SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
RICHARD R. COOCH NEW CASTLE COUNTY COURT HOUSE
RESIDENT JUDGE 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 10400
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801
(302) 255-0664
Robin C. Kondzielawa
11 Allandale Drive, Apt. L19
Newark, Delaware 19713
David J. Ferry, Esquire
Jason C. Powell, Esquire
Rick S. Miller, Esquire
Ferry, Joseph & Pearce, P.A.
824 N. Market Street , Suite 904
P.O. Box 1351
Wilmington, Delaware 19899
Stephani J. Ballard, Esquire
Deputy Attorney General
Carvel State Office Building
820 N. French Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Re: Robin C. Kondzielawa v. Ferry, Joseph & Pearce, P.A. et al.
and Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
C.A. No. 02A-09-011 RRC
Submitted: May 1, 2003
Decided: June 6, 2003
Upon Appeal From a Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals
Board. AFFIRMED.
Dear Ms. Kondzielawa and Counsel:
Robin C. Kondzielawa ("Claimant") applied for unemployment
compensation benefits following her separation from employment with
Ferry, Joseph & Pearce, P.A. ("Employer"). Claimant’s application was
denied at all administrative levels on the ground that Claimant had
voluntarily resigned, i.e., quit her employment, without good cause
attributable to her employment, pursuant to title 19, section 3315(1) of the
Delaware Code. Following the adverse decision by the Unemployment
Insurance Appeal Board ("the Board"), Claimant filed a pro se appeal in this
Court. For the reasons below, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In affirming the Appeals Referee’s decision, the Board adopted the
factual findings that the referee had made; accordingly, this Court will
review also the Appeals Referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Furthermore, upon appeal from a denial of unemployment insurance
benefits, this Court is limited to consideration of the record that was before
the Board.
The Court therefore begins by restating the factual findings made by
the Appeals Referee, substantially in their entirety:
The [C]laimant was employed as a legal assistant...from June
2000 until May 8, 2002 when she resigned from her employment. The
[C]laimant...[w]as a full-time employee.
The [C]laimant had been on a medical leave for three and one-half
weeks because of a medical condition. The [C]laimant returned to work
on May 8 although she was nervous and panicky with stress because she
had to face catching up to her work. The [C]laimant also had concerns
about hemorrhaging because of lifting that needed to be done in the office.
The [C]laimant had been under the care of her physician...as well
as her gynecologist.... The [C]laimant did not submit any medical
documentation to suggest that she was advised to leave her job for reasons
of health.
The [C]laimant became emotional at approximately 7:30 a.m. in
her office on May 8. The [C]laimant obtained her personal belongings
and walked down the hall, went out the reception area and left...the
office....
The [C]laimant had [previously] considered quitting her
job....Although the [C]laimant had given the impression she needed a day
or two to get back into the mode of working again [after returning on May
8, 2002], the [C]laimant never returned to work [after that day]. The
[E]mployer sent the [C]laimant a confirmation of her resignation on May
8, 2002.
The [C]laimant had been previously counseled [by members of
Employer’s firm]...about conduct in the office. There had been
continuing work available for the [C]laimant at the time she resigned.4
On appeal from the Appeals Referee’s decision denying Claimant’s
application for unemployment insurance benefits, the Board declined to hold
a further evidentiary hearing. The Board did however consider the evidence
presented to the Appeals Referee, as well as the referee’s decision, before
finding as follows:
The appeal is without merit because the issue on appeal (whether
[C]laimant voluntarily quit her employment) is factual and the [Appeals]
Referee’s findings of fact in this regard are supported by substantial
evidence. It is undisputed that [C]laimant became angry and upset on the
morning of May 8, 2002,grabbed her things, walked off the job[,] and
never returned. While [C]laimant was under medical care for various
problems, there was no evidence that [C]laimant was medically advised to
quit her job at that time. There was continuing work available for
4 R. at 0010.
[C]laimant at the time she left. The Board adopts the [Appeals] Referee’s
findings of fact herein.
The appeal is also without merit as the [Appeals] Referee’s
decision is controlled by settled Delaware law and is free from errors of
law. The Appeals Referee concluded that [C]laimant voluntarily left her
work without good cause attributable to the work, failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies, and is disqualified from the receipt of benefits.
The law in this area is well settled: a [c]laimant who voluntarily leaves
employment must exhaust his or her administrative remedies before
quitting. Even if [C]laimant was having medical problems or felt that the
stress of the office was too much for her, the [Appeals] Referee correctly
held that [C]laimant did not avail herself of any administrative remedies in
this regard; rather, she simply walked off the job. The [Appeals] Referee
correctly held that, under the circumstances, [C]laimant was disqualified
from the receipt of benefits.
Both the Appeals Referee and the Board therefore found that Claimant was
not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left
work without good cause attributable to that work. This appeal followed.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Claimant now urges this Court to reverse the Board so that she may be
awarded unemployment insurance benefits. Claimant has submitted an
eight-page Opening Brief that is partially typed and partially handwritten
and a thirteen-page Reply Brief entirely handwritten in support thereof. The
Opening Brief has numerous attachments that this Court will not now
consider, as they were apparently not produced at the hearing below.6
Claimant asserts that she is entitled to unemployment insurance
benefits because she was "forced to quit her job due to [a] unhealthy
working environment" and cites Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v.
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board8 to support that supposition.
Claimant asserts that Employer knew that Claimant’s work environment
"aggravated" Claimant’s pre-existing mental and physical illnesses, and she
cites O’Neal’s Bus Service, Inc. v. Employment Security Commission9 and
White v. Security Link10 in support of her argument that this establishes
good cause for her resignation. Lastly, Claimant cites two cases from
outside of this jurisdiction, Hinds v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review11 and Mauro v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,12 to
further support her argument that her voluntary resignation was made for
good cause.
In response, Employer contends that the Board’s decision was free of
legal error and was supported by substantial evidence. Employer posits that
those parts of the record indicating that Claimant left work without good
cause, i.e., she walked out on May 8, 2002 with no intention of coming back
and without trying to resolve any differences with Employer, are
"uncontradicted." Employer alternatively contends that even if Claimant
can show good cause for her voluntary termination, "she failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies." Lastly, Employer suggests that Claimant’s
legal authorities are "unpersuasive and distinguishable." Employer
therefore urges the Court to affirm the Board’s ruling.
DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the
limited appellate review of factual findings of an administrative agency; the
function of the reviewing court is to determine whether substantial evidence
supports the agency’s decision.16 Substantial evidence means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. On appeal, the court does not weigh the evidence, determine
questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. The reviewing
court merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the
agency’s factual findings. If substantial evidence exists and the Board
made no error of law, its decision must be affirmed.
Pursuant to title 19, section 3315 of the Delaware Code, a claimant is
disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits "[f]or the
week in which the individual left work voluntarily without good cause
attributable to such work and for each week thereafter...." Good cause has
been defined as "such cause as would justify one in voluntarily leaving the
ranks of the employed...." The burden to show good cause is on the
claimant. Additionally, a claimant "must do something akin to
exhausting...administrative remedies by, for example, seeking to have the
situation corrected by proper notice to...[the] employer."
Here, Claimant voluntarily left work on the day immediately
following her return from a three and one-half week medical leave of
absence. Although the record reflects that Claimant did so because of
anxiety that was largely the result of the backlog of work awaiting her, the
record also reflects that Claimant did not return following her early-morning
departure, and she did not attempt to reconcile her anxiety and escalated
workload with Employer before (or after) her abrupt departure that day.
Claimant has therefore failed to meet her burden of showing good cause for
leaving in connection with her employment situation.
Furthermore, the case law cited by Claimant is either distinguishable
or nonpersuasive, and therefore does not aid Claimant in her efforts to secure
unemployment insurance benefits. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. is an
unemployment insurance benefits case having to do with "just cause" for
employee discharge under section 3315(2), and therefore does not apply
here. The Security Link case largely involved accommodation of routine
parental obligations and is therefore also inapposite here. The Pennsylvania
cases Claimant cites appear to be decided under a different standard than is
embodied by section 3315(1) and are therefore nonpersuasive, not to
mention that both cases center upon the efforts the claimants therein made to
resolve their difference with their employers at the time of separation, and
thus are "exhaustion" of administrative-type remedy cases, and are
distinguishable from the facts here. And the O’Neal’s Bus Service, Inc.
case, although involving the factual establishment of good cause therein,
actually supports Employer’s contentions under the facts of this case, as
established at the proceedings below.
It may well be that Claimant’s concerns with her work conditions vis-
à-vis Claimant’s health problems were serious. However, as recognized by
the O’Neal’s Court, "an employee does not have good cause to quit merely
because there is an undesirable or unsafe situation connected with...[the]
employment."24 On the record presently before this Court, it is clear that
Claimant made no effort to resolve her concerns with Employer.
As has been stated in at least one treatise, "[g]ood faith is an essential
element of good cause[ ]";25 Claimant has failed to show on this record that
good faith which would be required under the circumstances, and the Board
did not err when it found that Claimant had not legally established that her
voluntary departure on May 8, 2002 was for good cause for reasons having
to do with her work.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the Board’s
decision. The Board otherwise committed no error of law. The decision of
the Board is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
oc: Prothonotary