IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
IN AND FOR KENT COUNTY 
PHILLIP E. LUKE, ) 
) C.A. No. 03A-07-003 JTV 
Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CHESAPEAKE UTILITIES CORPOR- ) 
ATIONS and UNEMPLOYMENT ) 
INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD, ) 
) 
Appellees. ) 

Submitted: October 4, 2004 
Decided: January 28, 2005 

William A. Denman, Esq., Parkowski, Guerke & Swayze, Dover, Delaware. 
Attorney for Appellee Chesapeake Utilities. 
Phillip E. Luke, Dover, Delaware. Pro se. 
Upon Consideration of Appellant’s Appeal From 
Decision of Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board 

AFFIRMED 

VAUGHN, President Judge

Luke v. Chesapeake Utilities, et al. 
C.A. No. 03A-07-003 JTV 
January 28, 2005 
 
ORDER 

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record of the case, it appears 
that: 

1. Phillip E. Luke (“the appellant”) is appealing a decision of the 
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (“the Board”) which denied him 
unemployment insurance benefits. The appellant began employment at Chesapeake 
Utilities Corporation (“the employer”) on May 6, 2002. In early February of 2003, 
the appellant was placed on suspension pending an investigation of discrepancies in 
his cash drawer. Based on the results of the employer’s investigation, the appellant 
was officially discharged. On March 7, 2003, the Claims Deputy determined that the 
appellant was eligible for benefits based on a finding that the employer did not prove 
willful and wanton misconduct. The employer appealed this decision and a hearing 
was held before the Appeals Referee on April 16, 2003. The Referee affirmed the 
decision of the Claims Deputy primarily because of the lack of evidence presented by 
the employer to substantiate the allegations that the appellant was misappropriating 
funds. The employer appealed and on June 04, 2003 a hearing was held before the 
Board. 

2. While the appeal process was ongoing, Beth Cooper, Director of Audits 
for the employer, performed an internal audit of the appellant’s transactions dating 
back six months. Ms. Cooper testified before the Board on behalf of the employer 
and discussed the internal audit she conducted. The audit revealed several instances 
where there were discrepancies in the appellant’s cash drawer and Ms. Cooper 
concluded that the appellant had been “lapping” payments he received. “Lapping”
is a system by which an employee receives a payment from a customer and, rather 
than crediting that payment to the appropriate account, the payment is credited to 
multiple accounts of other customers in smaller amounts while the employee retains 
the rest. This requires an employee to keep track of accounts that should have been 
credited and to later credit other payments to that account before it becomes 
delinquent. The audit revealed the appellant had been “lapping” payments as far back 
as six months and, during her testimony, Ms. Cooper submitted a report to the Board 
detailing the loss of funds. The Board issued a decision reversing the Referee and 
denying benefits. 

3. The limited function of this Court in reviewing an appeal from the 
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is to determine whether the Board’s decision 
is supported by substantial evidence.1 Substantial evidence means such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.2 
The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, 
or make its own factual findings.3 In other words, the Board, not the court, 
determines the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and 
the inferences to be drawn therefrom.4 The court merely determines if the evidence
is legally adequate to support the agency’s factual findings.5 Therefore, if there is 
substantial evidence for the Board’s decision, the decision will be affirmed. 

4. Title 19 Del. C. § 3315(2) provides the standard for determining eligibility 
for unemployment benefits. “An individual shall be disqualified for benefits . . . if 
the individual was discharged from the individual’s work for just cause . . . .”6 In a 
discharge case, the employer has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the claimant was terminated for just cause. A “preponderance of the 
evidence” is defined to mean “the side on which the greater weight of evidence is 
found.”7 Just cause is defined as a “willful or wanton act or pattern of conduct in 
violation of the employer’s interest, the employee’s duties, or the employee’s 
expected standard of conduct.”8 Misappropriation of funds amounts to willful or 
wanton conduct and is sufficient just cause for discharge.9 

5. The appellant’s Opening Brief and Reply Brief essentially argue the reasons 
why he believes he was falsely accused of taking money from his employer. He 
discusses a problem with the company computers resulting from a common password 
for multiple computers which allows any employee to access any computer. This 
issue was before the Board and the employer presented evidence showing that each
employee was required to initial the receipts on deposits they received. The 
appellant’s initials were on the receipt for the deposit that was misapplied. Based on 
the testimony and documentation presented, the Board determined there was 
sufficient evidence to discharge the appellant despite the password problem. 

6. The appellant argues several other theories as to why there may have been 
a discrepancy in his cash drawer, including information concerning another 
employee’s discharge for similar reasons. The appellant, however, was entitled to 
present this evidence and any witnesses who would testify on his behalf at the hearing 
before the Referee and at the hearing before the Board. This Court’s role is limited 
to review of the record and any consideration of new evidence would be inappropriate 
as it is not the role of this Court to make factual findings. 

7. The Referee did not find willful or wanton conduct on the part of the 
appellant, but he did not have the benefit of information relating to the internal audit 
or the testimony of Ms. Cooper. Based upon the presentation of this evidence and the 
information already in the record, the Board determined that the appellant had 
misappropriated funds. The Board’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. 

8. Therefore, the decision of the Board is affirmed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
President Judge 
oc: Prothonotary 
cc: Order Distribution 
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