IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY 
HELEN D. MARTIN, ) 
) 
Claimant-Below, Appellant ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ) 
APPEAL BOARD, ) C.A. No. 03A-08-002 RRC 
) 
Appellee ) 
) 
& ) 
) 
PACHULSKI, STANG, ZIEHT, YOUNG ) 
JONES & WEINTRAUB P.C., ) 
) 
Employer-Below, Appellee ) 
) 
Submitted: January 22, 2004 
Decided: February 25, 2004 
UPON APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD. AFFIRMED. 
ORDER 

Upon this 25th day of February, 2004 it appears to the Court that: 

1. Claimant Helen D. Martin ("Martin") has filed a pro se appeal to 
this Court from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board 
(the "UIAB") that had denied, as untimely, an appeal to the UIAB by Martin 
from a decision of the Appeals Referee. The Appeals Referee had affirmed 
the decision of the Division of Unemployment Insurance’s Claims Deputy 
("Claims Deputy"), who had denied Martin’s claim for unemployment 
benefits. 

2. Martin had been employed by the law firm of Pachuski, Stang, 
Ziecht, Young, Jones & Weintraub, P.C. ("Pachuski, Stang") as the 
Managing Supervisor of the File Room from January 2000 until January 
2003, when she resigned. Martin filed a claim for unemployment benefits 
on March 30, 2003, in which she claimed she resigned due to job related 
stress. Pachuski, Stang maintained that Martin voluntarily resigned due to 
"disappointment over [her] most recent salary increase." 
The Claims Deputy denied Martin’s unemployment benefits because 

Martin had not met the burden of proof establishing that she had resigned for 
good cause. The Claims Deputy, relying on 19 Del. C. §3315, ruled that a 
claimant must exhaust all administrative remedies available before resigning 
a position because of work related stress.4 In Martin’s case, the Claims 
Deputy ruled Martin had not exhausted all administrative remedies available 
and that no evidence existed to show a valid work related reason for Martin 
to have resigned and that she had resigned voluntarily for personal reasons.5 

Martin’s appeal to the Appeals Referee was heard on May 14, 2003. 
The Appeals Referee then affirmed the decision of the Claims Deputy. The 
Appeals Referee found that under the totality of the circumstances, Martin 
was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because 
she had voluntarily quit without good cause.6 The decision of the Appeals 
Referee was mailed on May 15. The Referee’s decision noted that the last 
day to file an appeal was May 25. However, May 25 was a Sunday and 
Monday, May 26 was Memorial Day, therefore, the last day to file an appeal 
pursuant to 19 Del. C. §3318(c) was Tuesday, May 27.7 Martin filed her 
appeal of the Referee’s decision to the UIAB on May 29, 2003. 

In its June 18, 2003 decision, the UIAB declined to assume 
jurisdiction of the case because Martin had filed her appeal late pursuant to 
19 Del. C. §3318(c). Subsequently, the UIAB reviewed Martin’s request for 
a rehearing on its decision, which she based on the contention that she did 
not receive the Referee’s decision until May 28, one day after the last day to 
file. The UIAB denied her application for a rehearing by decision issued 
July 17, 2003. This appeal followed. 

3. Martin urges this Court to reverse 1) the UIAB’s original decision 
not to assume jurisdiction because the appeal to it from the decision of the 
Appeals referee was filed late and 2) its decision denying her a rehearing. 
Martin asserts that she did not receive the Appeals Referee’s denial until 
May 28, which was after the last day in which an appeal could be filed. She 
disputes that the Appeals Referee could have held the hearing on May 14 
and then made a decision and mailed it by May 15. She claims that the 
correct deadline for filing an appeal should have been June 2.9 She also 
argues that she should have had notice or a Certificate of Service stating 
when the mailing took place or that she should have been served via certified 
or registered mail. 

(note: Martin is apparently arguing that she had ten business days in which 
to file an appeal. Inexplicably, Martin has identified June 2, 2003 as the 
last day in which to file an appeal.)

The UIAB argues in this Appeal that it did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Martin’s late appeal. The UIAB contends that 19 Del. C. § 3318(c) 
precludes it as a matter of law from accepting a late appeal brought by a 
party. The UIAB argues that its power to consider a late appeal sua sponte 
pursuant to 19 Del. C. §3320 is limited to cases where there has been some 
administrative error on the part of the Department of Labor, or where the 
circumstances are such that in the interests of justice the appeal should be 
heard. The UIAB further argues that it did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Martin’s request for a rehearing because the appeal from the 
Appeals Referee was untimely and there were no administrative errors on 
the part of the Department of Labor to justify the UIAB to hear the appeal 
sua sponte. The employer, Pachuski, Stang, joins the UIAB in arguing that 
Martin failed to file a timely appeal to the UIAB.
 
4. When this Court reviews a procedural decision of the UIAB, which 
in this case is a discretionary decision (as opposed to a factual decision of 
the UIAB that would require a substantial evidence review), the Court must 
consider whether the UIAB abused its discretion in rendering its decision. 
A procedural decision by an administrative agency is not an abuse of 
discretion "unless it is based on clearly unreasonable or capricious grounds" 
or "the Board exceeds the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and 
had ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice." 
Absent an abuse of discretion, the Court must affirm the judgment of the 
UIAB.

6. This Court affirms the UIAB’s decision not to assume jurisdiction 
of her appeal from the Appeals Referee because the appeal was filed late to 
the UIAB pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3318(c). This Court also denies Martin’s 
appeal of the UIAB’s denial of her request for a rehearing of its decision 
because it has been waived by not being argued in either of Martin’s briefs 
on appeal, and because it was within the UIAB’s discretion not to hold a 
rehearing. 14 Section 3318(c) is explicit as to the requirements of filing an 
appeal to the UIAB. Section 3318(c) states 

   an appeals tribunal, after affording the parties reasonable opportunity for a 
   fair hearing, shall affirm, modify or reverse the decision of the deputy . . . 
   [and] [t]he parties shall be duly notified of the tribunal’s decision, together 
   with its reason therefore, which shall be deemed final unless with in 10 
   days after the date of notification or mailing of such decision further 
   appeal is initiated. 

19 Del. C. § 3304 states that "[w]hen any notice, report or other document 
required to be filed under this chapter and the same is forwarded by mail to 
the Department, the day of mailing shall be deemed to be the day of filing." 
The UIAB lacks the power to accept a late appeal from a party because the 
UIAB is a "creature of statute" and the parties are subject to a statutory ten-
day limitation period.

The Supreme Court did recognize in Funk v. UIAB that the UIAB had 
the discretion under 19 Del. C. § 3320 to consider a late appeal sua sponte if 
the situation involved circumstances "severe enough" to require the UIAB to 
exercise its discretion.16 The UIAB had explained in its letter opinion 
denying benefits to the claimant in Funk that it was "extremely cautious in 
assuming jurisdiction [sua sponte when an appeal is filed late] and it does so 
only in those cases where there has been some administrative error on the 
part of the Department of Labor . . . or in those cases where the interests of 
justice would not be served by inaction" and that "such cases are far and few 
between." 

The UIAB had no discretion pursuant to 19 Del. C. §3318(c) to accept 
a late appeal from the Appeals Referee directly from Martin and therefore 
could not have abused its discretion in refusing to assume jurisdiction of her 
appeal. The Appeal Referee’s decision was dated and mailed May 15, 2003. 
Because the deadline, May 25, was a Sunday and May 26 was Memorial 
Day, Martin actually had until May 27 to file her appeal with the UIAB.18 
Section 3318(c) specifies a ten-day time frame without reference to calendar 
days or business days. However, the proceeding section of the statute, § 
3318(b), requires a ten-day time frame based on "calendar days" in which to 
file an appeal after the Claims Deputy’s decision. The logical presumption 
is that § 3318(c) is also based on "calendar days" because the legislature 
would have specified the method of calculation had it been intended to be 
different from § 3318(b). 

Martin has not presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption 
that the UIAB’s decision was mailed on May 15 or that she did not receive it 
before the May 27 deadline to file an appeal. Delaware case law has 
established the legal principle that properly addressed mail is presumed to be 
received by the addressee and mere denial of receipt of the notice is 
insufficient to rebut this presumption.19 This Court finds that it is reasonable 
to expect that mail, properly mailed to the claimant’s correct address, is 
presumed to have been delivered in a timely manner. 

The UIAB also did not abuse its discretion in not hearing the appeal 
sua sponte pursuant to 19 Del. C. §3320 because there was no administrative 
error on the part of the Department of Labor, nor do the circumstances of the 
situation rise to the level "where the interests of justice would not be served" 
if the UIAB did not act on its own.20 Martin has not presented any evidence 
to show that the mailing of the decision of the Appeals Referee was 
defective in any manner. 

7. The Court finds that the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board did not 
abuse its discretion when it declined to assume jurisdiction over Martin’s 
appeal because it was filed late pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3318(c). The Court 
also finds that the UIAB did not abuse its discretion when it declined to act 
sua sponte pursuant to 19 Del. C. §3320 when it found that the 
circumstances of Martin’s case did not rise to the level required for it to act. 
The decision of the UIAB is AFFIRMED. 


IT IS SO ORDERED. 
_____________________________ 
Richard R. Cooch 
oc: Prothonotary 
cc: Helen D. Martin, pro se