SUPERIOR COU RT
OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
RICHAR D F. STOKES
JUDGE P.O. BOX 746
COU RTHO USE GEORGET OWN, DE 19947
July 29, 2004
Heidi Ann Morra Mary Page Bailey , Esquire 10366 Fawn Road Department of Justice Greenwood, DE 19950 Carvel State Office Building
820 N. French Street, 6th Floor Wilmington, DE 19801
RE: Heidi Ann Morra v. Unemployment Insurance A ppeal Board
C.A. No. 03A-11-004 R FS
Date Submitted: April 1, 2004 Dear Ms. Morra a nd Counsel:
This is my decision on Heidi Ann Morra's ("Morra") appeal of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's (the "Board") decision to deny Morra's late appeal pursuant to 19 Del. C. $ 3318(c), thereby declining to assume jurisdiction of the case. The Board's decision is affirmed for the reasons stated herein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claimant Morra was hired as a part-time em ployee for Girgis Family Practice ("Girgis") and worked until April 9, 2002, at which time she went on maternity leave . Morra w as working
approximately 30 hours a week. H owever, Morra w as asked if she wo uld consider work ing full time in the future, and she assured them that she would. Yet, once another employe e ou t on leav e re turned, Mo rra's hours were reduced. Morra spoke with the office manage r, and her hours were significantly cut again.
1
The postmark on the letter was dated September 9, 2003.
2
Thereafter, Morra went out on maternity le ave and was rele ased to return to work six weeks after April 15, 2002. However, Morra failed to contact the employer about returning to work. The
Claims Deputy found that Morra resigned when she did not return t o work following h er maternity leave due to the reduction in hours over the course of her employment. Therefore, Morra had good
cause f or l eaving her employment and was entitled to the receipt of bene fits during her period of unemploymen t.
However, the Appeals Referee disagreed and found that by failing to contact the employer regarding her ability to return to work, Morra prevented herself f rom continu ing to work for the employer and thereby voluntarily quit her job. Theref ore, the Appeals Referee reve rsed the Claims Deputy's decision on January 29, 2 003. There was no appeal of that d etermination. The Claims Deputy issued two determinations on July 10, 2003 relating to Morra's original and extended
benefits. An overpayment for nonfraudulent reasons was found as to both cases. As a result, Morra fi led an appeal on July 18, 2003 to the Appeals Referee of the finding of an over pay ment. Th e Appeals Referee hear d the appeal on Au gust 11, 2003 and issued a decision on Aug ust 13, 2003, in which she found that Morra had been overpaid. The last day to file an appe al to the Board on this issue was August 23, 2003, as indicated on the front of the Referee's decision. How ever, s ince August 23rd was a Saturday, Morra had until August 25, 2003 to file an appeal. The Board did not
receive an appeal until September 11, 2003.
1
The Board re viewed the matter on October 1, 2003 and, by decision issued November 6 , 2003, denied Morra's l ate appeal pursu ant to 19 Del. C. $ 3318(c), there by declining to assume jurisdiction of the case. Morra has filed a pro se appeal to this Court f rom the Board's decision,
2
On appeal, the scope of review of findings of the Board is limited to a determination of
whether or not the Board's findings are supported by substantial e vidence. Unemployment In s. Appeal Bd. of Dep't of Labor v. Duncan , 337 A.2d 308 (Del . 1975). In the case at bar, the only finding made by the Board was that Morra's appe al was not timely filed.
3
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp. , 312 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965); General Motors v.
Freeman , 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960) .
4
In re Beattie , 180 A.2d 741, 744 (Del. Super. Ct. 1962).
5
Oceanport Indus. v. Wilmington Stevedores , 636 A.2d 892, 899 ( Del. 1994); Battista v.
Chrysler Corp. , 517 A.2d 295, 297 (Del.), app. dism. , 515 A.2d 397 (Del. 1986)
3
claiming that (1) her appe al was not untimely , (2) her claim wa s not handled fair ly or in its ent ire ty, (3) an overpayment issue was not heard and was dismissed without explanation prior to the hearing that this would be the case, and (4) she was t reated unpr ofessional ly and with dis respect. Al though Morra brings forth fou r claims for review, three of the four claims are beyond the scope of the appeal and will not be discussed.
2
The only issues to be ad dres sed are (1) whe ther the Board p roperly
determined that Morra failed to timely appeal the Appeals Referee 's decision on or before Aug ust 25, 2003, and (2) if the appeal was properly found to be untimely, whether or not the Board abused
its discretion in denying the late appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court and t his Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual fin dings of an administrati ve agency . The function of t he reviewing Co urt is to determine wh ether t he agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence,
3
and to review
questions of law de novo.
4
Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
5
The appellate court does not weigh the evidence,
6
Johnson , 213 A.2d at 66.
7
19 Del. C. $ 3323.
8
Anderson v. Comfort Suites , 2004 WL 304359, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct.).
9
Anderson , 2004 WL at *2.
10
Id. , citing Robledo v. Stratus , 2001 WL 428684, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct.).
11
K-Mart, Inc. v. Bowles , 1995 WL 269872, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct.), quoting Berry v.
State, Del. Super. Ct., C.A. No. 85A-AU- 2, Bush, J . (June 29 , 1987) at 5 (citing In Re Kennedy , 472 A.2d 1317, 1331 (Del. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 and Raymond Heartless Inc. v. State , 401 A.2d 921 (Del. 1979)).
12
K-Mart, Inc. , 1995 WL at *2, quoting McDowell v . State , Del. Super. Ct., C.A. No.
88A-JN-3, Steele, J. (March 14, 1991) (Order) at 4 (citations omitted).
4
determi ne questions o f credibility , or make its own fa ctual findings.
6
It merely determines if the
evidence is legally adequate to suppo rt the agency 's factual findin gs and whether errors of law exis t.
7
In reviewing the Board's decision, the Court's analysis is twofold.
8
First, it is necessary to
determine whether or not the finding that the appea l was untimely is supported by the facts in the record.
9
Second, "the Court must determine whether the Board abused its discr etion by not
exercisin g, sua sponte , its power to review the record for an injustice despi te the untimely appeal."
10
This Court will not disturb a discretionary ruling of an admi nistrative age ncy unless it is "based on clearly unreasonable or capricious grounds."
11
Furthermore, "an abuse of discretion occurs where
the Board exceeds `the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has ignored recognized
rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice.'"
12
B. There Are Facts to Support the Board's Finding that Morra's Appeal Was Not Timely
Upon a careful rev iew of the record, the B oard's decision t o deny Morr a's late appeal is supported by substantial evidence. Delaware law clearly provides that a claimant has ten day s after
13
19 Del. C. $ 3318(c).
14
Id.
15
Funk v. UIAB , 591 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. 1991) (en banc).
16
Anderson , 2004 WL at *3, quoting Funk , 591 A.2d at 225.
5
an adverse decisio n from the Appeal s Referee is maile d to appeal that decision to the Board.
13
If a
claimant fails to file an appeal within this statutory time period, the Appeals Referee's determination
shall be deemed to be f inal.
14
The record shows that the Appeals Referee's decision was dated and
mailed to Morra's addre ss on August 13, 200 3. Morra had until A ugust 25, 2003 to app eal the decision. Morra claims that she sent an appeal on Aug ust 19, 2003. Howev er, there is no evidence to suggest that any appeal was filed prior to September 9, 2003, even though Morra included a letter dated August 18, 2003 along with her appeal. The only documentation presented to the Board by Morra was a letter dated August 18, 2003 with an original signature. The Board found this letter to
be a copy and not an original, and was therefore la te. Moreover, following a review of Morra's file, the Board found no copy of the appeal allege dly sent by Morra on August 19, 2003. B ased on the evidence presented in the record, the Board's decision that Morra' s appea l was not timely is supported by substantial evidence and free from lega l error. C. The Board Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Morra's Late Appeal
1 9 Del. C. $ 3320 grants the Board authority to "act sua sponte beyond the ten day appea l period to consider a case where no valid appeal has been filed by the parties."
15
However, the Board
exercises this authority only "whe re there ha s been some administrative error on the part of the Department of Labor which deprived the claimant of the op portunity to f ile a timely a ppeal, or in those cases where the interest of justice would not be served by inaction."
16
It is well established that
17
Id.
18
Lacsamana v. Dept. of Labor, Del. Su per. Ct ., C.A. No. 97A -07-00 3, Silve rman, J .
(Feb. 20, 1998), aff'd, 713 A.2d 932 (Del. 1998) (Table).
6
absent an abuse of discretion by the Board, "the Court must uphold a decision of an administrative tribunal."
17
Morra claims that she spoke with a representative of the Department of Labor in regard
to her appeal allegedly filed on August 19, 2004, and she w as informed tha t no appeal had been received by the Department. However, the Board found that there was no departmental error or other grounds that would require it to assume jurisdiction of the case sua sponte .
The record clearly shows that the Appeals Referee's decision was properly mailed to Morra 's a ddress on August 13, 2003 and that no appeal was received until September 11, 2003. In fact , Morra has failed to show any evidence of error on the part of the Departme nt of Labor that might have caused her appeal to be filed untimely. Morra also failed to prese nt any evidence of "severe circumstances" to the Board, other than the loss of benefits and the requirement of overpayment by Morra. In Lacsamana v. Dept. of Labor , Del. Super. Ct., C.A. No. 97A-07-003, Silverman, J. (Feb. 20, 1998), aff'd , 713 A.2d 932 (Del . 1998) (Table), this Court found that the loss of benefits alone
was insufficient to demonstrate a severe circumstance. Unlike Morra, the appellant in Lacsamana was charged with f raudulently obtaining unemplo yment benef its.
18
The appellant was subject to the
consequences of the fraud and lost the ability to ap ply for unemployment benefits for one y ear. Morra's circumstances a re obviously less severe. Therefore, it is the Court's determina tion that, in
the present circums tances, the Boa rd did not abuse its d iscretion by applying th e time limitation of 19 Del. C. $ 3318(c) and re fusing to conside r Morra's late a ppeal sua sponte .
CONCLUSION
7
Considering the foregoing, the decision of the Board is affirmed. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
Richard F. Stokes