms. Parsons”) appeals the decision of the Unemployment Insurance 
Appeals Board (“the Board”) that denied Ms. Parsons’ request for unemployment insurance 
benefits. The Board denied Ms. Parsons’ request for benefits after concluding she voluntarily 
left her position of employm ent with Atlan tis Industries, Inc. (“Employer”) without good cause. 
For the reasons set forth herein, the Board’s decision is affirmed. 

Procedural & Factual Background 

On June 1, 200 6, a Claims Deputy found Ms. Parsons voluntarily left her place of 
employment without good cause and was therefore disqualified from the receipt of 
unemployment benefits. After a hearing, and by way of written decision mailed July 7, 2006, the 
Appeals Referee agreed with the Claims Deputy’s determination. Ms. Parsons appealed to the 
Board, which upheld the Appeals Referee’s decision and denied Ms. Parsons’ request for
benefits by way of written decision mailed on September 28, 2006. Ms. Parsons timely filed an 
appeal in this C ourt. 

The relevant facts are a s follows. Ms. Parsons worked for Employer as a production 
operator from July of 2004 u ntil May of 2006. On May 3, 2006, Ms. Parsons’ mother was 
admitted to the hospital for c ongestive hea rt failure. In order to b e with her m other during th is 
crisis, Ms. Parsons requested emergency leave from work. This request was gra nted. Ms. 
Parsons missed a total of one work shift on this occasion. After her mother was discharged 
from the hospital, Ms. Parsons scheduled an out-patient follow up visit with a specialist for her 
mother. Unfortun ately, the earliest availab le appointm ent time wa s during one of Ms. Pa rsons’ 
scheduled work shifts on May 24 , 2006. Ms. Parsons reported for work in the evening of May 
15th and requested leave from work to attend her mother’s doctor appointment on May 24th.1 
Ms. Parsons’ supervisor, Carol Orr, informed Ms. Parsons that she had not com plied with 
Employer’s requirement that an employee request vacation time at least two weeks in advance 
of the requested leave date and , therefore, Ms. Parsons’ request wou ld be denied. Moreo ver, 
Ms. Orr also reminded Ms. Parsons that she had accum ulated eleven absentee “segm ents” 
pursuant to the company absentee policy and the accrual of a twelfth segm ent (the necessary 
outcome another m issed work sh ift) would result in her termination. According to the absentee 
policy, an employee is charged two segm ents for each m issed work sh ift. For each full calendar 
month with no attendance issues, the oldest two of the segments are deducted from the 
employee’s segment tally. Ms. Orr testified before the Appeals Referee that the purpose of this
policy is to eliminate the need for Ms. Orr, or any other supervisor, to make a judgment call as 
to what constitu tes a “good” excuse for m issing a scheduled work sh ift. In any event, M s. 
Parsons testified below that she told Ms. Orr that she would nevertheless request the day off and 
that “I might as well get my check now.” In response to tha t statement, Ms. O rr asked M s. 
Parsons if she was resigning. Ms. Orr replied in the affirmative. Ms. Parsons then signed a 
statement that she was resigning voluntarily and cleared ou t her locker.2 

Discussion 

When reviewing the decisions of the Board, this Court must determine whether the 
Board’s findings and conclusions of law a re free from legal error and are supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Martin, 431 A.2d 1265 (D el. 
1981); Pochvatilla v. U nited States Postal Serv., 1997 WL 524062 (Del. Super. Jun. 9, 1997); 19 Del. 
C. § 3323(a) (“In any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the [Board] as to the 
facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the 
jurisdiction of the Court shall be confin ed to question s of law.”). “Sub stantial evidence ” is 
“such relevant evide nce as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”. 
Gorrell v. Division of Vocational Rehab., 1996 WL 453356, at *2 (Del. Super. July 31, 1996). The 
Court’s review is limited: “It is not the appellate court’s role to weigh the evidence, determine 
credibility questions or make its own factual findings, but merely to decide if the evidence is 
legally adequate to support the ag ency’s factual find ings.” McManus v. Christiana Serv. Co., 1197 
WL 127953, at *1 (D el. Supe r. Jan. 31 , 1997).

In this case, the findings of the Board are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
Delaware law states that an ind ividual will be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits 
if that individual left work “voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work.” 19 Del. 
C. § 3314(1). Claimant bears the burden for demonstrating good cause existed for vo luntarily 
terminating the emplo yment relation ship. Longobardi v. Unemployment In s. App. Bd., 287 A.2d 690 
(Del. Super. 1 971). An un desirable or unsafe situation does no t constitute good cau se. O’Neal’s 
Bus Serv., Inc. v. Emp loyment Sec. Comm ’n, 269 A.2d 247 (Del. Super. 197 0). However, “[g]ood 
cause can include a substantial reduction in wages, work ho urs or a substantial deviation in the 
working conditions from the original agreem ent of hire to the d etriment of the employee.” 
Weathersby v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 1995 WL 465326, at * 5 (Del. Super. June 29, 1995). In 
order to qualify for benefits, an employee must do something comparable to exhausting 
administrative remedies by, for example, givin g notice to the employer and seeking to have the 
situation remed ied. Id. 

The Board agreed with the Appeals Referee’s finding that nothing prevented M s. Parsons 
from continuing to work for Employer after May 16th when she requested, and was denied, 
leave for May 24th. Moreover, the Board concluded that the Employer’s insistence that Ms. 
Parsons abide by the Employer’s known attendance policy did not co nstitute a change in Ms. 
Parsons’ working conditions or agreement for hire. The record of the proceedings below 
reflects the following: (1) Ms. Parsons was aware of and understood the absentee p olicy; (2) Ms. 
Parsons had, in fa ct, received verbal and written warnings regarding her accum ulation of 
segments in accordance with the policy, including a suspension from work without pay; and (3)
Ms. Parsons understood that she did not request leave for vacation time two weeks in advance 
as required by the policy. Ms. Parso ns does not attack the general n ature of Em ployer’s 
absentee policy but, rather, feels that it was unjust for her to lose her job due to th e unfortunate 
personal circumstanc es. Ms. Parso ns’ predicament in this case was, indeed, unfortunate; 
however, as a matter of law, her legal argument is withou t merit. As this Court has previou sly 
noted, “There are tim es when people must quit work if they are to attend to pressing personal 
matters. But the Court must determine eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits 
based on statutory standards. Good cause to volun tarily terminate under the statute must be 
attributable to the job.” Mifflin v. Polo Factory Store, 2001 WL 1 489907, at *3 (Del. Su per. Oc t. 18, 
2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the Board’s decision to deny 
Ms. Parsons unemployment compensation because she voluntarily terminated her employment 
with Employer to care for her mother is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal 
error. 

Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth herein, the Board’s decision denying unemployment insurance 
benefits to Ms. Parsons is affirmed. 

Very truly you rs, 

T. Henley Graves