Date Submitted: July 18, 2001
Date Decided: October 18, 2001
Sean A. Dolan, Esquire
Marshall, Dennehy, Warner, Coleman
&
Goggin
1220 Market Street, Suite 202
P.O. Box 130
Wilmington, DE 19899
Gina L. Mifflin
321 Park Avenue
Lewes, DE 19958
RE: Gina L. Mifflin v. Polo Factory Store
Civil Action No. 01A-04-002
Dear Ms. Mifflin and Mr. Dolan:
Pro se claimant Gina L. Mifflin ("Claimant") appealed a decision of the
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("Board") dated April 21, 2001. The Board
denied Claimant’s request for unemployment benefits. The Board found that Claimant
voluntarily resigned from her employment with The Polo Factory Store ("Employer").
Claimant’s reasons were personal as she wanted to care for her mother. The Board’s
decision is affirmed.
FACTS
Claimant was a Group Manager at the store from September 1995 until
December 15, 2000. This was a full time position with a $23,000 annual salary.
Claimant quit this employment because her mother was ill with dementia, an
illness requiring 24-hour care.1 Claimant was the only person capable of providing her
mother with complete care. Before December 15, 2000, Claimant’s mother was
hospitalized and doctors and relatives routinely called Claimant at work. Claimant
informed the general manager of the store that she faced an emergency. The employer
knew Claimant left her job given her mother’s illness. The record contained the
following letter dated December 5, 2000:
As per conversation on [November 28, 2000] I am writing this letter as to
why I need time off. As I explained my mother is in the hospital in
[Pennsylvania] she is very ill. She will be discharged in a couple of weeks.
My mother will need 24 hour care. And I am the only one in the family
that can take care of her at this point. This is not by choice it is an
emergency.
Claimant stated she was not offered leave pursuant to the Family Medical Leave
Act ("Family Medical Leave"). The general manager told her to write a letter
regarding her situation. However, Claimant did not submit this letter or ask for leave
because the general manager told her they would discuss her situation together. The
Although Claimant argues she did not "quit," the Board found she did and, as discussed below, the evidence
general manager never contacted Claimant. At a subsequent hearing, the general
manager testified that Family Medical Leave was included in the employee handbook
but was not offered.
On December 15, 2000, a claim for unemployment insurance benefits was filed.
On January 25, 2001, the Claims Deputy found that Claimant voluntarily resigned
from her employment without good cause. Claimant appealed the Claims Deputy’s
decision to the Appeals Referee, and a hearing was held on February 20, 2001.
On February 22, 2001, the Appeals Referee found that Claimant’s mother was
ill with dementia and, when she was released from the hospital, Claimant moved her
mother into her home. Claimant intended to provide the 24-hour care needed by her
mother, and Claimant had to leave work.
The Appeals Referee concluded that the motivating reason for Claimant’s
leaving her employment was personal to the Claimant and barred the receipt of
unemployment benefits. Providing for her sick mother was not a reason for leaving
that was inherent in the work or connected with the job itself, such as, a substantial
reduction in hours, wages, or a deviation in the working conditions. Instead, her
mother’s home care was a reason personal to Claimant and, consequently, Claimant
lacked "good cause" to leave her job to permit unemployment benefits. The decision
of the Claims Deputy was affirmed.
Thereafter, Claimant appealed the decision of the Appeals Referee to the Board
on February 25, 2001. The Board’s written decision dated April 12, 2001, affirmed the
decision of the Appeals Referee denying Claimant unemployment benefits. The Board
considered evidence presented to the Appeals Referee as well as before it. Its Summary
of Evidence related:
Claimant was sworn and testified that she was needed to take care of her
mother who was ill, and this interfered with the hours she needed to work
for her job. Before being discharged, claimant tried to do some work for
employer from home. Claimant stated she was not offered Family
Medical Leave (FMLA) although her manager told her to write a letter
regarding her situation. She did not submit this letter because the
manager did not contact her to discuss it.
Kristin Mitchell was sworn and testified that Employer stands upon the
Referee’s record. Mitchell stated that FMLA was not discussed with
claimant.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Board determined:
The Appeals Referee found that [C]laimant voluntarily terminated her
employment for personal reasons, to take care of her mother. A threemember
quorum of the [B]oard considered the Referee’s decision and
record as well as the testimony presented at the Board hearing of March
28, 2001. Following deliberations, two members of the Board, a majority
of the quorum, voted to affirm the Referee, finding that [C]laimant had
quit her employment for personal reasons. One Board member, Mr.
Engle, dissented, finding that [C]laimant’s rights were violated in that she
should have been counseled on and offered Family Medical Leave by the
employer.
This timely appeal was filed on April 16, 2001.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited
appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of
the reviewing court is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the agency’s
decisions. Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66-7 (1965); General
Motors Corp. v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686, 688 (1960). Substantial evidence
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. Oceanport Indus. v.
Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994); Battista v. Chrysler Corp.,
Del. Super., 517 A.2d 295, 297, app. dism., Del. Supr., 515 A.2d 397 (1986). The
appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make
its own factual findings. Johnson, 213 A.2d at 66.2 It merely determines if the evidence
is legally adequate to support the agency’s factual findings. 19 Del. C. _ 3323 (a).
DISCUSSION
In her brief, Claimant stated, "…. [N]o one could have taken the time to discuss
with me a plan or a policy to accommodate me. Such as short term disability, FMLA
or time off. Nothing was offered or discussed." In the hearings below, Claimant
testified that she voluntarily left her employment because she was faced with an
emergency situation and thought that was the best thing to do. As indicated, the
employer knew Claimant’s mother was ill. Claimant needed to take care of her.
Although Family Medical Leave was not discussed, Claimant did not submit a letter as
requested on this subject.
It is unnecessary to remand the case for further factual determinations on
whether Claimant qualified for Family Medical Leave. Claimant is seeking
unemployment compensation. The Family Medical Leave Act provides an eligible
employee from a qualifying work site with up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave for various
reasons, including the care of an immediate family member. It further entitles the
employee to the restoration of her original job or an equivalent upon return from
Family Medical Leave.4 See 29 U.S.C.S. _ 2612. Here, Claimant neither sought unpaid
leave nor restoration to her original job. Moreover, if Claimant had obtained Family
Medical Leave she would not receive unemployment compensation because she would
be employed.
Claimant conceded that she made a personal decision to leave her employment
to care for her ill mother. This Court’s review is limited. Is there evidence before the
Board to support its decision that Claimant is disqualified from unemployment benefits
because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause? Is the Board’s
decision legally correct?
The Court notes that while the Claimant’s mother’s condition would likely qualify as a "serious health
condition" entitling her to leave under FMLA, the Claimant has not indicated that she would be able to
return to work after the 12 week period expired. Failure to return to work upon the expiration of the 12 week
period would have exposed the Claimant to termination by her employer. See Baker v. SPL Polyols, Inc., Del.
Super., C.A. 97A-03-021, Carpenter, J. (Jan. 7, 1998) (noting that "[n]either this Court, nor the laws of this
State, can require more of an employer than to hold a job for an employee for 12 weeks").
19 Del. C. _ 3315 (1) states in pertinent part that "an individual shall be
disqualified for benefits for the week in which the individual left work voluntarily
without good cause attributable to such work…." When a claimant voluntarily quits
employment, the burden falls upon that claimant to establish good cause for leaving
and, thus, her eligibility for unemployment compensation. White v. Security Link, Del.
Super., 658 A.2d 619 (1994). Good cause to leave employment "must be such cause as
would justify one in voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks
of the unemployed" and must be for reasons connected with the employment. Id. at 622.
The burden of proving "good cause" for voluntarily leaving employment and,
therefore, a right to unemployment compensation falls on the claimant. Longobardi v.
Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Super., 287 A.2d 690, 692 (1971).
While this is a difficult decision in light of the trying family circumstances
involved, sympathy cannot influence it. As another Superior Court Judge similarly
noted, "The situation is unfortunate. There are times when people must quit work if
they are to attend to pressing personal matters. But the Court must determine
eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits based on statutory standards.
Good cause to voluntarily terminate under the statute must be attributable to the job."
Ayala v. Delaware Racing Ass’n, Del. Super., C.A. No. 95A-07-009, Quillen, J. (Feb. 26,
1996). In this vein, public policy underlying Unemployment Compensation Law is to
eliminate economic insecurity due to involuntary unemployment. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Dale, Del. Supr., 271 A.2d 35, 36 (1970).
Claimant presented no evidence that she left work for good cause connected with
employment based grounds. To the contrary, she voluntarily left the workplace for a
personal reason, to care for her sick mother. Substantial evidence supported the
Board’s findings that Claimant voluntarily quit, Claimant failed to carry her burden
to show good cause, and correct legal standards were applied in denying unemployment
compensation.
CONCLUSION
Considering the foregoing, the Board’s decision is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
Richard F. Stokes
Judge
cc: Prothonotary
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board